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· Introduction 
As the concept of peacekeeping continues to evolve as a pragmatic solution to 
conflict resolution, another term - peacemaking - requires equal consideration. 
Peacemaking is a form of conflict resolution that focuses on establishing equal power 
relationships that will be robust enough to forestall future conflict, and establishing 
some means of agreeing on ethical decisions within a community that has previously 
had conflict. Whereas peacekeeping is a notion that rose to importance when it became 
part of the Charter provisions relating to the maintenance of international peace and 
security, peacemaking is a term that is yet to reach popular appeal but nonetheless 
conveys some important ideas. Whereas the term peacekeeping is used to describe a 
way. of helping countries tom by conflict create conditions for sustainable peace, 
1 
peacemaking is a means of bringing about peace through a willful effort to prevent or 
mitigate conflict rather than a passive stance that hopes to maintain the status quo.
2 
This research aims to provide an overview of the primary documentation of those 
political organs relating to the history, structure, and laws of international peacekeeping. 
But its purpose is to show through an analysis of these laws and histories that the costs 
and benefits of keeping peace in a particular region call upon peacemaking operations. 
The focus of this research is southern Thailand with the idea that such a study will help 
bring back the security, stability of the region and will support the reconstruction, 
development and integration of the varying differences while keeping in mind some of 
the contemporary challenges of globalization. 
1 Meeting New Challenges, United Nations Peacekeeping, available at 
http://www.un.org 
2 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, G.&C. Merriam Company, Springfield, MA 1965. 
1 
Although throughout its long history, Thailand has undergone many significant 
changes -, abolishing the system of slavery, transitioning from an absolute monarchy to a 
democratic regime, neutralizing the challenge for the Communist Party of Thailand in the 
early 1980s. -- these major transitions, the conduct and resolution of Thailand's external 
and internal affairs, happened without a major political revolution.3 Whether as a result 
or a cause of this, the Thai people have been 'often characterized as peaceful, typically 
seeking to resolve conflict through means other than extreme forms of violence. 
The violent attacks in southern Thailand in 2004 are, however, an example of 
serious internal conflicts that pose a great challenge to the current Thai Government. Yet 
they are not conflicts that, I believe, should lead to broad, full-scale structural change but 
rather imp-octant changes in laws, policies and attitudes that this thesis will hope to 
explore in analyzing the various aspects of the cultural, racial, economic and ideological 
conflicts. 
In the first chapter, I hope to look at the history and background of those cultural 
groups in conflict in Southern Thailand. In order to understand where the difficulties 
stand at the present moment, it is crucial to understand how those problems are rooted in 
the past. Because this region used to be prosperous and used to be the center of the old 
Empire, the religious, linguistic cultural and economic landscape is distinctly different 
from the rest of the country. The primarily Muslim population of Southern Thailand 
inhabits a world where the vestiges of the old regime are very much alive. Part of the 
challenge for modem Thai Government is to incorporate and balance the various regional 
concerns with the demands of a centralized state. As an example of these old conflicts, 
Pattani once paid tribute to Siam, and this gift was taken by the Siam Government as a 
3 LikitTeeravakin, Political-Revolution in Thailand 2, Thammasat Press 2003 (1990)_ 
2 
sign of respect for the law. However, Pattani did not consider the gift to be a concession 
to the government's legal power but merely a gift that had no other meaning. When the 
Thai Government declared that scarves (traditionally a Muslim adornment) could not be 
worn, there was a great furor over the way in which the centralized government did not 
respect or accommodate Muslim cultural and religious mores. This type of policy that has 
been culturally insensitive to Thailand's diverse populations has contributed to the 
potential for violence and this thesis hopes to explore the possibility of new policies 
based on greater cultural, historical and economic understanding of this region (Pattani) 
so as to analyze the problems that have occurred during and since 2004. 
In the second chapter, I will explore the particular tactics and strategies of 
violence that have characterized these moments of dissent. It is important: not only to 
consider the forms of violence (how acts of violence were committed) but the pattern of 
violence. Without scholarship on this topic, these patterns will doom Thailand to an 
ongoing and unresolved internal battle that can only escalate without a reconsideration of 
contemporary policy. Furthermore, there can be no attempt to resolve these violent 
outbursts without first considering how those eruptions of violence are deeply rooted in 
economic disparities, the historically high crime rate and the long-standing history of 
d~scrimination against Muslims in this area. To attempt to resolve the violence without 
considering the economic and religious context would only to looking at the symptom 
without considering the disease. This chapter will examine, therefore, the forms of 
violence that erupted in 2004 and attempt to put those acts in context of the region's 
troubled economic, religious and cultural climate. The Thai Government cannot have a 
3 
successful policy if there is only an attempt to fix the chronic problems without taking 
into account where those problems came from. 
Chapter Three will explore whether the violence in Southern Thailand is related to 
the terrorist acts in this era or not. I will look at the application of Thai and international 
laws to such acts of violence, how the Thai Government responds to these acts, and the 
problems in the use of the term encountered by the United Nations. 
Chapter Four will examine the question of whether Thailand's domestic laws 
regarding the operation of Thai Security Forces defies international agreements of armed 
conflict, humanitarian laws, and human rights law. This thesis will examine where there 
are inconsistencies in order to consider ways of reconciling those differences between 
Thailand's military laws and international agreements. 
Chapter Five will suggest ways of resolving the problems by considering various 
issues including legal battles, security issues, domestic policies, international relations, 
cultural conflicts, and educational concerns. Further, the purpose of such a study is to 
find the most appropriate approaches that respond to complex circumstances that 
characterize this region's strife. The causes of the violent acts that have taken place in 
Southern Thailand are composed of many factors and it is impossible to attempt to solve 
such complex problems without consideration of these various elements. I will then look 
at both long term and short term solutions. 
This study is an attempt to understand the structure, nature and extent of related 
public acts of violence in Thailand and the policies, laws and issues that have contributed 
to the ongoing problems. It is my hope that through this research, there will be a greater 
4 
sense of what might be done to attain justice and peace while maintaining a faith in the 
basic concept of Human Rights .. 
5 
~ CHAPTER I l 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
1- 1 Introduction 
The Kingdom of Thailand ("Thailand") is the only Southeast Asian country that 
the European powers were unsuccessful in their combined and separate attempts to 
subjugate and colonize. Thailand is located on the Southeast Asian Peninsula, 
4 
and 
covers an area of 513,115 square kilometers (198,062.39 square miles). Archaeological 
recently discoveries made this century support us 'logical ideas to believe that -the 
northeastern regionS of Thailand was actually one of the first cradles of civilizations in 
Southeast Asia.6 The country was known as "Muang Thai" and interchangeably as 
"Siam" until May 11, 1939, when its official name, "Thailand," was adopted. The word 
"Thai" means "free"; thus, "Thailand" means "Land of the Free.,,7 Thailand as a 
Kingdom is a constitutional monarchy with the King as a sovereign Head of State. The 
Government exercises power under the law and the Constitution is based on democratic 
principles (i.e., the King rules the country through the National Assembly, the Council of 
4 Pre-History, Suvarnabhumi, Land of Gold, The Siam-Thai Millennia Book, Nation Multimedia Group 19-
20,2000. 
[S)outhest Asia is referred to as Suvarnabhumi or the "Land of Gold: The remains of Homo Erectus found in 
Java prove that this region has been occupied by humans since the Pleistocene period (two million to 
~ o~,ooo. years a~~) when islands in the South China Sea including those now part of Malaysia and 
~ onhesta, were Jotned to the mainland. Other evidence indicates that there were permanent settlements in 




See Pre-History, Suvarnabhumi, Land of Gold, cited in note 4 supra, at p.11. 
7 H htt . tstorical Background, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Thailand, available at 
P.WWW.mfa.go.th/web/14.php. (last visited Feb.14, 2006). 
6 
Ministers and the Courts of law In accordance with the provIsIOns of the Thai 
• . ) 89 ConstltutIOn . 
The country comprises 76 provinces, and has a population of approximately 64 
million, of which 75 percent are ethnic Thai, 14 percent Chinese, 3 percent Malay and 
other ethnic minorities (such as Mons, Khmers, Karens, Kachins, and various hill tribes). 
The Thais are not a "pure" race; they are descended from people of many different ethnic 
backgrounds, 10 and the people of modem Thailand are as varied as those in any nation. 
They are of all shapes and sizes, complexions, and statures. Their professions vary widely 
-as-well: farmers and computer programmers, soldiers and bus drivers, merchants and 
students, princesses and monks. But virtually all of those who would call themselves first 
and foremost "Thai," would define" Thai" as primarily political. In other words, the Thai 
are "Thai" because they are citizens of Thailand, subjects of the Thai monarch. The 
8 Constitutional of Royal Kingdom of Thailand B.E.2550 (2007), the National Legislative Assembly's Version 
[hereinafter Thai Constitutional B.E.2550], sec. 3 
[T]he sovereign power belongs to the Thai people. The King as Head of the State shall exercise such power 
through the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers and the Courts in accordance with the provisions of 
this Constitution. The performance of duties of the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers, the Courts, 
and the constitutional organs as well as State agencies shall be under the Rule of Law, available at 
http://www.senate.go.th/pdflConstitution2007.pdf (last visited Aug.1, 2007); 
Constitutional of Royal Kingdom of Thailand (Interim Edition) B.E.2549 (2006), the National Legislative 
Assembly's Version [hereinafter Thai Constitutional B.E.2549], sec. 2 
[T]he sovereign power emanates from the Thai people. The King who is Head of State exercises such power 
thro~gh the National Legislative Assembly, the Council of Ministers and the Courts in conformity with the 
proVisions of this Constitution, available at http://www.senate.go.th/pdf/const.pdf (last visited Nov.1, 2006); 
See. also the Constitutional of Royal Kingdom of Thailand B.E.2540 (1997), Office of the Council of State, 
Tha~land version [hereinafter Thai Constitutional B.E.2540j, sec. 3 [T]he sovereign power belongs to the 
Thai p~ople. The King as Head of the State shall exercise such power through the National Assembly. the 
Council of Ministers and the Courts in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. 
9
U 
~avit .K.Wyatt, The Politics of Reform In Thailand: Education in the Reign of King Chulalongkorn 1, Yale 
OIverslty Press 1969. 
~he first major Thai Kingdom was founded at the town of Sukhothai on the northen edge of the great 
~~tra: :Iain Of. the Chaophraya River system, in the first quarter of the thirteenth century. The political and 
the ~~~ oundatlons of Su~hothai established by its great rulers, from King Ram Khamhaeng at the end of 
I eenth century to King Lu Thai at the middle of the fourteenth. 
10 
See Pre-History, Suvarnabhumi, Land of Gold, cited in note 4 supra, at p.11. 
7 
social, cultural and linguistic components of Thai identity each has its own rich history 
and although such an analysis goes well beyond the scope of this study, what is important 
to keep in mind is that the Thai people share a common linguistic and cultural identity 
that historically has become differentiated into a large number of separate but related 
'd .' 11 I entitles. 
The Thai Constitution recognizes the right of the people to enjoy freedom of 
religion. Thus, Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and other faiths are represented 
throughout the Kingdom. Buddhism is the official main religion and can be considered 
the national religion of Thailand (roughly 94.6 percent of the populations are Buddhists). 
4 percent of the population is Muslim, the second most popular faith, which is 
concentrated in the southern part of the country and constitutes a strong majority there. 
Finally 0.7 percent are Christian, and 0.1 percent embrace other faiths. 12 
Over many centuries "Thai," as term that denotes both a civilization and a marker 
of cultural identity, has evolved out of the ongoing interaction between Tai13 and 
indigenous and immigrant cultures. 14 The Thai people have lived with generally peaceful 
relations within the varying cultures and politics without great political turmoil or 
irreconcilable ethical dilemmas. 
11 0 'd 
aVI K. Wyatt, Thailand A Short History (2nd edition), University Press 2003. 
12 
htt ~oPulation and Housing Cencus 2000, National Statistial Office Available at 
p.lweb.nso.go.th/pop2000ftables htm, (last visited Oct. 1, 2006). 
13 
A term used to denote the various Tai peoples in general. 
14 
See D. K. Wyatt cited in Note 11 supra .. 
8 
Since 2004, Thailand has encountered sporadic bursts of internal violence in the 
southern part of the country. The South includes the provinces of Pattani, Yala, 15 
Naratiwat,16 and Songkhlal7 where violent activities have caused the death toll to top 
3,000 in recent years. The attacks generally have occurred without warning, and are often 
vicious and indiscriminate. The victims have included civilians, monks, and ethnic Thai 
and Muslim government officials. On January 4, 2004, a group of Islamic militants stole 
a cache of weapons and killed four soldiers in Narathiwat. On April ?8, 2004, the Thai 
army captured more than one hundred of the suspected terrorists at Krue Se mosque in 
Pattani. On October 25, 2004, after a protest turned violent, hundreds of protestors were 
arrested, and approximately eighty died after being crammed into army trucks. Even now 
the newspapers continue to report killings on a daily basis. The Government's efforts to· 
enhance security by placing four provinces--Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Songkhla--
under martiallawl8 has resulted in further unending chaos. 
The Government is not only concerned about the terrorist movement, but also 
keeps a wary eye on the separatist movement. Although separatism and terrorism might 
seem related in that terrorist activities perpetrated by individuals who desire to forge a 
separate state, historical accounts show no actual or necessary connection between the 
15 . 
Yala proVinces is the southernmost province of Thailand. It has an area of 4,521 square kilometers 
(1745.1. square miles )and is 1,083 kilometers (672.97 miles) from Bangkok. Its border is connected to 
MalaYSIa (Perak and Kedah State) but it used to be part of Pattani Region. 
16 Na.rathiwat province which borders on Malaysia is the southemmost province of Thailand. In fact 
Na~athlwat province was part of the Pattani Region until the Government made it a separate province in the 
period of King Rama V. 
17 
S Songkhla province is a border province in southern Thailand, adjoining the State of Kedah in Malaysia. 
~Ing)khfla covers an area of 7,393.9 square kilometers ( 2854 square miles). It is 950 kilometers (~9().32 




Situ ~~ law was superseded by the Thai Emergency Decree on Public Administration in Emergency 
a 10~, B.E.2548(2005). 
9 
separatist movement and international terrorism. Recent events, however, like the arrest 
of Riduan Isamuddin, an Indonesian who goes by the alias, Hambali, could force the 
Government to re-consider whether there might be an international or transboundary 
connection. Isamuddin was suspected of being the operations chief for Jemaah Islamiah 
(JI), a group allegedly linked to Al Qaeda and blamed for the recent Bali bombing and 
. other attacks. Isamuddin was captured in the ancient temple city of Ayutthaya on August 
11, 2003 during a raid on an apartment building after a tip-off by an unnamed 
19 
Government agent. 
This dissertation will analyze the political and cultural issues involved and 
propose a peaceful resolution to the problems that have been ongoing in Southern 
Thailand. As ethical and religious conflicts are pressing contemporary issues, I will 
discuss these problems by first contextualizing them and situating the challenges in this 
region within the historical background. The purpose of such a study is to find the most 
. appropriate laws that respond to complex circumstances that characterize this region's 
strife. Additionally, I will analyze the other factors in conjunction with particular 
incidents to find the best approach to workable legal, social solutions and policies. In 
other words, my purpose is to find the most appropriate domestic, international law and 
military operations for a set of complex circumstances in other chapters. The following 
section introduces the province of Pattani and its history. 
19 
htt ."Terror suspect Hambali quizzed BBC NEWS (Aug 15 2003) available at 




Pattani (or "Patani" in the Malay spelling) is a small province that is located on 
the east coast of Thailand. It has been know as an autonomous region for hundreds of 
years. Pattani, with an area of 1,377 square kilometers (532.52 square miles), is 
approximately 1,055 kilometers (655.57 miles) from Bangkok. Many millennia ago, 
Pattani as an Empire included part of present-day Yala and Narathiwat provinces, which 
had long been dissociated from Pattani to become autonomous provinces in their own 
right. Pattani has a rich and diverse culture, its own indigenous regional customs, and is 
known for extensive golden ~eaches along its portion of the Gulf in Southern Thailand. 
Pattani region also has considerable natural resources such as rubber, coconuts 
and sea fauna; much of the marine fauna is used as food. However, despite its ideal 
location and cultural success, violence has been an ongoing problem in Pattani for as long 
as 500 years. In fact, Pattani unsuccessfully revolted several times against Ayutthaya
20 
and Bangkok under the modern Thai Rattanakosin Kingdom. 21 To understand how and 
why Pattani has become the focus of conflict, and to resolve such problems, one must 
take into account the history and perspectives of the southern region, its cultural 
evolution, and be mindful of events and personalities from the past. We shall now tum to 
this task, beginning with the history of Pattani. Time constraint implies that an in-depth 
:f ~e ~~ngdOm of Ayutth~ya was officially founded in 1350 by King Ramathibodi (u----l=Aong). The Kingdom 
pow!~' a;:~' whose. capital was also called "Ayutthaya", expatlded its territory and became the dominant 
. In sla. The Kingdom of Ayutthaya had existed for 417 years until it was sacked by Burmese in 1767. 
21 Rattanakosin Kingd . .' . was fou d d . o~ was estabhshed by King Rama I In 1782, founder of the Chakn Dynasty. Bangkok 
nine Thai~' as Its capital a~d remains the capital city of Thailand today. The Chakri dynasty has crowned 
Ings, who have reigned without interruption for over 200 years. 
11 
study of history would be beyond the scope of this dissertation. I shall, therefore, provide 
a brief outline and references for anyone desiring to pursue a more thorough historical 
study of Pattani. 
B. Historical Perspectives 
The history of the Pattani region is related respectively to the circumstances of 
indigenous Malays in the Southern Peninsula and the Empire of Lankasuka. The 
Kingdom of Pattani was founded in the early second century A.D. Legend has it that 
Pattani probably rivaled Kedah as being the oldest ethnic Malay States on the 
Peninsula.22 Historical documents show varying descriptions 'of Pattani, many of which 
seem appropriate to reproduce in extracts below. 
22 
1. The Arab Account: 
.... 
Lankasuka was located on some latitude intermediate between 
Kelantan and Singora. The position of Lankasuka most nearly 
consonant with the exigencies is the vicinity of Patani. 23 
The end of Lank k th . http://www s b' .asu a, e nse and fall of Malay Kingdom at Patani, available at 
, . a nzalO.demon.co.uklmalaya/kedah3:ntm. (last visited Mar. 14, 2006). 
23 
.. Paul Wheatley Th G I 
befOre A.D.1500 258 e U ~ den. Khersonese studies in the Historical Geography of the Malay Peninsula 
.. ' nlverslty of Malaya Press 1966 (1961). 
12 
2. The Chinese Map: 
Lankasuka (Lang hsi chia) is placed uncomprisingly to the south 
of Songkla (Singora). Its southern boundary appears to be a 
river with the name (in Amoy Hokkien) of Kun-ha-ti. It is 
difficult to suggest any modern place - name corresponding to 
this, but is clearly in the position of the Patani River. N 
3. The Chinese Record: 
Langkasuka ... was well known in China as a religious centre, 
and in the later seventh century several Buddhist monks 
specifically made voyages there ..... these small states could 
conduct diplomatic affairs with the aplomb of their 
neighbor ... By the ~ixth century Lankasuka in the Patani region 
was sending envoys to the Chinese Emperor. 25 
4. Malay Folklore: 
Langkasuka has passed into Malay folklore as a west- coast 
kingdom the predecessor of modern Kedah, though the evident 
association of it~ rulers with Patani beyond and the hills and 
forest may not be without significance. 26 
24 Ibid. 
25 
Barbara Watson Andaya & L d Y A . . . . 1987(1982). -Bonar . ndaya, A History of Malaysia 21, Macmillan Education Ltd. 
26 
See P. Wheatley, cited in note 23 supra, at p.262 
13 
5. The Tltai Alphabetical Order, tire Royal Institute, the Royal 
Academy stated: 
... the position of Lankasuka and Pattani were located at the 
same latitude ... 27 
. Dr. Paul Wheatlel8 believed that Lankasuka was an important Kingdom during 
the fifteen century and was situated in the vicnity of modem Pattani.
29 
Meanwhile, the 
history of Pattani indicates that Pattani was settled during the Empire of Langkasuka in 
the seventh century. This is similar to the Chinese report.
30 
The historical evidence found 
in anvient documents is supported by archeological surveys of limestone hill formations 
from Tham Din Cavern, which provide evidence substantiating a history of Pattani dating 
. back three and a half millennia.
31 
27 Anand Wattananikorn, History of Lankasuka and Pattani 13, Mitr - Siam 1988. 
2B C't d' I e In note 23, supra. 
([he] author was a specialist on comparative urbanism and historical urban geography and long-time 
profess?r and chairman of the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago. Or.Paul Wheatley 
sef':'ed In the Royal Air Force during World War II. He was best known for his works on Asia, which explored 
soel~1 rela~ions and developments related to ecological settings and comparative urbanism. An early work 
published I~ 1961, The Golden Khersonese, focused on historical, social, and ecological development in the 
Malay Pemnsula and drew heavily on primary source materials in Latin Greek Chinese Arabic and South 
and S th . ' , ' , d ou ea~t AsIan languages. The first draft of this work on Southeast Asia was also submitted as his 
oetoral thesIs at the University of London, awarded in 1958. 
29 
~ee P. Wheatley, cited in note 23 supra, at p. 265. 
30 Ibid. at p. 263. 
31 
The archaeotogical t d' . Universit Pa t. s u les. In South Thailand, a Fulbright-sponsored project at the Prince of Songkhla 
religious y, afl~ surveyed In the areas near Pattani on the coast, investigation of the Yarang ancient 
http:/wwwcomPlex Inland on the coastal plain, and an intensive field survey of an interior region, available at 
.uoregon.edu/-wsayresrrhaiiand.html(last visited Mar. 15, 2006). 
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The first settlement of people to inhabit the Malay Peninsula
32 
was of a primitive 
tribe after which came the Hindus from India and those who migrated from Siam; these 
groupS were followed by the indigenous Malay ethnic group.33 Ethnographers and 
archeologists, respectively, stated that the Thai and Malay races originated from the same 
racial stock and geographical area.34 In other words, the people ofPattani were aboriginal 
Malay and were indistinguishable from the ethnic Thai group.35 
c. The Prosperity and Decline of Pattani 
1. The beginning of Pattani 
After the Empire of Langkasuka collapsed, leaving only a legendary name to 
peasant mythology,36 archaeological evidence suggests that Pattani continued to thrive. 
Though there is no clear and precise evidence about the origins of Pattani, 37 certain 
references can be found on record: 
32 See Pre-History, Suvarnabhumi, Land of Gold, cited in note 4 supra, at p.1 p. 
{M]any tales in the Jatika(including "Mahajanaka" recently rewritten in Thai and English by HM King) tell of 
voy~ges made Suvarnabhumi which is described as a prosperous land with which people form many races 
aspired to trade. 
~3 Ibrahi~ S.yukri, History of The Malay Kingdom of Patani: Sejarah Kerajaan Melayu 4, (Conner Baailey & 
John N.MlksIC., trans., Silkworm Books Publisher 2005) (1985). 
34 
See P. Wheatley, cited in note 23 supra, at p. 265. 
35 S· N M n uryanti, The landscape of Intellectuals' Thought: Pattani Identity and the Emergence of a Resistance 
R~:ment <?enter for Political and regional Studies(L1PI), Indonesia 130, The Asian Face of Globalization, 
nstructmg Identities, Institutions and Resources, the Paper of 2001 API Fellows. 
36 
See P. Wheatley, cited in note 23 supra, at p. 265. 
37 H . 
. IStOry of Pattani, Pattani Province, 
available at http://~.pattani.go.th/(last visited Feb. 14,2006). 
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the people of Pattani are able to eat a hundred kind of fruits and 
many kinds of meat such as beef, mutton, goose, duck, chicken, 
capon, peacock, deer, mouse deer and birds.38 
Known not only for the richness of its natural resources, Pattani also became an 
important center of trade. It also had a well-known port, which was part of the general 
trading system with Brunei, Cambodia, China, Holland, England, Indonesia, Java, Malay, 
portugal, Siam, and Sumatra.39 Items of trade included pepper, gold, textiles, and various 
foodstuffs. Pattani functioned to circumvent Portuguese Malacca's predominant 
commercial influence by serving as an international port from which pepper could be 
acquired from its neighbors for trade with Chinese merchants in exchange for luxury 
textiles and porcelain.4o Historians also believed that within· Southeast Asia, Pattani 
eventually became a more important trade center than Ayutthaya.41 The chart on the 
following page shows the reigning monarchs and queens of Pattani. 
2. Kings and Queens of Pattani 
It is believed that Pattani was one of the oldest kingdoms on the Malay Peninsula. 
For centuries Pattani existed as an independent Kingdom. The chart below shows that 
R' S' 42 aJa n Wangsa was the first ruler. Thereafter, a number of his descendants ascended 
to the Pattani throne. 
38 
See I. Syukri, cited in note 33 supra, at p. 32. 
39A.leeuw & D.KWyatt, HIKAYAT PATANI THE STORY OF PATANI19, Konninklijk Instituut 1970. 
40 Ibid.at p.7. 
41 
See I. Syukri, cited in note 33 supra, at p. 32. 
42 
See at the chart of Pattani Rajas. 
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The Chart of Pattani's Rajas 
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As mentioned above, Pattani also enjoyed its greatest prosperity during the reigns 
of the Queens 43 and became well-known in countries in Asia as well as in Europe. The 
golden age of the Kingdom was during the regimes of its four queens: known as Raja 
Hijau (The Green Queen), Raja Biru (The Blue Queen), Raja Ungu (The Purple Queen) 
and Raja Kuning (The Yellow Queen).44 After Raja Kuning died, there were no other 
decendants of Raja Sri Wangsa in line for the throne. Thereafter, Pattani was ruled by 
Raja of Kelantan, Kampung Dawai and Sultan. The commerce ofPattani began to decline 
after the rule of the Kelantan Raja. 
D. Beliefs and Religions 
According to Islam, each person has his or her own identity. Each has individual 
practices, rituals and systems of ethics that regulate behavior, and stress harmony and 
ol)edience to Allah, the central deity. Further, Islam has promoted advancement in several 
branches of science and medicine.45 Thus, Islam has been in practice in Southern 
Thailand for a long time, and it has thereby established a lifestyle that has brought about 
the harmonious binding of relationships among Muslims. 
Since the first century A.D., Hinduism played a vital role in the 
mundane and ecclesiastical affairs of the coastal kingdoms, 
namely, Langkasuka, Ganga Negara, and to some extent Me/aka. 
The Hindu-Malay rulers observed the same doctrines as 
43 
See I. Syukri, cited in note 33 supra, at p. 52. 
44 Ibid. 
45 
htt ~~monti H?~sain, Islam behind the Stereotypes, available at 
p. WWW.rehgloustoleralice.org/hossain_01.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2006). 
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preached in the Indian heartland. Following the spread of 
Buddhism in India and the activities of its traveling monks, the 
scenario in Malaya changed accordingly. Many rulers adopted 
the new faith, and the masses followed suit. For a thousand 
years, these two religions had a popular following at all levels of 
society. Hindu temples and Buddhist pagodas flourished across 
the land. Their influences have left permanent marks on the local 
language and custom. In the thirteenth century, when Arab and 
Indian Gujerati traders brought Islam to the region, among the 
Hindu-Malay aristocracy of the time, -the first ruler to officially 
accept Islam was Parameswara, the Raja of Melaka, who upon 
conversion changed his name to Megat Iskandar Shah. From 
Melaka, Islam' spread to other districts of the Malay Peninsula 
and to the Malay states in Sumatra and along the trade routes 
throughout the Indonesian archipelago. -16 
Islam began a rapid expansion into the Domain of the Malay Peninsula, causing 
many of the imperial rulers to change their religious beliefs. During this period, Islam 
took root in Pattani during the reign of Raja Intera. For the edification of the royal family 
and other people of importance, studies of Islamic law were conducted in the royal 
palace. After that, the Islamic religion began to spread beyond the royal palace and 
among the common people. It was only a matter of a few years before nearly all the 
people of Pattani had embraced this new religion. Meanwhile, as the people of Pattani 
began to give it less attention, the Hindu religion began a gradual decline. Buddhist 
46 H' 
Ma 
IS1to4ry of Malaysia, Embassy of Malaysia in Soul, available at www.malaysia.or.krlhistory.htm(lastvisited 
r. ,2006). 
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idols, temples and other places of worship eventually succumbed to complete disrepair, 
or were intentionally destroyed.47 After Pattani had completely converted its inhabitants 
to Islam, many Mosques were established. These edifices were symbolically intended for 
the performance of religious activities while strengthening the belief in Allah: 
Currently, eighty-eight percent of the popUlation of southern Thailand are 
Muslims. This constitutes 4.6 percent of all Thais.48 Although Muslims are a minority 
group of the country, the majority group of people in Pattani and the three provinces of 
southern Thailand are Muslims. 
As the Muslims have always been part of the historical and political scenery of 
Siam, in the long-established period, their role was extremely significant and varies. Th~ 
region communities differed widely in many customs from Siam, nonetheless they were 
easily accommodated by the traditional systems. Muslims were able to settle, develop 
and share their role within the Thai polity despite their cultural, ethnic, and religious 
differences. The reform of the Thailand introduced factors that were not present in the 
previous period. But even then, relations between the Muslim and the majority Buddhists 
were still generally amicable and subtle. There is something in the nature and culture of 
Thai society that seems to make Buddhists reasonably broadminded of others who are 
different from them in terms of beliefs, origins, or outlooks, as long as Buddhism is not 
politicized. There have been few cases of interpersonal conflicts or interreligious rivalry. 
Throughout the centuries-old association with the Thai Buddhist polity, the Muslims in 
Thailand, nearly have never experienced any mass persecution of systematic 
47 
See I. Syukri, cited in note 33 supra, at p. 22. 
48 
. See National Statistical Office, cited in note 12 supra. 
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discrimination.49 Consequently, it is probable that the Muslim minorities in Thailand are 
more preponderant in the four southern provinces. Throughout many decades of cultural 
growth and creation in Pattani, the overall cultural and religious settings become a unique 
society. Islam has been widely practiced throughout the South of Thailand and was 
considered by many to result from an original Thai Muslims culture. It seems apparent 
that Islam has been rapidly absorbed into the region's culture. 
E. The Expanding Kingdom of Siam 
The Thai "Palatine Law" (Kod Monthianban), which King Ramathibodi 
Borommatrailokkanat promulgated in 1448-1488 states: 
... Altogether, twenty towns send gold and silver flowers to the 
King: Nakhon Luand, Sri Sattanakkhanahut, Chieng Mai, Tong 
U, Chiang Krai, Chiang Kran, Chiang San, Chiang Tung, 
Chiang Rai, Hsenwi, Khemmarat, Phra, Nan, Tai Thong, 
Khotrabong, and Reo Kaeo, these sixteen in the north; and, in 
the south Ujong Tahah, Malacca, Malayu, and Varavari four 
towns; altogether twenty towns which send the gold and silver 
fl 50 owers ... 
49 
C:attan1a Sugunasil . Dynamic Diversity in Southern Thailand Prince of Songkla University, Pattani 
pus 5, Silkworm Books 2005. ' 
soD . aVId K.Wyatt, Studies in Thai History 83, C.S.Printing House 2004 (1994). 
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The ideas following the foundation of Ayutthaya Kingdom modeled after Hindu 
Kings or Godly Kings based on the epic of Ramang are not too dissimilar to those 
inspired by the imperialistic ambitions of Great Britain, French, China, and Japan. The 
objective of Ayutthaya was to create an empire by dominating its less powerful neighbor 
nations. 
According to the Ligor Choronicle or Nakhon Si Thammarat, 5 1 Ayutthaya 
Kingdom began to extend southwards to annex the area of Malay-speaking peoples. The 
two lords from Phetburi who were the descendants of the Phetburi royal family were 
responsible for appointing Malays to supervise the Malay lands under Ayutthaya control 
such as Pahang, Kelantan, Pattani and Kedah. Ligor known as Nakhon Si Thammarat . 
became the major Thai center in the south through which Aytltthaya was able to 
supervise its Malay vassals. In the early sixteenth century each province, including 
Terengganu (formerly spelled Trengganu), was required to send 600 grams of gold as 
tribute. The two Ligor officials supervised the collections. 52 
In the seventeenth century, the bunga masS3 was sent from Kedah and Pattani to 
the Thai Prince. In the Malay view, the Kedah ruler claimed that the bunga mas 
demonstrated a gift of friendship and alliance, and not to confirm, or accept a vassal 
51 
Th N~khon Si Thammarat province, originally known as Ligor, is the second largest province in the South of 
alla~d. It was predominantly Buddhist during the Srivijaya Empire Period. Nakorn Si Thammarat 
(~~es .an area of 9,942 square kilometers (3837.61 square miles) and approximately is 780 kilometers 
h' t '. mlle~) from Bangkok. The exactly founding date of Nakhon Si Thammarat is unknown. From the 
~s o~cal eVidence, the ~ity flourished for 1,800 years and was a trading center since the first century. The 
Ki~g d om of. Nakhon . SI Thammarat remained semi-independent until finally surrendering to the Thai 
9 om dunng the reign of King Taksin. 
52 
See B. W. Andaya & L Y. Andaya, cited in note 25 supra, at p. 62. 
53 
St~!~e:owithdflower~ and leaves made of gold which the Ayutthaya Kingdom required its vassal 
sen as tnbute. 
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status. Ayutthaya, nonetheless, saw the dispatch of the bunga mas as Malay recognition 
. M I 54 
of its authonty over a ay. 
The period from 1549 to 1563 was historically significant; during the reign of 
King Mahachakrapat, a massive attack from Burma (Myanmar) was launched against the 
Kingdom of Ayutthaya. Phraya55 Tani Sri Sultan (Sultan Muzafar Shah) carne to assist 
Ayutthaya with two hundred warships, one thousand soldiers and one hundre~ women as 
a combined force. However, when the Sultan saw that the Burmese had surrounded the 
citadel of Ayutthaya and that the troops of Ayutthaya appeared to be losing, the Sultan 
switched alliances and attacked the Ayutthaya Royal Palace, killing many of Ayutthaya's 
soldiers. Eventually, His Majesty King Mahachakrapat succeeded in driving off the 
Burmese troops and re-gathered his forces. King Mahachakrapat then counter-attacked 
the forces of Phraya Tani Sri Sultan and defeated them. The Sultan died during that 
campaign from uncertain causes but was not buried in Pattani.
56 
Between 1688 to 1702, during the reign of King Phrapethraja, Pattani declared its 
full independence from its earlier status of semi-independence under the rule of 
Ayutthaya. Afterward, in 1767, when Ayutthaya w3.!' defeated by Burma and the 
Kingdom was completely destroyed, all rajas who ruled the various territories subject to 
Siam at that time desired to be independent and freed themselves from subservience to 
the Kingdom of Ayutthaya.57 
54 Ibid .at p.66. 
55 
A non hereditary title conferred by the King. 
56 
See I. Syukri, cited in note 33 supra, at p.27 
57 Ibid. at p. 52. 
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It took seven months for Phraya Taksin to drive off the Burmese and to settle in 
the neW capital of Thonburi. After he became King of Siam, he led an army to all 
territories under the control of Siam to defeat the minor rajas who had strongly advocated 
independence from Siam. In a short time, all the minor rajas, including Pattani (Sultan 
Mahmud Reign), had again surrendered to King Taksin. 
After the end of the reign of King Taksin, King Rama I rose to establish the 
Chakri Dynasty in 1782 (the Rattanakosin Period). Since. the country had endured a long 
war, King Rama I began to reunite the country. At the beginning of the Chakri Dynasty, 
the attempt to regain the control of the Malay Peninsula was a complete success. The 
reunion included Pattani, Kedah, Kelantan, Pedis and Terengganu. 
From that time on, Pattani was ruled by the dynasty of Kalantan that had been 
appointed by the King of Siam.58 On account of the massive resistance demonstrated in 
Pattani and other areas of Siam, a new strategy to restrict power was implemented during 
the reign of King Rama II; it was a strategy of "divide and conquer." Pattani was, 








58 Ibid. at p. 72. 
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Each district still retained its own raja who was supervised and controlled by 
Siam. After the fonnal enthronement of King Rama V in 1873, His Majesty announced 
the reforms of all infrastructures in Siam such as the judiciary, the Treasury, and the 
political structure. 59 This was a time of large-scale refonn and initiate fundamental 
change of all structures within the country.60 The organization of the southern part of the 
Kingdom included the four following regions (Monthon): 
1. Monthon Phuket . 
2. Monthon Chumpom 
3. Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat 
4. Monthon Saiburi 
59 Arthorn Chanta~imol, History of the Land, Thailand 280, Auxsomthai 1995(1993). 
60 See DKWyatt, cited in note 50 supra, at p. 273 and 278. 
[T]he reform decree that followed, through the rest of 1873 and all of 1874, began more substantial 
institutional change and attacked directly the existing state of public affairs. Along four separate 
approaches, they undermined the strength of the semi-independent, oligarchic nobility. First, by announcing 
the progressive abolition of hereditary slavery and by severely restricting the conditions under which the 
nobility could hold debt bondservants, the King undertook to free tbe ordinary Thai farmer from traditional 
constraints on his political and economic life-an action which struck against the chief source of the nobility's 
wealth, which was their control over manpower. Second, he established special law courts to clear the 
~normous backlog of litigation in Bangkok and its concomitant- delays, which oppressed all the litigants 
In.volved and profited the nobleman and petty officers who controlled the myriad jurisdictions of the 
Kingdom's legal system. Third, he worked to build up the financial resources available to the central 
g?vernment, at the expense of numerous private pockets, by attempting to centralize collection and 
dl~bursement records, by standardizing rates of taxation, by ordering that tax collections farmed out to 
p~lvate individuals be let by public auction, and by establishing a central audit office (in which the King 
himself, with the assistance of his teenager brother, pored over ledgers and receipts). Fourth, and finally, he 
moved to consolidate his own political support against the men left in office by his father by establishing two 
~dvlsory councils to consider public legislation and policy, the Council of State and the Privy Council. His 
Intention in this respect was to bring older, more conservative officials into a larger body where they could be 
outvoted or influenced by his young friends and loyal supporters. 
Ibid. at p.282 
~PlrO~incial administration was brought under centralized direction and control and serviced by specialized 
~nc~l~nal ministries staffed by competent specialists. Modern law-codes were drafted and put into force by 
~ mlnl~trators, judges, and lawyers. Fiscal administration was centralized and modern accounting, 
A ~getlOg, and auditing procedures introduced. Railways and telegraphic communications were constructed. 
IllTtrOad range of educational institutions was founded to serve all the varied needs of the state, and modern 
II ary and naval forces were created. 
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The seven districts of Pattani were combined with Monthon Nakhon Si 
Thammarat and each of the Monthon was ruled by royal commissioners instead of Rajas. 
This reform impacted Pattani. When Muslims are governed by Buddhists, they might feel 
that they are being ruled by "foreigners." Siam respects the unique cultural, historical 
Buddhist and linguistic heritage of ethnic Thais, and the administration of the Siamese 
Government control over its territory by a central bureaucracy.61 Such refonn br~ught 
great dissatisfaction to Phraya Vichitpakdi (Tongku Abdulkadir Kamaralladin), which led 
to the failed rebellions against the Siamese Government. Phraya Vichitpakdi was sent 
into confinement in Phitsanulok for nine months. After his release, he returned to Pattani; 
however, th~ central government had undergone a great many changes because of the 
reform initiated by Siam. Consequently, Phraya Vichitpakdi moved to Kalantan where 
he died. Even during the reign of King Chulalongkorn, which sought the abolition of the 
Pattani Sultanate, such historical tolerance was not entirely injeopardy. His Majesty's 
intention was to develop the country, by modernizing its outlook and creating a secular, 
polyglot of various cultures on equal footing within the whole of the country. The King 
once stated that he hoped to eventually to achieve a situation where" even though 
[certain citizens] are Malay and have a different faith ... [t]hey are Thai in sentiment and 
outlook as any other Thai ... " For example, the King donated a piece of land to build the 
new mosque "Unsorrizzunna" in Bangkok Noi and offered asylum to many Muslim 
peoples in Bangkok. There is a long tradition in which many Muslim people have 
;-----------------
c Aurel Croissant, Strategic Insights, Volume IV, Issue 2 (Feb.2005): Unrest in South Thailand: Contours, 
h:~ses, and Consequences Since 2001, NPS Department of National Security Affairs, available at 
P.IIWWW.ccc.nps.navy.millsiI2005/Feb/croissantfeb05.asp (last visite.d Apr. 13,2006). 
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become extremely wealthy such as Sakul62 Na Na, Sakul Boonnak and others. Resulting 
to this reform, the seven districts of Pattani were reorganized and separated from 
Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat to become Monthon Pattani and remains a simple 
separate province until this day. 
During the age of the British Empire, from 1867 until 1946, the Malay States 
were British Crown colonies. The British established their first strait settlement on the 
Malay Peninsula in 1786. During the following century the annexation of the key ports 
of Penang and Singapore led to the main region of Southern Peninsula being brought 
under British control. 63 
During this period, the influence of the colonial era expanded over the entire 
region of South East Asia, Siam had to struggle hard to maintain its territorial integrity 
and political "independence." Siam had its own methods of achieving its objectives. A 
treaty was entered into between the King of Siam and Great Britain on June 20, 1826, to 
engage in friendship, cooperation, and as well as to acknowledge Siam's sovereignty over 
Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and Terengganu. Another objective was to guarantee Britain's 
right to Kelantan and Terengganu. 
Siam could not, however, withstand the power of Britain. Therefore, on March 
10, 1909, Siam signed another Agreement with Britain to cancel the Convention of April 
6, 1897. The agreement concerned the Non-Alienation of Certain Districts of the Malay 
Peninsula, which delimited the boundary as follows: 
62 Thai Last Name 
63 M· 
Ichael Lynch, the British Empire 5, Book Print ltd 2005. 
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Commencing from the most seaward point of the northern bank 
of the estuary of the Ferlis River and thence north to the range of 
hills which is the watershed between the Perlis River on one side 
and the Pujok River on the other; then following the watershed 
formed by the said range of hills until it reaches the main 
watershed or dividing line between those rivers which flow into 
the Gulf of Siam on the one side and into the Indian Ocean on 
the other; following this main watershed so as to pass the 
sources of the Sungei Patani (S. Patfani). Sungei Telubin 
(Khlong Sai Buri). and Sunge Perak. to the point which is the 
source of the Sungei Pergau; then leaving the main watershed 
and going along the watershed separating the waters of the 
Sungei Pergau from the Sungei Telubin. to the hill called Bukit 
Jeli (Buket Yeli) or the source of the main stream of the Sungei 
Golok to the sea at a place called Kuala Tabar. 
This line would leave the valleys of the Sungei Patani, Sungei Telubin, and 
Sungei Tanjung Mas (Tanjong Mat), and the valley on the left, or west bank, of the 
Golok to Siam, and the whole valley of the Perak River and the valley on the right, or 
east bank, of the Golok to Britain. 
In addition to the Agreement of 1909 between Britain and Siam repealing the 
Convention of April 6, 1897 (the Non- Alienation of Certain Districts of the Malay 
Peninsula), the London Treaty was signed on July 14, 1925 with ratifications exchanged 
in London on March 30, 1926. Article 5 stated as follows: 
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Any treaty inforce at the time of the signature of the present 
treaty, which fIXes or delimits the boundary between Siam and 
British possessions or protectorates shall remain in jorce. 64 
As a result of the 1909 Bangkok Treaty and the 1925 London Treaty was the 
boundary established between Siam and Malaysia. This settled the question of the 
boundary and Pattani, Narathiwat, Songkla, Satun and Yala have remained under Siam 
until this day. 
F. Reform of the War-Time Siamese Government: Industrialist and 
Nationalist Movements 
In 1942, the ultimate goal of Field Marshall Phibul Songkhram65 was to 
completely transfonn Thailand66 into a larger and more homogenous nation state.67 To 
create this new national identity, it was necessary to go beyond the scope of the current 
regulations, or any religious belief or cultural practices. Therefore, Songkhram attempted 
to achieve his aims by promulgating the "Rataniyom policy," and unavoidably, such 
~~ntemational Boundary Study nO.57 - November 15 , 1965, Malaysia - Thai Boundary, The Geographer, 
h ~ of the Geograph~r, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, available at 
ltp.lIwww.laW.fsu.edu/hbrary/COliection/LimitsinSeas/IBS057.Pdf (last visited Mar. 14,2006). 
6S A Prime Minister of Thailand from 1938 to 1944 and 1948 to 1957. 
66 --
Siam became known as "Thailand" in A.D .1939. 
67 
[qn~~1. SY~kri, cited in note 33 supra, at p.87 
Walth 0 ~ Sla~ese cultural institute was established in Bangkok and was known by the name of "Sapha 
CUltur:~t an, the goal of which was the advancement of nationalism and the expansion of Siamese 
roughout the country. 
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transformation impacted the lives of Muslims of the South. The chief features of the 
Rataniyom policy towards Islam are summarized in the following twelve statements:
68 
• Statement 1: The official proclamation of the name of the country, civilians, and 
nationality 
• Statement 2: The protection of the country from damages 
• Statement 3: The requirement of Thai citizens to acquire a Thai name 
• Statement 4: The respect of Thailand's national flag, Thailand's national song and 
the King's anthem each morning or on special occasions in every town and village 
• Statement 5: The campaign of Thai people to consume Thai Products 
• Statement 6: The lyrics of the King of Thailand's national anthem 
• Statement 7: The campaign to build up the country 
• Statement 8: The King's anthem 
• Statement 9: The requirement that every Thai must learn the Thai language 
• Statement 10: The requirement that Thai citizens must dress in Western European 
style 
• Statement 11: The activities of the Thai people 
• Statement 12: The aid and protection of young people, seniors and disable persons 
Certainly, at least four of the statements seem antagonistic to Muslim culture. 
Statement 3 requires every person to have a Thai name although they may already have a 
-~Th--~--------------
amsuk Numnond, Thailand in the period of World War II 61, Winyuchon Publisher 2004. 
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Muslim name. Statement 9 requires the study of the Thai language and prohibits the use 
of Malay language, and requires Malay children to pray to Buddhist idols even though 
they have the right and freedom to select their own religion, as guaranteed by the Thai 
constitution. Statement 10 prohibits the wearing of Malay clothing. It also requires both 
men and woman to wear hats. Statement 11 addresses daily activities of Thai citizens. 
These statements are too inflexible to be compatible with Muslim traditions as Islam 
prescribes certain activities for everyday life. 
Unquestionably the campaign to harmonize traditions under the country's 
"Rataniyom policy" has caused much widespread resentment and resistance among 
Muslims. The policies of Phibul Songkhram administration significantly contributed to 
the occurrence of the violence in southern region, which's religious and cultural has been 
very sensitive. The use of policy by the central government and the Thai authorities 
made ordinary Muslim depressing and uncomfortable. Therefore, processing and 
carrying out this policy has been very difficult for the Thai authorities in the southern 
provinces. Although this policy was not successful in forcing Muslims to accept 
B.uddhism, the government's attempt to push new ideas into Muslim faith, without first 
trying to comprehend the role of Islam in their daily life, has led to serious tension. The 
thought of losing their religion, being subjected to forced assimilation, and being asked to 
abandon large amounts of their indigenous culture, forced many Muslims to consider 
immigrating to Malaysia. Muslims began condemning the government's policy rather 
than accepting it. The growth of the religious conflict expanded to a large scale. Haji 
Sulong Tokmina, a Pattani Leader who did not accept and respect the Rataniyom policy, 
began a widespread dissident movement that proclaimed a Muslim separatist movement 
31 
from Thailand. This led to the deaths of many people and Haji Sulong Tokmina was 
arrested. 
As the result of the Rataniyom policy, it is probable that such a policy would cause 
severe opposition having a religious fervor. The strong spirit of Islam among those early 
Muslims, who had feared the loss oftheir culture and being totally assimilated into the 
Thai way ofthinking, made them become extremely distrustful of the Thai Government. 
The Muslims who had most strongly resisted the Rataniyom policy immigrated to Malay. 
We have learned from the Rataniyom policy that the Government completely 
failed. Muslims stubbornly resisted being assimilated into Thai traditions and culture, and 
refused to be fully integrated into the Thai society. 
I - 3 Conclusion 
This section started with a study of the history. In addition to showing important 
cultural and religious trends, I have also tried to add a human aspect to that history. 
Although Thailand has governed of Pattani for centuries, the record, both past and 
present, testified to the fact that Thailand has never conquered the heart and mind of the 
Muslims of Pattani. 
It may seem that the study of history is intended to relive the painful past, and 
therefore, no State enjoys to reveal all of its history, only the lighter and more flattering 
aspects. However, it remains true that the facts speak for themselves, and this can be our 
guide to resolving certain problems that may seem interminable at the moment. For 
success in the south to be achieved, the appropriate approach will be to confront these 
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problems with wisdom and moderation and to appreciate the reasons for their failure. 
This is a task that is distressing but ignoring the age-old problems can cause far more 
distress and hopelessness. 
Pattani's long history and the development of its own governmental 
infrastructures, and its diverse culture and social structures, have been the source of pride 
among the people ofPattani. No doubt, Pattani still has strong social structures and a very 
distinctive character. Pattani is no different from any other Empire or State in the world 
that has tried to establish its own independence. 
As the Thai Government atte-mpt% to create a centralized administration rapidly 
without good research, the government officers will continue to face with the problem of 
the power differential between the officers and native people from different cultures. The 
contributing elements in this power differential are still the language problems. Until 
today, Muslims who stayed in the countryside felt uncomfortably when in contact with 
Thai officers. When people did not have good relationships with the government services, 
they shut down communications. Therefore, first, it is imperative that the government 
should seek to win the heart of Muslims. One of the best solutions to the problems in 
the South is to understand the way the people live and how they respond to the 
government's policy. The Government has to bear in mind that peace cannot be achieved 
in a single day or a single week. 
This should be done prior to taking any other actions. When the Government 
attempts to win over the "southern zone," at the very least, it should ensure that its plans 
are not inconsistent or antagonistic to the local or indigenous culture. 
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The above discussion has been aimed at gaining a historical perspective of the 
historical and current problems occurring in the south of Thailand. This foundation of 
understanding should help both the Government and the Muslim population to work out 
solutions to the problems of the South that continue to lead to deadly conflict. Further 
discussion of the history and the conflict will be reserved for the ensuing chapter. 
****** 
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~ CHAPTER .. J 
PATTANI TODAY 
11- 1 Varying Types of Continuing Problems 
Most Thais have never entertained the question of whether there could be a way 
of living without conflict. Thais accept conflict as a part of their lives due to the cultural 
belief that there is no life without conflict, and therefore, there is no living society 
without conflict.69 Within every society or community, there are conflicts and problems. 
Even though the four provinces of Southern Thailand - Pa~, Yala, Narathiwat, and 
Songkhla - form a small part of the Kingdom, these provinces have been the cause of 
serious concern for the Royal Thai Government. In past decades, these four Muslim-
dominated provinces have been a source of natural history in Thailand, but the 
government has been increasingly concerned with the other four southern coastal tourist 
provinces of Phangnga, 70 Krabi,71 Surat Thani, 72and Phuket. 73 74 
69 J. Krishnamurti, Psychological Revolution: 1962-1963: A Psychological Revolution 17, Krishnamurti 
Foundation Publisher 1992. 
70 
. Phang Nga, one of the southern provinces, is nestled among mountains which rise up around the city and 
IS located 788 kilometers (489.64 miles) from Bangkok on the west side of the Malay Peninsula. Phang Nga 
COvers an area of 4,170.9 square kilometers (1,610.38 square miles) and indudes many islands in the 
Phang Nga Bay, one of the famous tourist attractions for diving. 
71 
Krabi, one of the most attractive tourist destinations in Southern Thailand, is located 814 kilometers 
(505.80 miles) from Bangkok. Krabi occupies an area of 4,708 square kilometers (1,817.75 square miles) :d borders the Andaman Sea to the west, which is known for its natural attractions such as white sandy 
aches, enchanting coral reefs, limestone hills, and leafy forests with caves and waterfalls. 
72 
(
4 Surat Thani is the largest province of Southern Thailand, covering an area of 12,891 square kilometers 
,977.21 square miles). Surat Thani is located 644 kilometers (400.16 miles) from Bangkok. To the north 
~nd W~st, it borders on the Gulf of Thailand where countless islands around, induding the tourist island Ko 
alllui. SUrat Thani, named by Rama VI, literally means "City of Good People.~ 
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It has been ninety four years since the acceSSlOn of Kelantan, T erengganu, 
Saiburi, and Perak to the Anglo Siamese Treaty.75 Under this treaty Thailand retained 
sovereignty over Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. These provinces have a population of 
approximately four million76 and are located in a very poor and undeveloped part of 
Thailand in which there is woven a complex history of social, political, economic, and 
religious conflict. 
This chapter will be divided into two issues at the heart of the problems in this 
region. The first issue will focus on the problems associated with social, economic, and 
cu1tural structures. I will look first at the endemic crime in this region, considering why 
the high crime rate is unchanged both before and after the resurgence of violent acts. 
Secondly, I will spend some time analyzing the complex and long-standing ethnic 
. conflicts so as to propose how the Thai Government might issue a policy that attempts to 
' .. " 
unify the disparate elements of its society and integrate this region while respecting the 
profound ethnic differences. Lastly, I will look closely at the economic problems that 
characterize this region, which is rich in natural beauty, but is home to the poorest 
members of Thai society. In examining these three elements, I hope to reflect upon the 
types of Thai Government policies that have been implemented but have failed to provide 
73 P . 
. huket is known as the Pearl of the South and is Thailand's largest island with an area of 543 square 
~~~meters (2~9.65 square miles). It is 862 kilometers (535.62 miles) south o~ Bangkok. With splendid cov~s b:yS, whIte sandy beaches, a warm climate, comfortable accommodatIons, super seafood, Phuket IS 
one 0 the perfect places in the world to have a relaxing vacation. 
74 
IargAn~cha Charoenpo, Crime's fifth phase of crackdown kicks off this month: 30,000 drug dealers are still at 
e, angkok Post, Mar. 19, 2006. 
7S 
a~' Angl? - Siamese Treaty of 1909, or the Bangkok Treaty, was a treaty between the United Kingdom 
lam sIgned on March 10, 1909 in Bangkok. 
7$ 
SeeNr " . a lonal StatistIcal OffICe cite in note 12 supra. 
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assistance in order to get closer to a policy that, I believe, is appropriate for the problems 
of this area. 
In the second issue of this chapter, I will focus on patterns of violent acts in order 
to better prepare the Govenunent for potential violence. I will look at the legal and 
military ramifications of trying to keep the peace in this area. In this section, I am also 
concerned about what types of military operations and legal terminology has and has not 
worked in the past in order to better formulated future plans for containing, preven~ing, 
and managing violent acts and their consequences. We now tum to examine more closely 
the main conflicts in this area. 
A. Criminal Problems 
During the period of increasing globalization over the past few decades, Thailand 
has actively participated in international investing, technology, trade, and tourism.
77 
Although one of the changes that occurred as a result of the population explosion was an 
increase in the crime rate following necessary economic and social modernizations, even 
if compared to most industrialized countries, the crime rate in Thailand remains relatively 
low.78 The following chart shows recent comparative statistics of reported crimes. 
n for-:;.rrol~ W.Hudguet & Sureeporn Punping, International Migration in Thailand v, International organization 
Igratton, Regional Office Bangkok, Thailand (2005). 
78 
http:// A comparative criminology tour of the world, San Diego State University, available at 
WWW.-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/rwinslow/asia_pacificfThailand.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2006). 
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The Statistics of Reported Crimes 79 
of 
Thailand, United States, and Japan (2000) 80 
per 100,000 
inhabitants 
total crime intentional major assaults rapes 
homicides 
mlThailand 
robberies automobile burglaries 
theft 
111 Japan OUSA 
theft 
East Asian countries, such as Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong, are 
used as transit points for drug trafficking, but the risks of rapid globalization are not just 
economic,8l Thailand is a victim of its own virtues. Known for its cultural hospitality, its 
79 Ibid, 
[T]he offenses include murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor 
vehicle theft. In the UN reports, murders are referred to as "intentional homicides." Aggravated assaults are 
referred to as "major assaults," and larcenies are referred to as "thefts". 
80 Ibid. 
[A]ccording to the United Nations Seventh Annual Survey on Crimes, all Index crimes in Thailand by crime 
~ecorded in police statistics shows the crime rate for the combined total of to be 174.84 per 100,000 
Inhabitants in 2000. Compare this to 1951.92 for Japan (country with a low crime rate) and 4123.97 for USA 
(country with high crime rate). For intentional homicides, the rate in 2000 was 8,47 for Thailand, 0.50 for 
Japan, and 5.51 for USA. For major assaults, the rate in 2000 was 33.15 for Thailand, compared with 34.04 
for Japan, and 323.62 for USA. (Note these data for Japan are for total recorded assaults, since Japan did 
not report a figure for major assaults.) For rapes, the rate in 2000 was 6.62 for Thailand, 1.78 for Japan, and 
32.05 for USA. For robberies, the rate in 2000 was 1.29 for Thailand, 4.07 for Japan, and 144.92 for USA. 
For automobile theft, the rate in 2000 was 5,40 for Thailand, 243.81 for Japan, and 414.17 for USA. The rate 
°2f burglaries for 2000 was 21.78 for Thailand, 233.45 for Japan, and 414.17 for USA. The rate for thefts in 
000 was 95.13 for Thailand, compared with 1434.27 for Japan and 2475.27 for USA. 
81 
htt ~nited Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes: Drug Control and Urban Government, available at 
P.lIWWw.unodc.un.oLthlfactsheetidruggovernance.PDF (last visited Mar. 20, 2006). . 
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easy-going lifestyles, and its tolerance of diversity, the relative ease with which one can 
get a visa have made it easy for illicit businesses to establish themselves in the country. 
There is also the problem of large expatriate business communities that have made the 
Kingdom one of the world's favorite tourist destinations.
82 
This has been increasingly appreciated by globally minded criminals, and an army 
of illegal migrants from all over the world has helped form crime syndicates that include 
not only Asian but offenders from China, Taiwan, India, Russia, Korea, Australia, 
Europe, Africa, and North and South America. Many of them have settled down and 
made Thailand their home.83 
. 
Southern Thailand has a reputation as a troubled region characterized by a high 
.crime rate, lawlessness, endemic corruption within the bureaucracy, and as a place where 
smuggling, small arms trade, and other forms of illegitimate businesses flourish.
84 
The 
problems include economi~ injustice, powerlessness or lack of political access, inequality 
in the distribution of reve~ues, and the struggle to retain a cultural identity within the 
larger political, economic, and social structure of Thailand. 
82 
Antony Davis, Vol.26 NoAO Asia Weeks, Oct.13, 2000, available at 
http://www.pathfinder.com/asiaweekimagazine/2000/1013/na!.thaiiand.html(last visited May. 29, 2006). 
83 • 
h ~nme in Thailand, available at 
ttp.IIWWW.thai-info2004.com/crimejn_thailand.htm (last visited May. 28, 2006). 
84 
See A. Croissant, cited in note 61 supra. 
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The Statistics of Reported Crimes of Thailand by Region (Year 2003)85 
Bangkok Middle 
Ii!iI Bangkok II Middle 0 North 0 East ED Northeast Ii!iI West II South 
During the 1970s and 1980s86, Thailand faced an increasing cnme rate from 
illicit trade in opium, heroin, and cannabis. For many years, the Thai Government had 
been moderately tmccessful in handling these problems on both domestic and 
international fronts. 87 Ever since World War II, small bands of guerrillas, made of local 
Malaysian communists (mostly Chinese)88, have stayed on bases along the rugged border 
85 Royal Thai Police. 
86 Paul Battersby, Border Politics and the Broader Politics ofThailand's Intemational Relations in the 1990s: 
From Communism to Capitalism in Pacific Affairs 473-488, Vol. 71, NO.4. (Winter, 1998-1999). 
[W]ithin the space of two decades, mainland South East Asia passed from being a region characterized by 
the presence of fragmented states were governments were challenged form with separatist or revolutionary 
forces, to one where a discernible trend towards territorial consolidation is emerging. As it seeks to position 
itself as a regional commercial hub, Thailand must contend with a new political challenges arising from the 
expanding territorial reach of state power in Cambodia, Laos and Burma, One of the many ironies 
globalization, the spatial hardening of states underline the tensions and opportunities that shape Thailand's 
border relation and it broader economic and political relations with neighboring countries. 
87 
See A comparative criminology tour of the world, cited in note 78 supra. 
[f]hailand is one of the most successful countries of narcotic crop control programs in the world. Over the 
past twenty years, efforts to discourage cultivation and later to penaflZe growers through an active 
eradication campaign have proven effective. The eradication campaign is one of the main reasons refineries 
no longer operate in Thailand, and has reduced opium cultivation in Thailand to a point where opium must 
now be imported to meet the requirements of domestic addiction. 
88 
Thomas A. Marks, Anatomy of A Counterinsurgency Victory 36-37. 
[A]s in other regional conflicts, the Thai conflict grew out of a CommunisLbid for power. In a challenge to the 
Royal Government, the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) shed its pre-Second World War adherence to 
orthodox Marxist-Leninism, embraced Maoism, and adopted people's war as its strategy. From the outset, 
SOcietal transformation was the CPT's goal. Its strategy was to negate the state's greater military power by 
mobilizing the people against it through the creation of a counterstate. Direct mobilization of a popular base 
and indirect mobilizatiori through front organizations were to be the party's main lines of operation. 
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between Southern Thailand and Northern Malaysia. These guerrillas, a faction that 
contributed to the criminal element of this region when they signed a peace accord with 
the Malaysian Government in December 1989, made this region their home89 despite the 
fact that Thailand had been a tool for anti-communist campaigns launched by France and 
United States.90 Even today, the Thai Govenunent continues to struggle with these 
dilemmas: For instance, in a recently published report, the National Center Against Illicit 
Drugs stated that 400 big-time ?rug dealers and more than 20,000 small-time traffickers 
have been at large since 2003.91 
B. Ethnic Conflicts 
Ethnic conflict commonly arises when social, economic, religious, or cultural 
differences between the dominant ethnic groups or classes of people clash with local 
ethnic constructs, spurring the rise of nationalism within some particular etlmic group.92 
Ethnic conflict has multiple causes, many of which stem from structural differences 
between cultural groupS.93 "Structural" factors including historical concerns, religious 
89Th . 
all and Islamic Insurgency, available at 
htlp:/fwww.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/thailand2.htm (last visited May. 28, 2006). 
90 
Sam Lightner, Thailand: A Climbing Guideby 53, the Mountaineers 800KS,2005(1967). 
91 
See A.Charoenpo, cited in note 74 supra. 
92 
See A. Croissant, cited in note 61 supra. 
93 Ibid. 
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differences, and social and economic marginalization sometimes result In local 
grievances and latent crises in inter-ethnic relations.
94 
Recently economists have focused on ethnic diversity, or "fractionalization," as a 
possible cause of corruption, political instability, and poor economic performance. 
Political scientists have argued for years over possible links between ethics, structures, 
civil violence, democratic stability, and party systems.95 In addition, a study published in 
1999 reviewing Australian evidence on ethnic crime states that: "Criminological 
literature over the last several decades shows that socio-economic disadvantage and 
disorganized communities contribute substantially to a city's crime problem ... race, 
ethnicity, or country of origin has less to do with crime than the environment and the 
disorganized communities people live in. ,,96 
A study in 1990 found that out of 160 surveyed countries there were 820 ethnic 
groups, meaning that on average 1% of each country's population is composed of some 
ethnic minority. In Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East, the configuration of ethnic 
structure is characterized by splinter groups that clash with a large lowland majority 
(Burma, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, and Pakistan).97 For instance, in Southeast Asia, 
nationalist uprisings have all come from the following areas: the Shan, Kachin, Karenni, 
94 Ibid. 
95 James D. Fearon, Ethnic Structure and Cultural Diversity around the World: A Cross - National Data Set 
on Ethnic Groups, Remarks at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 




A Zachariah Matthews, A structure of violence or peace? Address at the University of Sydney 
ug. 22, 2001). 
97 
See James D. Fearon, cited in note 95 supra. 
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Chin, and Rakhinein in Bunna (Myanmar),98 Moro in the Philippines, the Amboinese 
Acehnese in Indonesia, and the Pattani in Thailand.
99 
As a result of the fight for democratic rights among ethnic minorities as well as 
the struggle for cultural identity rights and equal opportunities, Bunna (Myanmar) 
remains today as much embroiled in conflict as it ever has been. These deep-rooted 
ethnic clashes have led to resistance movements and have jeopardized any sense of a 
'fi 'd t 100 um le sta e. 
In the Philippines, the ethnic conflict stems from the resistance many Muslims 
have toward integration. Fearing that assimilation would wipe out their ethnicity, 
religion, and culture, the Muslim community has protested and defied Philippine law.
101 
Today, measures have been taken in order to circumvent such divisiveness. The 
Government knows very well the problem of ethic conflict in the country and, after 
international pressure, has found legal support for indigenous peoples. Thus, regional 
autonomy laws were passed by the Aquino Government, however, the language of the 
region had to be changed so that the conflict of autonomy laws would not bring about 
conflict between indigenous peoples and government forces .102 
98 Chao - Tzang Yawnghwe, Burma and National Reconciliation: Ethnic Conflict and State-Society 
Dysfunction, Legal Issues on Burma J., Burma Lawyer's Council, 10 Burma J. 1-3 (2001). 
99 S ~hanet Aphomsuvan, Origins of Malay Muslim "Separatism" in Southern Thailand 4, Working Paper 
enes No.32, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore 2004. 
100 
See Chao - Tzang Yawnghwe, cited in note 98 supra. 
101 '" ~Ihplno Muslims Need More Than Economic Development, United States Institute of Peace, Apr. 2002 , 
available at http://www.usip.org/peacewatch/2002l4/filipino.html(last visited Jut. 18, 2006). 
102 
S John ~.Richardson and Jianxin Wang, Peace Accords and Ethnic Conflict, (K.M.deSiva and S.w.R.de A 
amaraslnghe eds., New York: St. Martin's Press1993) (1992). 
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The conflict in Indonesia in the past four years has resulted in about 4,000 deaths 
from Christian-Muslim fighting and has displaced 500,000. So although the roots of the 
conflict have distinct historical, political, and economic factors, it could be said that the 
ethnic conflicts came from a basic structure. I03 For example, today the roots of ethno-
religious unrest and the most visible signs of armed separatism in Southeast Asia Islamic 
dissident movements in Southern Thailand, the Southern Philippines, and Aceh still share 
many of the basic factors: insensitivity to local concerns, regional neglect, military 
repression, and the contemporary sect ofIslamic militants. 104 
As mentioned in an earlier Chapter, four percent of the popUlation in Thailand is 
Muslim, which is itself hardly a homogeneous group. At least three types of Muslim 
communities can be distinguished in Thailand. Malay Muslims living in the provinces of 
Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani in the eastern peninsula of Thailand have a strong Malay 
identity and consider Thai culture a foreign imposition. In 1975, records showed that 
85% of the village heads in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat were Muslims who could not 
read and write in Thai. los However, the Thai-speaking Muslims in Satun adjusted 
smoothly to Thai society, probably owing to their proficiency in Thai. Muslims in the 
last group are found among the overwhelming Buddhist majority in and around the 
Bangkok metropolitan area, where they are tightly integrated into the larger urban milieu 
and have more or less adapted to Buddhist social customs. All of these three Muslim 
103 S. 
Idney Jones, Executive Director, Asia Division, Causes of Conflict in Indonesia, Excerpts from Asia 
Society panel discussion on New Yorl<, Oct. 24,2000, available at 
http://WWw.asiasource.org/asip/sidneyjones.cfm (last visited Jun. 30,2006). 
104 
Peter Chalk, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 241-269, Routledge (Tayor & Francis Group) 2001. 
105 
M Girling, John L.S.Thailand: Soceity and Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press (1981) cited by Duncan 
U c~argo, Southern Thai Politics : A Preliminary Overview 5, POLIS Working Paper No. 3 Feb. 2004, 
nlversity of Leeds. 
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groupS share the same cultural identity as followers of Islam, whose organization is 
radically different from that of Buddhism. 106 These differences within the ethnic group 
complicate any government policy that is formulated toward helping the Muslim 
minority. 
Because the majority of Thais are Buddhist, and the King is the head of State, 107 
the Thai Constitution and the basic laws promulgate that the King uphold Buddhist 
principles. The Thai legal system itself is built upon such beliefs. 108 Although the Thai 
constitution recognizes the rights and liberties of the Thai people to profess any religious 
beliefs, and the Constitution prohibits discrimination against person for religious 
reasons. 109 for instance, currently, the Thai Government nominated with the 
endorsement of King Bhumibol Adulyadej - Generel Sonthi Boonyaratglin, the first 
106 Yoneo Ishii, Religion and Law, A Dynastic Realms and Secular States, 453 THAI MUSLIMS AND THE 
ROYAL PATRONAGE OF RELIGION, 28 Law & Soc'y Rev. 453, L. & Society R. Part I. 
107 Constitution of Royal Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2540 (1997) [hereinafter Thai Constitutional B.E.2540] 
sec. 9 [f]he King shall be Buddhist and the upholder of Buddhist faith. 
108 Sompong Sucharitkul, Thai Law and Buddhist Law, American Society of Comparative L. INC., 
XL VI Am. J. of Compo L. 82, Supp.(1998). 
109 See Thai Constitotional B.E.2550 sec. 4 
[T]he human dignity, rights and liberties and equality of the people shall be protected; sec. 5 [f]he Thai 
people, irrespective of their·origins,sexes or religions, shall enjoy equal protection under this Constitution; 
Thai Constitutional B.E.2549 sec. 3 
[U]pon the provisions of this Constitution, the human dignity, right, liberty and equality of the Thai people 
protected by the democratic tradition of Thailand with the King as head of State and by the existing 
International commitments of Thailand shall be protected by this Constitution; 
See also the Thai Constitutional B.E.2540] sec 30. 
[~]II persons are equal before the law and shall enjoy equal protection. Men and women shall enjoy equal 
nghts. Unjust discrimination against a person on the grounds of difference in origin, race, language, sex, 
age, physical or health condition, personal status, economic or social standing, religious belief, education or 
CO~~titutionally political view shall not be permitted ; sec 38.[A] person shall enjoy full liberty to profess a 
religion, a religious sect or creed, and obseNe religious precepts or exercise a form of worship in 
accordance with his or her belief; provided that it is not contrary to his or her civic duties, public order or 
~OOd mor~ls. In exercising the liberty referred to in paragraph one, a person is protected from any act of the 
tate, which is derogatory to his or her rights or detrimental to his or her due benefits on the grounds of 
rrofessing a religious precepts or exercising a form of worship in accordance with his or her different belief 
rom that of others. . 
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. Thai Muslim army officer, to the position of Army Supreme Commander, which is the 
highest rank and position in the Thai Army. In fact, a number of Muslims in Thailand 
have had important positions in the Government both in the present and in the past. Also, 
Thai Law on family relations recognizes a pluralistic society wherein persons of different 
faiths are subject to different personal laws such as family relations, adoption, betrothal, 
marriage, divorce, and succession. Thus, Thailand already recognized a choice of family 
laws other than Buddhist even prior to the adoption of the Code on the Conflict of Law in 
B.E.2481 (1938).110 However, language and religion are usually considered key elements 
in what constitutes an ethnic group. 
Data of Population and Religion 2000 III 
No. Area Population Muslim Buddhist 
Christian Others 
Pattani 608,246 485,718 119,090 
1,173 1,735 
2 Yala 358,011 279,705 74,730 
2,691 865 
3 Narathiwat 671,649 529,398 89,262 
1,380 1,987 
4 Satun 260,265 200,700 59,234 
212 119 
Total 1,898,201 1,495,521 342,316 
6,016 4,706 
Based on data collected by the Islamic Committee ofPattani, 2000. 
110 
See S. Sucharitkul, cited in note 108 supra, at p. 86 
111 • M Sn Nuryanti, the Landscape of Intellectual's Thoughts: Pattani Identity and the Emergency of a resistance 
F ovement 127 - 128, Center f~)f Political and Regional Studies (UPI), Indonesia, the Papers of the 2001 API 
ellows, the Asian Face of Globalisation Reconstructing Identities, Institutions, and Resources (2001). 
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Trends in the Social Structure ofPattani 112 
No. Main issue 
Thai-Buddhist* Thai-Muslim* Malay-Muslim* 
Location Urban 
Semi-urban Rural areas (southern 
part) 
2 population Spread 
Over most areas of the Southern areas Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, 
country 
Satun 
3 Social and Economic Advanced 
Moderate Low 
Status 
4 Level of Education 
High school and upper High school Primary 
levels 
5 occupation 
Staff and peasant Sales 
and Peasant or jobless 
peasant 
* According to the use of language and religion faith. 
People in this southern area of Thailand speak a dialect (yavi) and embrace 
Islam, and they remain traditionally Islamic and fulfill religious duties by teaching the 
Islamic faiths and practices to their children. There are several hundred Pondoks
l13 
offering a traditional religious education that does not always provide a strong 
preparation for successful employment in wider Thai society.1l4 Moreover, Pondoks 
112 Ibid. 
113 I I T~e origins of this school can probably be traced back to the Hindu Buddhist ashram (retreat) in pre -
~s~mlc Southeast Asia. But as the Malay word "Pondok" indicates, it developed into a uniquely Southeast 
d~n y.et thoro~ghly Islamic institution. Maintaining such a Pondok can be considered as fulfilling a religious 
obI" ' ~lnce takmg care of traveling scholars or students "on the way of AllahH is one way to meet the 
Igabon of Zakat, one of the five pillars of Islam (Carool Kersten: 21 Am.J. Islamic Soc.Sci.2004). 
114 . 2~un~n McCargo, Southern Thai Politics: A Preliminary Overview 6, POLIS working Paper No.3 Feb., 
,Umversity of Leeds 2004. 
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have been blamed for providing the breeding ground for the bloody uprising
llS 
and have 
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Thailand had a good record of economic growth in both the GDP117 and the SET 
index between 1976 and 2003. There was considerable expansion from 2003 to this 
current year. In the view of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Thailand was one 
of East Asia's best performers in 2002-04 because of a well-developed infrastructure, a 
115 John R Bradley, Islamist schools are blamed for bloody upnslng in Thailand, The Independent 
n~spaper, May.15 2004, available at httpflnews.independent.co.uklworld/asia/article60509.ece (last 
VISited May.18, 2006). 
116 
J Jan McGirk, Thai soldiers search Islamic schools for terrorism suspects, The Independent newspaper 13 
2~)~' 2004, available at httpllnews.independent.co.uklworld/asia/article73330.ece (last visited May. 1, 
117 
9ro~~e rep~rt of National Economics and Social Development Board, Bank of Thailand shows the economic 
WOrld (%) 10 Thailand from year 1999 through 2004 are 4.4, 4.8, 2.1, 5.4, 6.8, and 6.1. Meanwhile the 
Economic Growth (%) from year 1998 through 2003 are 2.8,3.7,4.6,2.5,3.0 and 4.0. 
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free-enterprise economy, and pro-investment policies. Thailand appears to have fully 
recovered from the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis despite a sluggish global economy. 
Bangkok has pursued preferential trade agreements with a variety of partners in an effort 
to boost exports and to maintain high growth. However, ordinary people are more 
worried about the rising cost of living compounded by the fear of lay-offs for their newly 
graduated sons and daughters. Most Bangkokians still remember the pain of the 
economic meltdown in 1997, which toppled many businesses, bled into the poorer 
segments of society, and cast many deep into debt. II8 
According to studies by the United Nations agencies conducted to find out about 
the consequences of those policies, 82% of the southern province's 730,146 people are 
Malay-Muslims, who have a poverty rate that is two to three times higher than Thailand's 
national average. 119 These provinces have long been at a disadvantage since economic 
neglect, little industry, no infrastructure, and a failed tourism campaign (despite extensive 
natural beauty)120 have conspired to make this region less prosperous compared to the 
central country.l2l However, in terms of revenue, Thai records show that the poorest 
provinces lie in the Northeastern region of Thailand. 122 This is completely contrary to the 
118 
Kamol Hengkietisak, Juling - A Model Teacher, Bangkok post 1, May 28,2006. 
119 
Marwaan Macan -marker, Armed Conflict report, Asia Times online, Sep. 29, 2008, available at 
http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRTextlACR-Thailand.htm (last visited May. 1,2006). 
120 . 
Dantel Lovering & Kareem M.Kamel, "Bloodshed in Thailand's Restive Muslim South Follows Oecades-
Old Struggle, Apr. 28, Associated Press (2004). 
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. Thailand's restive south, Jut. 15, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.ukl1/hi/world/asia-
paClficJ3955543.stm (last visited Aug.1 , 2006). 
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In year 2006, unemployment was the highest in the Northeast at 1.87 per cent, but it dropped from 3.2 
~e~ cent in the same period last year. Unemployment was the lowest at 1.09 per cent in the South due to the 
"181n9 price of rubber. Unemployment in the Central region was 1.56 per cent and in the Northem region at 
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studies by the United Nations Agency, which provide evidence that Pattani,. Satun, Yala, 
and Narathiwat are among the least developed provinces of the Kingdom. \23 
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123 SAC . . d' ee . rOissant, cite In note 61 supra. 
omc al Itsuchon & Jirapom PLangpraphan, Poverty, Economic Security and the Role of the Thai 124 S h' J' 
Govemment: TORI Quarterly Review Naresuan University, Vol.18 No.4, December 2003, at 20 and 21. 
[T]hailand is among the countries of the world with an impressive record of poverty reduction. In the early 
1960s, around 60 percent of the Thai people lived in poverty; in 2002 the proportion was less than 10 
percent. However, as recently as 1986 the incidence of poverty, measured by head-count ratio, was still 
~ro~nd 40 percent. The pace of poverty reduction has been both rapid and virtually uninterrupted. Only twice 
urlng the past two decades has the incidence of poverty increased: first, between 1981 and 1986 when 
~mmodity prices plummet and second, after the financial and economic crises of 1997/98, which resulted in 
Widespread unemployment. 
Of the fiv~ regions, including the Bangkok Metropolitan Area (BMA), the Northeastern region is always the 
Inr.; ... "S,hn,oMwlng the highest incidence of poverty. The Northern and Southern regions have a comparable 
Int'i ... ,,~.~~ of poverty, second to the Northeastern region, while the Central region and BMA enjoy the lowest 
as in many other countries, poverty in Thailand is largely a rural phenomenon. The rural poor 
""'-"UIlU>N for around 80 percent to 85 percent of the total poor during most of the last 20 years. The fact 
between the rural poor and the urban poor remains largely unchanged amid the 
that has taken place suggests that rural poverty declined at a somewhat slower rate than urban 
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The conflicts that have erupted in this area are the result of the accumulation of 
many problems-historical, economic, political, and ideological. It is apparent that the 
problem is not simple, but certainly drugs, crime, and religious fanaticism could lead to a 
large-scale conflict. All of these issues are central to the current serious crisis in the 
southernmost provinces. So long as the State cannot eradicate the root of the conflict, the 
violent past will reoccur. This is the reason why Thailand has been continually faced with 
escalating violence in its southern provinces since the beginning of 2004 . 
. II - 2 Resurgence of Violence 
In 1948, a vi Hager from Dusun Nyir,125 Narathiwat Province, rebelled against the 
Thai government because the Thai Nationlism policy (so-called Rataniyom policy) 
disregarded Islamic religion during the leadership of Field Marshall Pibulsongkram. 
This policy caused the death of many Muslim villagers. Until the last two years, there 
have been very few deaths related to this conflict. On January 4, 2004, violence again 
erupted in the four Muslim-dominated southern provinces, violence that started with 
"t l' s ea mg weapons." 
VOrramai Kabinsingha. Dusun Nyir, S.P.S.Printing. 2004. 
51 
I 
A. Weapon Seizing 
BBC news posted on January 4, 2004: 
Armed raids in southern Thailand; Four soldiers have been 
killed and 18 schools burned down in a series of attacks in 
predominantly Muslim southern Thailand. About 30 gunmen 
raided an army depot in Narathiwat province early on Jan 4, 
2004, stealing some 100 rifles. 
1. Succession of Systematic Acts of Violence 
An unexpected raid at the army depot shocked Pattani into a new era of violence 
and terror. Some thirty armed bandits stormed the army depot in Narathiwat and made 
off with a cache of 300 weapons including 300 assault rifles, 40 pistols, and two M-60 
machine guns. This attack killed four Thai soldiers and stunned the country. Even though 
the raid was not an act of war or an armed conflict, the effects were not different from 
military conflict, and the attack seemed to be ushering in' a new era of armed conflict. 
Whel) in the same area eighteen schools were set on fire using mosquito coils on petrol-
soaked sacks, these conflicts seem to embroil more and more Thai citizens in a new 
epoch of ethnic war. On the following Monday, January 5, 2004, two policemen were 
killed when a bomb they were trying to defuse (planted on a motorcycle parked outside a 
shOpping mall in Pattani) exploded. In another incident, an explosion ripped through a 
POlice box in a nearby public park killing two policemen and injuring another policeman. 
Two more b b . ' om s were found and defused, one m a shoppmg-mall telephone booth and 
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another in a nearby petrol station. 126 The bombs in the shopping mall were perhaps the 
most disconcerting because it was clear that the attack was aimed to impact the daily 
lives of common people (to say nothing of causing havoc with the Thai economy). These 
scare tactics were the result of careful planning in which a series of attacks were to occur 
many places within and outside government buildings at the same time. However, these 
acts of violence were focused on symbols of the Government because schools in the past 
were seen as anti-Islamic by separatist militants. 127 Furthermore, these attacks not only 
aimed at challenging the authority of the government, but also of gaining access to 
weapons for the assailants' plan. Deputy Prime Minister Chavalit Y ongchaiyudh 
speculated that the assailants were aided by someone inside the military's armory. This 
supposition of the Deputy Prime Minister showed the weakness of the armed forces in 
areas of security and intelligence as Military units had the guards performed their daily 
duties as usual. However, this raid was very audacious and started the wave of violence. 
2. Government Response 
Initially, former Prime Minister Taksin Shinawatra said most of the separatists in 
the area were bandits who ran rackets along the Thai-Malaysian border and described the 
violence as the work of only criminals,128 but Police General Sant Sarutanond said 
intelligence officers learned that a group of 12 Muslim terrorists had planned to plant 
See Globalsecurity, cited in note 89 supra. 
Ibid. 
MCGivering , Thailand's separatist fears, Jan. 6, 2004, available at 
li/a~;ia-l)acifici'33jr29:23.s,tn (last visited Mar. 18,2005). 
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bombs in the four Muslim-dominated provinces as part of an ongoing terror campaign. 129 
Meanwhile some Thai officials have even suggested that the leaders of the groups of 
violence have fled into the Terengganu, Province of Malaysia, but Malaysian officials 
. k d h . 130 have been qUlC to eny t at suggestlOn. 
It was not difficult to imagine why former Prime Minister Taksin insisted that this 
incident was merely a criminal act. He did not want this incident to become an 
international affair and did not want to panic the people even though the gravity of the 
raid was unusual as many experts have pointed out. 
Subsequent to the violence on January 4, 2004 where there was a robbery of 
military weapons at the Army camp in Narathiwat province, the.Thai Government placed 
these three southern provinces under martial law, which afterward was superseded by the 
Emergency Decree On Public Administration in Emergency Situation, B.E. 2548 (2005). 
..... 
This Decree is broadly criticized for its neglect of human rights, an issue to be discussed 
in another chapter. In the meantime, as a consequence of the army raid, the army offered 
a reward of 1 million bath ($25,000 US dollars) for information leading to the arrest of 
those responsible131 and issued special licenses for civil servants to carry guns for self-
defense. 132 
129 
Armed raids in southern Thailand, Jan. 4, 2004, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.ukl1Ihilworld/asia-pacificl3366359.stm (last visited Mar. 18, 2005). 
130 
h ~ualnoi Thammasathien, Thailand wakes up to southern threat, Jan. 8, available at 
ttp.llnews.bbc.co.ukl2lhilasia-paCificl3379345.stm (last visited May. 1, 2006). 
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See Globalsecurity, cited in note 89 supra. 
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htt ~ungrawee C. Pinyarat, Gun lessons for teachers in the South, the Nation, Oct. 10, 2004, available at 
(
I p./lWWW.nationmultimedia.com/search/page .arcview .php ?c1id=3&id= 1 08043&date=2004-1 0-26) 
ast Visited Aug.1, 2006). 
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Because the Government knew that it would be blamed for the poor quality of 
security and intelligence, they launched strong policies to respond to the attack. 
Although it is the duty of every State to protect its citizens, such policies were considered 
to be too harsh and the Thai Government resorted to the use of extreme force to perform 
the operation, 
Finally, the predictions of many analysts and officers that tensions would rise and 
continue in this area were accurate', The robbery of rifles was followed by gun shots, 
bombings, and random attacks, setting off a second wave of violence on April 28, 2004, 
in "Kre Se Mosque" in Pattani Province, 
B. Krue Se Mosq ue 
CBSNEWS posted on April 29, 2004: 
Angry and grief-stricken villagers buried their dead Thursday a 
day after Thai police killed more than 100 suspected Islamic 
militants, and the government braced killings happened as police 
repulsed coordinated insurgent attacks across Thailand's 
Muslim south. Bands of about 20 people each raided about 15 
police outposts for revenge attacks amid allegations of excessive 
force. The widespread and checkpoints in the provinces of Yala, 
Pattani and Songkhla. Security forces shot and kiJled. 108 





were killed in fights with the suspects; most of them are teenager 
armed with knives or other blade weapons. 133 
1. Systemic Violence 
In another attack focused on symbols of Government authority, thirty members 
of an armed Islamic band. started to open fire by launching rifle shots at the police 
outpost, killing two security officers in the Pattani Province. After the gun shots, the 
Islamic band escaped, carrying off AK-47 and M-16s rifles to the Kru Se mosque, 134 and 
continued to fire from the mosque at Thai security forces. This appeared as if the Kru Se 
Mosque was deliberately used as a place of their choosing according to a scheme. 
Finally, the Thai Security Forces made the decision to execute all of the armed bandits 
after waiting for several hours while villagers surrounded the Thai Security Forces and 
began to try to assist the armed Islamic band. Although the Thai security said these were 
necessary measures for the operation at that time, newspapers from around the world did 
not see it in that light. After the Thai Security Forces decided to kill the suspects, it was 
found that most of these allied offenders only had machetes and very few were carrying 
rifles. 
In this case, it is very significant that they were trying to attack symbols of 
Government authority by targeting fifteen police outposts again, and this situation was 
different from the January 4, 2004 assault because of villager involvement. The Islamic 
;;----------------------
h ~hais Fear 'Militant' Revenge, CBS News, Apr.29, 2004, available at 
ttp.llwww.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/27/world/maiI614100shtmI (last visited Aug. 1,2005). 
134 
157 Kru Se mosque is one of the oldest mosques in Pattani province which was unfurnished and built in 
8 by a Chinese convert to Islam. 
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armed band attempted to lead the Thai Security· Forces into misunderstanding that the 
band had rifles and to make the situation worse by pushing villagers into pressuring the 
Thai Security Forces to resort to the use of force. Moreover, some analysts observed that 
the date of the incident coincided with the same period of the Dusun Nyir incident in 
1948. 
From the incidents, it could be gathered that this act was calculated to start 
conflict between the Thai Security Forces and the villagers. This could be seen from the 
strange way in which the villagers surrounded the Thai Securities Forces. To complicate 
matters, if the Thai Security Forces used force on the villagers, whether it was deliberate 
or not, this could easily go beyond the scope of domestic issues. This incident could 
spark an international debate and get international attention in favor of the Islamic 
militants cause. If it were, in fact, the case that Thai Security Forces used more force than 
necessary, it would definitely raise the issue of human rights before the United Nations. 
It would be an act of mistreatment of the Government towards its civilian population, and 
as a result many sections of international law would be concerned and affected. At this 
stage, it could be said that the well-deliberated plan of the Islamic dissidents to die had 
Succeeded. Because, beyond doubt, the international community would be outraged by 
the needless execution of thirty unarmed Islamic minorities at the hands of the Thai 
police. 
2. Government Response 
Faced with the fact that the Government could do nothing to stop the harshness of 
the dissidents, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra finally accepted the theory that the 
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raids were linked to a January 2004 attack on a military camp and hinted that these 
dissidents received financial support from influential figures, politicians and drug 
gangsters. He, however, still did not believe that the attackers had any connections with 
international terrorists 135 despite the fact that one of the men killed in the violence was 
found to be wearing a shirt with Jl136 emblazoned on the back.137 Meanwhile, widespread 
critiques on the war on drugs policy and the arrest of Riduall Isamuddin (so-called 
Hambali) at Ayutthaya on August 11, 2003 were perceived to be related to the armed 
bandit groups. 138 On the contrary, Defense Minister Chettha Thanajaro said the attacks 
were carried out by Muslim separatists who received assistance from abroad. 
Furthermore, General Pallop Pinmanee, deputy chief of the Internal Security Operations 
Command, said that one of the group's leaders, lehbemae Buteh, was being hunted and 
was believed to be hiding in Malaysia. 139 The possibility can be seen that the political 
and military operations cannot work together. At this stage, no matter how violent an act 
would be -- whether it was committed by gangsters or separatists or any other bandits, the 
National Intelligence Agency would blame such attacks on the Muslim dissidents. 140 
135 . 
South's Bloodiest Day, The Nation, Apr. 28, 2004, available at 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/search/page. arcview. php?clid= 1 &id=978 74&date=2004-04-28 
(last visited Mar., 2005). 
~ . 
Jemaah Islamiah (JI), a militant Islamic organization was founded in the mid-1990s. This group has the 
goal of establishing an independent Islamic State in Indonesia, Malaysia and the southem islands of the 
~h~l~pp~nes.136 The goal is to use violence to overthrow the governments in Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
hlhpPlnes, Singapore and Thailand. 
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Scores killed in Thai gun battles, Apr. 28, 2004, available at 
http://news.bbc,co.ukl2/hi/asia-pacific/3665293.stm (last visited Mar.18, 2005). 
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. A ~ossible reference to Jemaah Islamiah, the group blamed for terrorist attacks across South East Asia, 
InClUding the-Bali bombings. 
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h ~uslim group 'behind Thai raids, Jan. 8, 2004, available at 
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Prime Minister Taksin did not take any further steps that would have been helpful 
in an effort to establish a link between this incident and the army raid. But Prime Minister 
Taksin still insisted that the incident was most likely a criminal act rather than an 
international incident because he feared such a connection would enflame the 
. international criminal organizations and might inspire another Muslim militant group to 
undertake another wave of attacks. Whether to take consolation or to make amends for 
the failure of the Government in handling problems in the south, the Prime Minister 
promised, after the attack on Kru Se mosque (one of the oldest mosques in Thailand), to 
restore the historic temple by ordering the Fine Arts Department to repair the walls that 
were tom down or damaged. 141 
c. TakBai 
After the detention of six men who were accused of providing the stolen weapons 
from an Army camp to Islamic militants, later that year, violence erupted again: 
USATODAY posted on October 26,2004: 
Officials say 78 died after Thailand riot: At least 78 people were 
suffocated or crushed to death after being arrested and packed 
into police trucks following a riot in southern Thailand over the 
Carnage: Kingdom shaken; The Nation, Apr. 29, 2004, available at. 
n~tllnnrnl .arcview.php?clid=2&id=97956&date=2004-04-29 (last visited 
PM Promises' to Rebuild Mosque Damaged in Police Attack, Yahoo!News, May. 8, 2004. 
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detentions of Muslims suspected of giving weapons to Islamic 
. 142 separatIsts. 
1. Acts of Violence 
Acts of violence began when a crowd gathered at the Tak Bai police station in the 
Narathiwat province, and asked for the unconditional release of the six detained men who 
were accused of unlawful seizure of weapons in January of 2004. There has been 
speculation that this incident had a connection with the preceding story. The protesters 
injured three officers and overturned two military trucks and one police car. Again, this 
was not a peaceful riot. Evidence recovered from the area of the protest during their 
attempt to storm the police station showed that the protesters had knives, machetes, and 
grenades. At this stage, the situation seemed to be getting worse. The Thai Security 
Forces were facing a situation that might spiral out of control, but they had to attempt to 
make the situation manageable. However, after being arrested and loaded into army 
trucks, at least seventy-eight people died from suffocation. This raises the question: did 
the Thai Security Forces cause the death of seventy-eight people either deliberately or out 
of neglect? The media reported that there was an unnamed group that tried to block the 
riots and failed to get away from the scene. 143 Who was this unnamed group? How 
reliable is the media's report? Is it suspicious that this riot also included a group who 
failed to leave or was it just a typical protest? 
----------------------
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o Chutarath Aueu- Umnuey, The prosecution in 3 southern provinces: problems and remedies 69-70, 
ctober Printing (2005). 
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2. Government Response 
Once more, the Government was compelled to resort to the use of force because 
the Thai Security Forces failed to exercise enough restraint in handling the protesters. 
Lack of experience and negligence in the past by Thai Security Forces have long been 
causes of these tragedies even if the capacity of the Thai Security Forces was not at its 
highest on the weekend because there were not enough trucks to serve the need. This 
incident was understood by the public as an example of government security officials 
mistreating protesters who dispersed after the demonstration by using reckless tactics. l44 
At this time, Prime Minister Taksin made a statement to the Senate asserting that the 
pr<?testers belonged to the Autash group or were teachers at the Ponok School that had 
induced the crowd to protest by asking the crowd, their friends, and their relatives to join 
in so as to reveal Pattani history. 145 This gave Thailand a bad reputation as a government 
that violated human rights. However, Prime Minister Taksin's speech implied that he 
knew of no relation between the domestic dissidents and any international terrorist group. 
Despite the fact that Prime Minister Taksin had always insisted that the incident was only 
confined to domestic affairs, his statement was meant to the explain of the use 9f force by 
Thai Security Forces as absolutely necessary. Although Prime Minister Taksin attempted 
at first to support the Thai Security Forces because he-realized that the use of force was 
not effective enough and accomplished nothing toward the task of relieving ethnic 
tensions. At this stage, Prime Minister Taksin launched a policy to reimburse the victims 
and ordered the formation of the 48-member commission, known in short as the Thai 
144 
Thai army criticized over Tak 8ai, May. 4, 2005, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2/hi/asia-pacificl4512845.stm (last visited Mar.2, 2005). 
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National Reconciliation Commission (NRC). The commission was appointed on March 
28, 2005 and was responsible for suggesting policies, measures, mechanisms, and 
methods to reconcile and bring peace to Thai society, especially the three southern border 
provinces, Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat, with former Prime Minister Anand 
panyarachun as chairman. The NRC was then appointed to investigate the Kre-Se case.
146 
Although the appointment of the committee may have made the matter look better for the 
time being, it was not the best long-term solution. In this case, the transparency of 
criminal justice would be the best indication of any sign of recovery of the soiled 
reputation of the country. 
D. The Abduction and Murder of the Two Marines 
In an unprecedented incident, two marines were held hostage and later killed by 
villagers who accused them of shooting customers at a teashop. The marines were part of 
a central government plan to support the alliance policy of providing good relations 
between Security Forces and the people. In this case, I will focus on why the two marines 
were killed in spite of the fact that they had been successful in their mission to become 
very friendly with the local inhabitants. 
~-----------------
http~~ ~ational Reconciliation Commission to Help Ease Southern Problems, Apr. 1, 2005, available at 
. alland.prd.go.th/the_inside_view.php?id=663 (last visited Mar. 18,2006). 
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ASIANEWS posted on September 22, 2005: 
Two Thai Marines held captive by villagers in the 
insurgency - racked south were beaten and stabbed to 
death yesterday by young Islamists who rushed into the 
house where the two marines were being held. 147 
1. Acts of Violence 
On Tuesday night (Sep 20, 2005), there were gun shots at a local teashop that 
caused the death of two people and injured four. At that time, the two servicemen were 
just passing by on their way to another incident but decided to stop after they heard the 
shooting at the teashop Their car ap~eared to have broken down at the same time.
148 
Because the villagers accused the two marines of being behind the shooting, hundreds of 
villagers took the two marines hostage and locked them in a religious school that night. In 
these circumstances, villagers expressed their distrust of the Thai press and their 
preferences for Malaysian coverage of the incident. They demanded that the government 
set up a committee to investigate the shooting at the teashop and that foreign media be 
permitted into the village to document the incident. Why the international media were so 
quick on the scene lent suspicions to the incident, begging the question why people 
would be thinking about the media when there was an emergency in progress. But no one 
would step forward to act as a representative of the villagers. For the moment, 
147 hU:~ndame~talists Kill Thai marines held in the mosque. Asianews. Sep. 22. 2005. available at 
.1www.aslanews.iUview.php?1=en&art=4167 (last visited Mar. 1. 2006). 
148 
http~~uthern ':lurders reflect lack of effective. The Nation. Sep. 22. 2005. available at 
(\ast ~.natlonmultimedia.com/search/page.arcview.php?c1id=2&id=12277 4&date=2005-09-22 
VIsited Mar.1. 2005). 
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conunandos were positioned to storm the village and rescue the marines, but hooded 
villagers took advantage of the absence of eyewitnesses to kill the men when people 
gathered in the mosque for mid-day prayers. Throughout the entire stand-off, hundreds of 
women - their faces wrapped in traditional headscarves - stood on a tiny bridge just 
meters away from heavily armed soldiers, as their children played nearby. Also, it is 
possible that these children were deliberately put there by people who wished to stage or 
choreograph a scene that pulled at the hearts of TV viewers watching the showdown. 
The women and children blocked the entrance to the village for 18 hours. Meanwhile, 
they put up a large tent that was plastered with messages: "Evil has spread since 
Thaksin 's party came to power. Ethnic Malay people have been cruelly killed by soldiers. 
They are the real terrorists. " The killings carne amid a desperate attempt by authorities 
to negotiate their release from Ban Tanyonglimo in the border province of Narathiwat. 
But by the time Malaysian reporters arrived on the scene in the middle of the afternoon, 
the two marines had been executed. This incident explains how in some measure the 
extremists used violence to draw public attention to the injustices of the Thai 
Government no matter how violent and unspeakable the methods were. 
An autopsy performed by doctors revealed that the pair had died a gruesome 
death after being beaten and tortured. The time of their deaths was about 2.00 p.m. on 
September 20, 2005. The bodies of the two marines were recovered by the Thai military 
already brutally beaten to death with machetes and sticks with their hands and legs tied 
up. They were also gagged and blindfolded. 
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Again, this incident is related to the villagers' blockade and the demanding of 
foreign media to document the incident. This case leads to the next question: Is that the 
real intention of the villagers? If not, who induced them? 
2. Government Response 
In this case, even though the authorities had the capacity to assist the two 
marines, they did not. This begs the question why the authorities let the two marines die. 
The authorities preferred to negotiate rather than use force out from the lessons they had 
learned in the Tak Bai and Kru Se case. This decision of whether or not to assist the two 
marines was ail example of the risk the Government had taken to protect its reputation. 
Because the authorities feared that the unnamed group might kill villagers and that even 
greater chaos and violence might erupt, they let the two marines die. After the two 
marines died and before the discouragement of authorities, the Government tried to win 
back the confidence and the trust of the authorities. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra 
announced his decision to capture the killers of the two marines and launched an all-out 
military operation to bring the suspected militants and villagers responsible for the crimes 
to justice. On September 23, 2005, the Narathiwat Provincial Court issued arrest warrants 
for 11 suspects, including a 48-year-~ld woman, in connection with the brutal murder of 
the two marines in a hostage drama, and the two suspects were arrested. 
Many of the violent responses from the dissidents in this incident resemble that 
the first year of the attack. It was as if the violence continued on as before and in some 
Ways was worse since the arrest of 48-year-old woman implied that the members of the 
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militant group was composed of all types of people - the elderly, teenagers, and women. 
This raised concerns that the dissidents had gained in numbers and suggested that as a 
result in the not too distant future boys, girls, or children will be involved. That will be a 
tough task for the Government to handle successfully if this militant group is not just a 
group but is a society or community. However, this incident underscores that this 
approach of using force - either to suppress behavior or to instill peace- did not work 
at all. 
E. Assassination of Teachers 
THE NATION posted on February 16,2006: 
. 
Teachers take a week off after five colleagues shot: Some 250 
primary schools hit as attacks continue; 3 defense volunteers 
killed 149 
Resulting from tensions since the army raids on April 2004, more than 1,000 
schools in Southern Thailand have closed. A teacher at one school in Pattani province 
told The Nation newspaper on January 28, 2004, that she had received leaflets 
threatening attacks on teachers and students in the province. ISO Then, no less than 3,000 
teachers in southern Thailand held a rally to demand better security after one of their 
Colleagues was ShOt. ISI In Yala, teachers at 250 primary schools refused to go to perform 
149 
h Teachers take a week off after five colleagues shot, The Nation, Feb. 16,2006, available at 
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their duties for one week. The atmosphere in the area was very tense, and the teachers 
refused to go to work. Since being targeted by militants during the resurgence of violence 
over the past two years, many teachers in the three southernmost provinces have sought 
h 152 transfers to ot er areas. 
From 2004 to May 2006, at least forty-nine teachers and other school staff have 
been killed. 153 Although teachers were escorted to and from schools by security forces in 
many parts of the border provinces, and the Government allowed them to.carry guns, they 
still have been targeted by Muslim separatists. Many teachers (Buddhists and Muslims 
alike) have been gunned down while traveling alone. 154 
a. Muslim Teachers 
On June 21, 2005, a group of killers entered the home of three young Islamic 
teachers (ustazs) shot them in their heads, killing them instantly, while they were 
performing their nightly prayers (Isha).155 
h. Buddhist Teachers 
The two most tragic incident of Buddhist teachers occurred on June 24, 2005, 
When at least two gunman opened fire by shooting four times - twice in the chest and 
152 
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twice in the arm--which killed the victim instantly. The teacher was identified as Kobkul 
Runsaew~ 47, a female school director, the director of Ban Tua Ko School in 
Narathiwat's Rangae district. Because the school director visited her home daily to take 
care of her paralysed mother during lunch break, the assailants might have been tracking 
her movements just prior gunning her down. This case received attention from all 
sectorsl56 because Thais customarily respect the teacher and adore the grateful person. 
So, there were more than 2,000 people from many areas including northern, eastern and 
central provinces came to attend her funeral and cremation. 
On the following day (May 19,2006), Juling Panganmoon (or Teacher Juei) and 
another female teacher Sininart. Thawomsuk were taken hostage and beaten by villagers 
until Juling fell into a comatose state and was taken to Prince of Songhkla Hospital in the 
Hat Yai district. As the villagers demanded security officers release two men arrested 
earlier in connection with the murders of the two marines in the same district in 2005,157 
around 100 villagers stormed Gujingruepo School and abducted the two teachers -an 
altercation that appears to have been well-planned.
ls8 
In the Juling case, the violent villagers wanted Thai Security Officers to release 
two men arrested in connection with the murders of the two marines last year. These were 
the same conditions of the Tak Bai case when the rioters demanded the Government 
release suspects wanted for the seizure of weapons. After the villagers abducted and beat 
the two women Buddhist teachers, more than 100 Government schools in Thailand's 
ISS/b 'd I. 
157 
See K. Hengkietisak, cited in note 118 supra. 
158 
Three more arrested for attack on teachers, Bangkok Post, May. 24, 2006. 
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rebellious Muslim in the far south were closed. 159 These attacks definitely caused 
. 1 d d· 1160 southern proVInces to ose more goo e ucatlOn personne . 
Expert161 viewed the deaths of these teachers as importarIt for three reasons. First, 
Kobkul was killed while trying to perform an act of a daughter's filial duty to her mother. 
The moral outrage that was triggered by her murder was therefore comprehensible. 
Second, her killing was unique in the history of violence in Southern Thailand because it 
was very unusual for a woman to be deliberately targeted for an assassination. Third, the 
assassination of the three young ustazs could be seen differently by the killers and 
families of those killed as well as ordinary Muslims. 162 These assassinations have a 
definite and visible aim; killing teachers would ·attract media attention from around the 
world. 
Moreover, political analysts 163 say that the reason for killing teachers is because 
Muslim radicals prefer an uneducated populace. They do not want the Muslim population 
159 School in Muslim Thai south closed after attack, Reuters, May. 22,2006. 
160 Interview by The Nation with Pakorn Thepsom, director of Narathiwat's Education Zone 2, Southern 
Violence: School director gunned . down, available at 
http://www.komchadluek.neUbreaking/read.php?lang=en&newsid=66742 (last visited Jun. 30, 2005). 
161 
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director of the Thai Peace Information Centre which conducts studies and activism in relation to the Thai 
milit~ry and social issues. He is an expert on non-violence theory as well as activism and Islam. He has 
rUbhshed numerous articles and book chapters on the military, altemative defense, religion and peace, 
~Iam and nonviolence, ~n.d modern political ~hi~osophy. For !l1any years, he directed the Intern~tio~al 
. eace Research ASSOCiation's (IPRA) commiSSion on non-Violence, and he serves at the SCientific 
Committee of the International University for Peoples' Initiative for Peace, IUPIP, in Rovereto, Italy. 
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. B Chaiwat Satha-Anand, Southern Thailand: Beheading citizens: Killing Teachers as the Trap of Violence, 
angkok Post, JuI.S, 2005. --
163 
. Or.Grace Gorospe-Jamon is an esteemed associate professor of political science for twenty-eight years 
~h the College of Social Sciences and Philosophy at the University of the Philippines where she teaches 
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Pr ~rma~ce of members of both Houses of Congress and serves as consultant to the Office of the 
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to be educated, so that this area can eventually become the breeding grounds for 
recruitment for terrorist groups like Al Qaeda.
164 
The impact of these acts of violence is a great challenge to the Government. But 
the important thing is that it affects the feeling of the children that have to be confronted 
with the daily killing of indiscriminate targets that happen to be their teachers or people 
that they are familiar with. If the Government cannot stop this violence, it should be 
concerned about the aggressive characteristics of these children in the next ten years. 
1. Government Response 
After -a number of threats to teachers and students, as well as arson attacks on 
school buildings, the Government has tried to step up security in southern schools, but 
fewer than 1,000 soldiers and police have been deployed to the schools. 165 However, the 
incidents of teacher assassination suggest that the lack of appropriate security in the 
schools demonstrates the Thai Government's inability to respond to the demands ofrapid 
operation. 
F. Decapitation 
The dissident groups use decapitation as a form of assassination not merely because 
of its dramatic effect but also to symbolize the act of violence. The main target of this 
;;---------------------
~Ucille Talusan CBN News Asia Correspondent, Thailand's Islamic Radicals Target Teachers, CBN, 
available at http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/news/051104f.aspx (last visited Jun.30, 2006). 
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See Nationmedia, cited in note 152 supra. 
70 
> ~bol is Buddhism!66 Although various acts of violence have in their own ways sought 
to bring about religious conflict, the beheading of a Buddhist village leader in Thailand's 
Muslim-dominated south has provoked serious concern throughout Southeast Asia. 167 
Besides, authorities believe sometimes decapitated victims were Muslims suspected by 
the extremist of cooperating with government authorities.
168 
Since most of the dead 
bodies were first shot and then followed by the act of severing the head, decapitation as a 
form of torture de~igned to elicit fear or terror would seem superfluous. But this act of 
mutilation implies more than a way of inducing fear, but it is also a direct challenge to the 
power of the State and is seen as a form of punishment.
169 
G. Acts of Terror 
BUDDHIST CHANNEL posted on October 17,2005 
About 20 suspected Muslim separatists stormed a 
monastery, hacked an elderly Buddhist monk to death and 
fatally shot two temple boys Sunday in southern Thailand, 
police said. 170 
166 See N.Go, cited in note 153 supra. 
167 Berti! Lintner, Yale Global, Yale Center of the Study of Globalization, Nov.24,2004, available at 
IUP:llyclleQlob,al.yale.edu/display.article?id=4922 (last visited June 15, 2006). 
Insurgents behead rubber tapper, The Nation, Mar. 7, 2006 available at 
,1I11l1./IIA" ...... nationmultimedia.com/searchlpage.news.php?elid=35&id=20002170 (last visited June 15, 2006). 
Monk, temple boys murdered, Oct.17, 2005, available at 
.l'!'lindex.php?id=1,1823,O,O,1,O (last visited Jun.15, 2006). 
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This incident is a straightforward and clear instance of the dissidents group's 
endeavor to pressure Buddhists and Muslims into religious conflict so as to provoke 
further dissension and disorder. After a monk was hacked to death and two temple boys 
were killed, their bodies burned in a raid on a Buddhist temple in Pattani, I7I the local 
southern leaders appealed for calm and urged authorities not to take rash action. 
However, the· Buddhist community began to protest and ask the Government to take 
action against the Islamic dissidents. This violence is not merely intended to spark off 
religious conflict but also to choose indiscriminate targets. After the killing of elderly 
people, next would inevitably be infants and children. 
XINHUA posted on May 27, 2006 
A three-year-old infant was shot dead in his mother's arms 
in· Thailand's southern province of Pattani by unidentified 
gunmen late Saturday, and his parents and brother were 
I ., d 172 severe y Injure . 
About 7:00 p.m. on May 27, 2006, while a father was riding a motorcycle in 
Pattani's district with his wife sitting behind him holding their infant and a one-year-old 
little brother in her arms, an unidentified gunman opened fired on them, killing the infant 
on the spot and injuring the other three persons.
173 
172 
Infant shot dead-in Thai South, weapons recovered by military, Xinhua, May . .27, 2006 available at 
com/englishl2006-05/27/content_ 4609668.htm (last visited Jun. 15, 2006). 
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From these facts alone, it would be hard to say that the violence in this incident 
goes beyond the statistically "normal" daily killing. However, if we observed that the 
infant's father was a civil servant in the local government, this violence could be 
interpreted not only as cruel and wanton act but also an expression of opposition against a 
civil servant of the Government who had failed to perform his duty in this area. 
Another couple was brutally murdered in Yala. The victims were Jud 
Suwanchatree, 52, and his wife Serm Suwanchatree, 50. While they were riding a· 
motorcycle with a side car, the husband was shot several times in the body, and his throat 
was slit until he was nearly decapitated. The wife's throat was also slit until her head was 
almost severed. Inside the side car, their pet dog was found dead with knife wounds to the 
body and neck.
174 
The act of brutal murder by a militant group reflects a sentiment of a strong 
separatist movement and a disregard for human life. Many of them are without 
justification for their indiscriminate murderous acts simply because of alleged lack of 
effective cooperation between the Government and its people. The goal of brutal murder 
is to put terror and fear in the mind of the people with a view to driving those who are not 
part of their militant group into leaving their hometown. 175 
174 Southern Violence: School director gunned down, Komchadluek, Jun. 24 , 2005, available at 
http://www.komchadluek.netlbreaking/read.php?lang=en&newsid=66742 (last visited Jun. 15,2006). 
17S Kankavi, Fire in the South 198 -199, Animate Group, 2004. 
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1. Government Response 
Closed-circuit televisions were installed in government buildings, where officials 
trained villagers to use weapons for self-defense. 176 It would seem that the State resorted 
to many innovations with different tactics and techniques. However, the State must be 
fully aware and take care not to release any policy that might cause a reaction to such 
measures. For example, when all unregistered mobile phones began to be banned last 
year in order to prevent bomb attacks in the region,l77 there was an immediate outburst of 
11 bombings, both before the blockade and after. 178 
H. The Deportation of 131 Muslims 
As Thailand plans to make the country as attractive as possible for tourists and 
businesses, a great effort was displayed to show the gentle character and hospitality of the 
Thai people who provide a warm welcome for visitors. Thailand has given a safe haven 
and afforded asylum to persons fearing persecution from as many as forty States around 
the world. No fewer than 100,000 persons have fled their homelands to avoid being 
caught in the crossfire of local armed conflicts, and at least 2 million migrants from 
neighboring countries are seeking employment in the Kingdom.179 Recently, more than 
176 
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neighboring States, including Malaysia, have concluded agreements with Thailand 
visa requirements for holders of diplomatic, official, or 
that are automatically permitted to enter and stay in the 
p' ___ ""~, ..... for 30 to 90 days.180 This was made possible by the fact that Malaysia, 
's adjacent neighbor, has had a tradition of Thais and Malays people being on 
good terms. So much so, that it is very easy for Malays to enter Thailand even without 
any travel documents. Just using the "angkat tangan" practice of raising a hand and 
waving at the personnel manning the Bukit Kayu Hitam checkpoint, a border pass is 
scarcely ever stamped. The locals have been using the "border pass system" for years to 
enter Thailand for various reasons.
18
! 
On October, 30, 2005, l31 Thais took refuge in mosques in Kelantan, Malaysia, 
offered temporary shelter. These 131 Thai Muslims fled across the border because 
had lost faith in the Government's willingness or ability to protect them. However, 
were blamed for illegally traveling to Malaysia. Malaysian police said they had 
,""'U:UUI;;U 131 Thai Muslims, including women and children, who had fled across the 
to escape the continuing violence without any travel documents and have handed 
over to the immigration department for further action.!82 These situations raised 
.... vulIII" about the standard of the pass checkpoints between the two countries. Meanwhile 
Malaysian foreign minister also said that there were contemplating an immediate 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Thailand, available at 
.mfa.go.thfwebI2381.php#thailand (last visited Jun. 30, 2006). 
Bukkit Kayu Hitam, New Straits Times, May. 24, 2006. 
More bombings rock south Thailand. BBCNEWS, Sep.1. 2005. available at 
.bbc.co.ukl2/hi/asia-pacificl4204028.stm (last visited Jun. 30. 2006). 
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repatriation of the 131 Thai Muslims who had effectively left Thailand to avoid conflict 
and the acts violence in Southern Thailand. 183 On the other hand, Thailand had a 
different view of the incident. 
1. Government Response 
On September 5, 2005, Dr. Kantathi Suphamongkhon, Foreign Minister, gave a 
press conference l84 on Thailand's reaction to the latest development in the South with 
regard to the 131 illegal entries of Thai citizens from the 3 southernmost provinces into 
Malaysian territory. On September 7, 2005, Mr. Sihasak Phuangketkeow, Director-
General of the Department of Information and Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, also gave a press conference I 85 .at the Press Center of the Foreign Ministry on the 
183 Malaysia risks row with Thailand, BBCNEWS, Sep. 2,2005, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilasia-pacific/4208094.stm (last visited Jun. 30,2006). 
184 Kantathi Suphamongkhon, Foreign Minister, address Minister of Foreign Affairs: Thailand's reaction to 
the latest development in the south with regard to the 131 illegal entries of Thai citizens from the 3 
southernmost provinces into the Malaysian territory (Sep. 5, 2005) as follows: 
1. Or. Kantathi Suphamongkhon, Foreign Minister, disclosed that yesterday he had another telephone 
conversation with his counterpart, Syed Hamid Albar, the Malaysian Foreign Minister. Both sides understood 
each other with regard to the issue. He pointed out that the Thai government intended to treat the 131 Thais 
with compassion and understanding and would be working closely with Malaysia at all levels to establish the 
facts. Efforts would be undertaken to ensure their safety and protection upon their return to Thailand. 
2. With regard to the status of the 131 persons who have entered Malaysia illegally, Dr. Kantathi clarified 
that he has been misquoted by the press and pointed out that, according to his information, most of them 
~ere likely to be innocent civilians although there may be a few who were driven by hidden agendas which 
aimed to create misunderstanding among international community by way of spreading unfounded rumors. 
3. Given the present situation and sensitivity involved,it-isoocessary for all sides to be careful and to avoid 
Words or statements that may not be helpful or may be interpreted as causing misunderstandings which may 
impede efforts to resolve the situation. What is important under the present circumstances is that it is 
necessary to act on facts and to engage in constructive exchanges of views and statements. 
185 . 
. ~Ihasak Phuangketkeow, Director-General of the Department of Information and Spokesman of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, address at the Press Center of the Foreign Ministry: The latest developments 
2
reOO9arding the 131 Thai citizens who crossed the border into Kelantan State of Malaysia illegally ( Sept. 7, 
5) as follows: 
1. The governments of Thailand and Malaysia are working closely to resolve the problem. The Thai 
a~thorities concerned will deal with the problem on the basis of national reconciliation and will make the best 
e Orts to ensure the safety of the 131 Thai citizens. 
~. According to Thai intelligence report, in early August 2005, around 10 militant leaders crossed the border 
~ the Kelantan State of Malaysia in order to spread rumors tha.t there would be serious incidents in the 3 
uthern provinces of Thailand. The rumors were also spread among Thai-Muslims who were employed in 
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latest developments regarding the 131 Thai citizens who illegally crossed the border into 
. MI' 186 {(elan tan m a aysIa. 
This is the first time that Thailand officially called an organization by name, 
namely, the Pattani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo )-as being behind the 
terrorizing acts causing the 131 Thai Muslims to flee from Narathiwat into Kelantan. 187 It 
is therefore the first accusation against the world's largest body of Islamic nations- the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)- where the organization is accused of 
disseminating misperception and misinformation about the unrest caused by religious 
conflict. 188 Also Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra believed the departure might have 
Tranganu State. With regard to the case of the 131 people who have illegally entered Kelantan from 
Thailand, intelligence reports have confirmed that leaders of the militant groups traveled into Kelantan five 
days before the incident took place to lay the groundwork, after which the 131 persons gradually fled in 
groups into Malaysia on 30 August 2005. 
3. The claim that the death of Mr. Satopa Yuso, a villager of Lahan Nua sub-district, Su-ngai Padi district, 
Narathiwat Province, on 29 August 2005 was the main cause for the fleeing of the 131 thais to Malaysia was 
not consistent with the facts. Most of those who crossed the border to Malaysia actually came from other 
areas. 
4. The militants have also conducted activities abroad by working with the PULO movement, which 
established a front organization called Pattani Malay Human Rights Organization (PMHRO) to spread 
inaccurate information through its website www.pmhro.org to tarnish Thailand's irnage. Right after the 
incident took place, the PMHRO is believed to have made approaches to the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Switzerland with the information alleging that the 131 Thais were 
terrified by the Thai government authorities after the implementation of the Executive Decree on Emergency 
Situation because it is alleged that these people were involved in the Tak Bai incident last October. The 
PMHRO, therefore, asked the UNHCR to render assistance to the 131 persons as well as to coordinate with 
the Malaysian Government not to repatriate these people back to Thailand. Moreover. the website of the 
organization was updated to report on the incident almost immediately after the report of illegal border-
crOssing. 
5. According to the interrogation of the 131 Thais, it is believed that these people entered Malaysia as a 
result of the rumors from the militants as well as the fear for their safety and not as a result of any acts 
COmmitted by the Thai authorities. In addition, these insurgents had the intention to create misunderstanding 
between the Thai and Malaysian Governments. 
6. The Thai government stands ready to protect these 131 Thai citizens. The Malaysian government also 
recognizes that this incident is Thailand's internal affair. The governments of both countries would work 
tOgether closely to resolve the situations as soon as possible. 
The spOkesman reiterated that this incident is Thailand's internal matter and that the Thai government has 
never resorted to any acts by the authorities that might threaten or endanger Thai citizens in any way. 
186 
See Minister of Foreign Affairs, cited in note 184 supra. 
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Thailand Rejects Criticism from Muslim Nations Over Handling of Unrest in South, Reuters, 
ct. 19,2005. 
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been orchestrated to tum the southern situation into an international issue. Although 
prime Minister Taksin did not specially assert that the situation in the South was related 
to the neighboring country, it is implicit in his account of the 131 Thai Muslims found 
crossing the Southern border. Finally, international attention was raised. This is 
consistent with the statement by the director of the Southern Border Provinces Peace-
building Command who confirmed that the escalating violence in the deep South was 
part of the militant group's attempts to get the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC) involved. 189 Furthermore, Prime Minister Thaksin blamed the militants for 
instilling fear in the hearts of the people, which he claimed eventually led to a state of 
panic in the villages of Narathiwat. The Prime Minister also condemned activists who 
had lodged a petition with the Thai embassy in Kuala Lumpur for being the villains and 
rebels and warned the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees not to get 
involved, or they would "become a pawn in the hands of the rebels.,,190 Although Prime 
Minister Taksin tried to explain the situations, it was ineffective after the United Nations 
refugee agency had begun interviewing the 131 Thai Muslims sheltered in Kelantan, the 
Malaysian State bordering Narathiwat since September 6, 2005,191 and the summary of 
. UNHCR on September 27, 2005 decided to withhold any public announcement as to the 
status of the 131 Southern Thais currently living in Malaysia. At this stage, the important 
issue is that the investigation of these 131 Thai Muslims would verify the accuracy of the 
information furnished by Prime Minister Taksin. The Thai side had to prove that there 
189 
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was a hidden conspiracy plan on the part of the 131 Thai Muslims. Failure to establish 
such a plan beyond a reasonable doubt, this question might function as a violation of 
human rights on the part of the Thai Government. Meanwhile, one of the 131 Thai 
Muslims was handed over to the Thai authorities and is facing criminal charges. 192 
II - 3 Conclusion 
The history of violent incidents in Southern Thailand is long and complex. The root 
causes of the problems are expressed in the ongoing clash between the push toward 
national identity and the pull of ethnic customs, beliefs and traditions. In this respect, the 
prevailing concept of the ideology is not the same as it was in the past. These problems 
are an extension of, but also different from, the old pre-existing problems. It is far 
broader in scope than merely a battle fought by the nation against disgruntled citizens, 
but now involves an international group with a deep understanding of media politics. 
No one exactly knows whether the strategy of the attacks in the last two years 
might well have been planned over hundreds of years or just designed in this era. The 
five basic operations of militants, separatist and terrorist, start from day one in the 
fOllowing order: 193 
1. Falling Leaf Strategy: killing people daily 
2. Extinction of Dharma Strategy: killing monks 
~--------------------
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79 
3. Extinction of Light Strategy: killing teachers 
4. Land of Darkness Strategy: blasting power plants 
5. Land of Flood: blasting damns 
These strategies cover operations in small areas of Southern Thailand. The result is 
not much different from armed conflict and traditional or conventional warfare. The 
tactical aspects include assaults in various forms of warfare, only it is worse than war or 
anned conflict because it disregards any humanity concept or respect for the Rule of 
Law. 
Without any doubt, it is clear that all of the responses of the Government have 
. 
abs9lutely failed to deter these acts of violence as exemplified by the coordinated 
bombings of government offices, police stations, and Army checkpoints at more than 40 
locations in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat by Islamic militants. 194 In this case, there were 
untold physical injuries and damage to Government and private properties. As such, the 
violence continued on June 15, 2006, a day deliberately chosen by a militant group to 
represent the 'national day' of an independent Pattani sultanate. It was designed to 
remind the local population that the cause championed by small groups of Malay 
nationalists to create a separate homeland in the Muslim-majority region is still very 
much alive and that the Government's effort to restore peace and re-establish the Rule of 
Law is not working. The recent acts of the last four years were meant to send a message 
that "the circle of violence" is approaching as it already has in the form of the Army raid, 
-----------------------194 
h ~ilitants evolve as military wilts, The Nation, Jun. 16, 2006, available at 










or the stealing of weapons in the case at the army camp. The characteristics of these acts 
of violence indicate recurrent patterns: 
• Challenge the power of the State; 
• Indiscriminate targets; 
• Villagers involvement; 
• Prelude to a religious conflict; 
• Appealing to international audiences, organizations, and mass media. 
From all of these circumstances, violence has persisted for the past two years as if 
there were no financial obstacles and as if the money has been sent from external sources 
to support local assaults. This raises the question as to the planning, instigation or 
perpetration of these acts of violence, and the profits of those who sponsor them. The 
Government claimed to have knowledge and to have learned from intelligence 
information that the militants were planning a 'major operation,195 on that date but the 
Thai Security Forces simply lacked the capability to fight elusive battles with the 
militants who have made effective use of hit-and-run tactics, creating havoc and then 
quickly blending into the local population. The important thing that the government must 
realize is that it may well be just the beginning: As long as the Government cannot 
control the violence, "civil war"l96 remains a distinct possibility. 
Throughout the history of Thailand and South Asia, untold numbers of people 
suffered from extreme acts of violence. The instances I mentioned are hardly 
195 
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. ~ war between different sections or parties of the same country or nation (Webster's Third New Edition 
Dictionary); A war between factions of the same country; there are five criteria for international recognition 
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comparable to the pam and suffering endured by the people. Whether those who 
committed these acts of violence were to be later labeled as "rebels," "militants," 
"dissidents," "separatists," or "terrorists," or some combination of two or three of these 
classifications, the key is how to arrest or interrupt these acts of violence for good by all 
ofthe peaceful means at our disposal. It is everyone's fervent hope that in the long run 
reason, wisdom, and justice will prevail. 
************ 
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~ CHAPTER ... J 
TERRORISM 
111-1 Introduction 
Just as so many dimensions of the world we live in today have changed 
significantly with the rapid advances in technology so· too have terrorist acts undergone 
drastic changes within this period of modem globalization. Recently, terrorism has been 
on the rise. Terrorist acts continue to occur in almost every comer of the world -- in 
Europe, America, Asia, Africa and throughout Asia. The number of nation states in the 
year 200 1 that fell victim to terrorist attacks was no less than 26. The countries that have 
the highest rate of terrorist activity are: India, Columbia, Algeria, Russia, Israel, and the 
Philippines. 197 
Terrorism has become, in some regions, an increasingly advanced operation often 
involving networks of small groups of individuals (or cells) in which members are united 
through a common cause. These networks of terrorist cells operate in close connection to 
each other across great distances and, much like the digital global integration, have 
penneated geographic boundaries and state sovereignties. 198 The events of September 
II, 2001, directly affected New York and Washington, but not only were US citizens 
IInpacted but so too were people all over the world. This incident illustrated how 
-----_.-----------------197 
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terrorism created a crisis not merely for the United States but an international crisis that 
directly involved US allies, detractors and nations who had hitherto attempted to remain 
1 199 neutra. 
The word "terrorism" is a contentious one. One man's "terrorist" is another 
man's "freedom fighter." However, whatever interpretation of the motives for these acts, 
it is impossible to escape the fact that the violent acts are a global concern. The United 
Nations recently added 'terrorism' to the list of the most significant world problems that 
. 1 d 200 me u e : 
• war between States; 
• violence within States; including civil wars, large - scale 
human rights abuse and genocide; 
• poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation; 
• nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapon; 
• transnational organized crime; and 
• terrorism. 
Because it is typically innocent people who are killed by terrorists, terrorism, 
unlike war, touches the lives of people, regardless of politically affiliation, all around the 
world. The whole idea of creating a State of Terror has also had the effect of making 
199 
Press Release, Secretary-General's message to the ceremony marking the commencement of the work 
~f the regional counter-terrorism structure executive committee of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
G/SM/9372(Jun. 17, 2004) as follows: 
~errorism strikes at the very heart of everything the United Nations stands for. It is a global threat to 
Ne~ocracy, the rule of law, human rights and stability, and therefore requires a global response. The United 
atlons has an indispensable role to play in providing the legaUr2mework within which the international 
campaign against terrorism can unfold. 
~ 
'II Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A more secure 
Orld: Our shared responsibility at 2, United Nations 2004. 
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IIlore and more people aware of the profoundly global nature of this problem. 
comparisons have been made between terrorism and 'SARS' because terrorist acts can 
occur anywhere and, like SARS, can never be eradicated once and for all. Both are 
global concerns that although they appear within the confines of a particular country, 
have ramifications that defy all political, ideological or economic boundaries.201 
Within the evolving political, ideological, social and economic changes that 
belong to this era of glQbalization, this chapter attempts to explore and analyze some of 
the complexities facing in the world today. In this chapter, I will explore: 
1. The use of the term "terrorists" by Thailand and the problems inherent in defining 
terms such as "terrorist" by the United Nations; 
2. The network of Al Queda in Southeast Asia and the effects on the recent situations in 
southern Thailand; 
3. The analysis of the violence In Southern Thailand In terms of terrorist law, self-
determination and the status of prisoners of war; 
4. The Thai Government's response to the United Nations. 
Before we discuss the issues above, it is important to first give an overview of the 
historical background of terrorism in order to contextualize the modem day dilemmas. 
201 
Tony Tan Keng Yam, Deputy Prime Minister And Minister For Defence, at the Singapore-US Business 
Council Plenary Meeting in New York (Apr. 1 0, 2003) as follows: 
l11errorism is similar to SARS in yet another way. The battle against terrorism, like the battle 
against SARS, has to be a long and sustained one. Weeks and months may go by without a 
~rrorist attack, but it does not mean that the threat is gone. As Bali, Riyadh and Casablanca reminded us. 
COuntry can eliminate SARS with robust healthcare measures, but the disease can come 
back - perhaps brought back by a traveler who caught it i.O. __ g[lOther country. Toronto knows this 
only too well. Toronto was declared SARS-free by the WHO in mid May, only to be hit by 
another outbreak of SARS less than two weeks later. 
ierro~ism. is also a global menace. With its roots in radical Islamic elements in the Middle East, 
erronsm IS now a phenomenon penetrating all corners of the globe. 
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Terrorism is not a new phenomenon nor is it a new word. There have been so-called 
terrorist acts before the first century [the Zealots- Sicarii202]. In more recent history, the 
end of World War II marked the beginning of new dividing lines for terrorists. With the 
cold war, the idea of anti-Democratic/anti-Capitalist, Marxist-based ideology arose as a 
popular motivating factor for many terrorist acts. There were terrorists to be found in 
Indochina, the first notable terrorist group known in Asia with trans-boundary activity 
was the C.T. (Chinese, or at time Communist, Terrorist).203 Terrorism arose in any place 
where anti-government sentiment leads to outright violence. Such "terrorists," however, 
tended to wage their wars in the traditional manner of rural guerrillas, sometimes coupled 
with urban operations. 
It was in this context that "terrorism" has become a historical term variously 
associated with French terror, revolutionary Anarchism or the "Mad" bombers. While 
anti-insurgency and guerrilla warfare were fashionable terms for academic subjects, this 
was not true of terrorism. Western governments would label any number of group 
terrorists for a variety of politically motives. It was common for the government to 
blame any political adversary as a 'terrorist.' As a result, the term became a catch all 
phrase that, although ubiquitous, is inherently politically suspicious. 
The British had fought CTs--Communist terrorist--in Malaya and the "mad" 
terrorists of the Mau Mau in Kenya. The French had fought the FKN terrorists in Algeria 
and, in the process, had fashioned their own brand of philosophy for counter-terrorism. 
-----------------------
202 A Jewish group in Palestine murdered individua-Is-w-ith dagger and swords. Later, they turned to open 
~arfare. Their objective wasto-ereate a mass uprising against the Greeks in Judea and against the 
lea°~ans that governed both Greeks and Jews. The revolt had unforeseen and devastating consequences, . ding to the destruction of the Temple and to the mass suicide at Masada. 
203 
V, I Sompong Sucharitkul, International Terrorism and the Problem of Jurisdiction 148, Syr.J.lnt.l. & Com., 
0.14 No.2, winter 1987. 
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Also, the Thai Government had fought local Malaysian communists (mostly Chinese) 
who made their home base in the border between southern Thailand and northern 
Malaysia. Thailand made a law banning Communism (the Communist Act) at that time 
to justify its military presence in this region and has since disbanded this law. 
Such violence, however, was commonly perceived by the world within the 
imperialist context in which rural guerilla warfare was seen as an effective response to 
institutionalized injustice and centralist despotism.204 However, ideological terrorism 
was more often than not the most modem incarnation of ethno-religious conflicts in some 
centuries-old disputes, the terms of which now took the form of terrorism, insurgency, 
regional instability, and civil war.205 
III - 2 The Use of the Term "Terrorism" 
A. Problems defining the term "Terrorism" as articulated by the 
United Nations 
Although terrorist acts have occurred among states for centuries and today we 
have twelve major multilateral conventions and, protocols related to States' 
responsibilities for counter-terrorist acts,206 there are still problems with defining, 
classifying and formulating terrorism as a legal category. These problems with defining 
the term have impeded meaningful endeavors to suppress acts of terrorism on an 
--~------------------204 
B ~.Bowyer Bell, A time of Terror: How Democratic Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence 58, 
aSlcbooks, Inc., Publisher 1978iffi31). 
20s 
See N. A. Pollard cited in note 198 supra. 
2(JG 
htt ~onventions against Terrorism, The United Nations, available at 
P.//WWw.unodc.org/unOdclterrorism_conventions.html(last visited Aug. 1,2006). 
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international scene.207 However, even if no universal definition of terrorism has yet been 
defined the United Nations, there are generally accepted ideas of what terrorism means. 
When walk about terror, everybody knows, broadly speaking, what this means. 
The first attempt to define terrorism was made under the League of Nations, the 
draft in 1937 was never ratified. However, the United Nations did not ignore the 
importance of terrorism. Twelve Conventions and Additional Protocols were negotiated 
from 1963 to 1999. Most are penal in nature with a common format. Typically, they 
defined a particular type of terrorist conduct as an offense under the convention, such as 
seizure of an aircraft in flight by threat or force. The convention also called upon State 
parties to penalize that activity in their domestic law; identified certain bases upon which 
the relevant state parties are required to establish jurisdiction over the defined offense, 
such as registration, territoriality, or nationality; and entitled the State party in which an 
accused offender is found to establish jurisdiction over the offense and to refer the 
offense for prosecution if the party does not extradite pursuant to other provisions of the 
. Convention. 208 
Obviously, terrorists do not call themselves terrorists. The rhetoric of freedom 
'. 
replete with images of liberation, military structure, self-defense, righteous 
self-determination, has made these unclear definitions more complex. 
one of the problems of finding a proper definition of "terrorists" is that 
can be applied downwards as well as upwards. In other words, certain groups can 
as an attempt to influence government decisions (or public approval of 
See S. Sucharitkul, cited in note 203 supra. at p. 141 
. Country Reports on Terrorism, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism Apr. 27, 2001, US 
of States, available at www.state.gov (last visited Nov.1, 2006). 
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govenunent decisions) or even to demolish the structure of a State. On the other hand, the 
spread of fear can be applied to the government itself (used "downwards") against its 
own citizens as a method of retaining power (Chile under Pinochet was a clear example 
ofthis use ofterror).209 
However, if there is no agreed-upon definition to the term, the violence will 
inevitably continue. Of course, the violence may continue with or without such a 
definition but formulating a legal term might better help stem the acts of violence (even if 
it does not squelch anti-government sentiment). 
B. Efforts to Define "Terrorism" by Nations 
All States, in every region -- large or small, strong or weak --
are vulnerable to terrorism and its consequences. They all stand 
to benefit from a strategy to counter it. They all have a role to 
play in shaping such a strategy, in implementing it, and in 
ensuring that it is updated continuously to respond to challenges 
210 as they evolve. 
Terrorism, unlike manslaughter, takes as its target the State not an individual.
211 
Accordingly, States have a duty to guard their sovereignties by maintaining their powers 
of determination through legally defining what constitutes terrorism in their countries. 
------------------------
- 2f:td Nici Keijer, Terrorism as a crime p119 0Nybo P .Heere, ed, Cambridge University Press 2003). 
210 
GI ~he Secretary-General, Address on the Launch of Uniting Against Terrorism: Recommendations for a 
h o. al Counter - Terrorism Strategy, New York (May. 22006), available at 
1tp./Iwww.un.org/unitingagainstterrorism/sgstatement.html(last visited Nov1. 2006) 
·211 
Isr S~mpong Sucharitkul, Terrorism as an international crime: Questions of responsibility and complicity 247, 
ae Yearbook on Human rights. 
89 
The principal judicial statement following comes from the principles in customary 
international law namely, Lotus case,212 which can be categorized the aspects of 
jurisdiction such as: 
1. Prescriptive jurisdiction refers to the power of a State to 
make its laws applicable to people, events and things, 
whether by legislation, administrative rule, executive order, 
or sometimes judicial ruling. 
2. Adjudicative jurisdiction refers to the power of a State to 
subject a person to the process of its courts 
3. Enforcement jurisdiction refers to the power of a State to 
ensure through coercive means that its legal commands are 
I · d ·h 213 comp Ie Wit. 
Howsoever, the five basic fundamentals that international law recognizes for the 
sovereign rights of States are214 : 
1. The Territorial Principle 215 
2. The Nationality Principle 216 
3. The Protective Principle 217 
212 




unsdlction and Immunities, Public International Law, Part IB, 2005-6; available at 
http://www.law.cam.ac.ukldocslview.php?doc=2893.(last visited Nov.1, 2006). 
214 
Thomas Buergenthal & Harold G.Maier, Public International Law 163-174, West Publishing (1985). 
2Is/bid. 
[S]tates have jurisdiction over their nationals, even when those nationals are phy sically outside the 
~untry's ~orders. This is so both because the national owes allegianceto his own country no matter where 
n et~r she IS located and because each nation has both responsibility to other nations for the conduct of its 
a lonals and an interest in their welfare while they are abroad. 
2Is/b·d I.
~ach sta~e has the right to define who are its nationals. Nationality may be acquired "naturally" as the 
paSUIt of birth, either by being born within a state's territory (jus soli) or through the nationality of one's 
rents (jus sanguinis) or both. It may also be acquired "artificially," by naturalization. 
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The Universality Principle 218 4. 
The Passive Personality Principle219 5. 
Because States have self-sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence, they also have jurisdiction over all acts committed by as well as upon its 
nation (despite whether _ acts against the nation were actually committed within the 
nation's boundaries). When there is terrorist activity that threatens the State's security, 
States have the right to ascertain their jurisdictions to establish and enforce their laws. 
Recently, over 170 nations continue to participate in the war on terrorism by 
taking terrorists into custody, freezing terrorist assets and providing military forces and 
other support. International organizations are also adapting to meet the threat. There have 
been numerous steps taken to eliminate underlying circumstances that foster terrorism.22o 
Because the US faces many terrorist acts, many US organizations have attempted to 
. define the term "terrorist" in relation to various ideologically motivated acts of violence. 
Such definitions have been generated by: the U.S. National Counter Terrorism Center 
217 Ibid. 
[T]his principle permits a state to exercise jurisdiction over conduct outside its territory that threatens its 
security, as long as that conduct is generally recognized as criminal by states in the international community . 
. 2lB /bid. 
[T]h: 'universality" principle recognizes that certain activities, universally dangerous to states and their 
Subjects, require authority in all community members to punish such acts wherever they may occur, even 
absent a link between the state and the parties or the acts in question. 
219 Ibid. 
[UI~der this principle a state claims jurisdiction over acts committed abroad solely because they injure a 
:tionai of the claiming state. This principle is related to the universality principle in that it is invoked only 
ere the state claiming jurisdiction has no other connection with the act. 
220 
The U.S. Department of State. 
[T]he U.S. Department of State defines "terrorism" tobe "premeditated politically-motivated violence 
~rpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to 
uence an aUdience". 
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(NCTC),221 the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, 222 the United States Department of 
Defense, 223 the USA PATRIOT Act 224and the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (FBI).225 
No States, however, are able to stay for the UN to arrive at a definition since the 
threat to State sovereignty is often urgent and pressing. Many States do not hesitate to 
adopt a definition of "Terrorism" that hopes to quell any threat to national security. 
The US White House's report on September 11,2002, divided the global war on 
terrorism into three parts: 
1. Attacking Terrorist Networks at Home and Abroad; 
2. Securing the Homeland; and 
3. Strengthening and Sustaining the International Fight 
against Terrorism. 
The first section focuses on defeating terrorist leadership and personnel, denying 
terrorist haven and sponsorship, and eradicating sources of terrorist financing. The 
second section is concerned with reorganizing the federal government -- especially 
creating the Department of Homeland Security- by reducing America's vulnerability to 
221 
The U.S. National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC): [A] terrorist act as one which was: "premeditated; 
pe~etrated by a sub national or clandestine agent; politically motivated, potentially including religious, 
philosophical, or culturally symbolic motivations; violent; and perpetrated against a noncombatant target" 
~ 
The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. [T]he unlawful use of force and violence against persons or 
,:ope.~y to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance 
.~ .• pollttcal or social objectives. 
United States Department of Defense. fTlhe calculated use of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; 
to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are generally political, 
or ideological. 
PATRIOT Act. [A]cts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United 
Or of any State. 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI). [T]errorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons 
to intimidate or coerce a govemment, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in 
of political or social objectives. 
92 
'I::'") 
::lCrJ"",' , .,..  
I" 
terrorists through enhancing emergency preparedness and response capabilities. The third 
part is devoted to global and regional efforts of fighting terrorism by attempting to 
remedy the underlying social, cultural and economic conditions that terrorists exploit?26 
226 See us Department of State cited in note 220 supra. 
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The British Terrorism Act 2000· of the UK227, the Philippines228, and Australia 
-'}27 The British Terrorism Act 2000. 
(1) terrorism means the use or threat of action where-
(a) the action falls within subsection (2), 
(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to 
intimidate the public or a section of the public, and 
(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political; religious or ideological cause. 
(2) Action falls within the subsection if it -
(a) involves serious violence against a person, 
(b) involves serious damage to property, 
(c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action, 
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or 
(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system. 
(3) T~e use ?r threat of action falling ~ithin su?sect~on(2) which involves the use of firearms or 
explosives IS terronsm whether or not subsectlon(1 )(b) IS satisfied. 
The British Terrorism Act 2006. 
Amendment of the definition of "terrorism" etc. 
In each of-
.(a) section 1 (1 )(b~ of the Terrorism Act 2000 (c. 11) (under which actions 
and threats designed to influence a govemment may be terrorism), and 
(b) section 113(1 ) (c) of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 
(c. 24) (offence of using-noxious substances or things to influence 
government or to intimidate), after "government" insert "or an international governmental organisation". 
Anti-terrorism, Grime and Security Act 2001. 
Dangerous Substances 
(113) Use of noxious substances or things to cause harm and intimidate 
(1) A person who takes any action which-
(a) involves the use of a noxious substance or other noxious thing; 
(b) has or is likely to have an effect falling within subsection (2); and 
(c) is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, iis 
guilty of an offence. 
228 Act of Terrorism, Republic of the Philippines House of Representatives(2002). 
sec.3. [T]errorism refers to the premeditated use or threatened use of violence or means of destruction 
against innocent civilians or non-combatants, or against civilian and government properties, to instill a state 
of common danger, panic or fear intended to influence and audience, regardless of motivations. 
Ibid.at sec.3 h) 
!C]yberterrorism refers to unlawful act and threat of attack against computers, networks, servers, and 
~nf?rmation and communication system resulting in violence against persons or property when done to 
Illtlmidate or coerce a government or its people using available and sophisticated instrument in cyberspace. 
Ibid. at sec.5. 
[AJn act of terrorism is committed when an individual acting for, or an aggravation, organization, 
con~regation or band of people come together to create or sow common danger or a state of terror, fear 
paOlc and chaos on the general public, or in order to coerce or intimidate the public in the government, 
through the use of force, intimidation, or violence, or by means possible and by every method available 
~esulting in the deprivation of personal liberty, or destruction of lives and property to achieve any of 
,allOWing: 
1) To threaten or cause death or serious bodily harm to a person by the use of violence or to 
cause a serious risk to health or safety of the public or any segment of the public;. 
2) To threaten or cause substantial damage to infrastructure or property, public or private; and 
94 
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Criminal Code 1995 of the Commonwealth)229 defined terrorism not only as a 
act but any act that is potentially considered to perpetrate violence upon the State 
its citizens (such as shutting down a website or security system), whereas the Penal 
of Indonesia23o and Thailand231 and the Internal Security Act (lSA) of Malaysia232 
To threaten or cause serious interference with or serious ~isruption of an essential service, 
or system, whether public or private, other than as a result of lawful advocacy, protest dissent or 
stoppage of work. 
·AdofTerrorism, Republic of the Philippines House of Representatives(2007). 
'Sec.3 [T]errorism is the premeditated or threatened use of violence of force or any other means that 
deliberately cause harm to persons, or of force and other destructive means against property or the 
.' environment, with the intention of creating or sowing a state of danger, panic, fear, or chaos to the general 
public or segment thereof, or of coercing or intimidating the government to do or refrain from doing an act. 
229 The Criminal Code 1995 ofthe Commonwealth, sec. 100.1. 
'';. 'terrorist act • means an act, or threat of action, that is done or made with the intention of advancing a 
'. political, ideological or religious cause; and done or made with the intention of advancing a political, 
~: ideological or religious; and done or made with the intention of either; 
'': coercing or influencing by intimidation the Government of Australia or of another country; or 
,;, '. intimidating the public or a section of the public. ' 
·~:The act or threat of action, must also cause a person serious physical harm or death, or involve serious risk 
• 0 public heath or safety, serious damage to property, or interfere with an electronic system. 
Government Regulation in lieu of Legislation of the Republic of Indonesia No 1/2002 on Combating 
Acts of Terrorism. sec.1 . 
. A criminal act of terrorism is any action having the elements of a criminal act in accordance with the 
nrnIJi!:.i/,n<: of this Government regulation in Lieu of Legislation. 
is any individual or group of persons, either civilian, military or police, who is responsible 
'U'VIUUQIIV or as a corporation. 
A corporation is an organized group of persons and/or properties, whether or not in the form of a legal 
is any act of misusing physical strength with or without the use of unlawful means, which causes 
to the body, life and freedom of a person, including causing a person to become unconscious or 
lOWEirles;s. 
A threat of violence is any action intentionally committed to give a sign or warning about a certain 
that tends to Cause widespread fear for a person or for the community in general. 
hl'\V"'r'nrn.ont of the Republic of Indonesia is the government of the representatives of the Republic of 
laOI''''<:;", Overseas . 
Representatives of foreign countries are foreign diplomatic and consular representatives and their 
intemational organization is an organization within the structural scope of the United Nations or any 
organization outside the United Nations or any organization undertaking its duties representing 
United Nations. Assets are any movable or immovable, tangible or intangible objects. 
A vital and strategic object is any place, location or building that has very high economiC, political, social, 
and defence and security values, including international facilities. 
A public facility is any place used for the interests of the general public. 
An explosive is any material that may explode any type of ammunition, bomb, burning bomb, mine, hand 
or any explosive material made from chemicals or other materials used to create an explosion. 
The Penal Code Amendment Act (No. 13) B.E.2546 (2003). sec. 13511. 
SCOpe of terrorism would treat terrorist acts as serious offences, and criminalize all steps in the 
process: the preparation, the aiding and abetting, and the actual commission of acts of terrorism. 
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cover any and all acts that could be construed as terrorist acts. Yet, Australia launched 
the Australian Anti-Terrorism Act 2005 to extend the Criminal Code 1995 of the 
Commonwealth relating to terrorist acts such as an extension for the definition of a 
terrorist organization, an allowance for monitoring of terrorist suspects, a grant of 
controlling a person for up to 48 hours without charge. 233 
[A) conduct made with the intention to -intimidate a population, to threaten or compel the Royal Thai 
Govemment or any government or international organization to do or abstain from doing any act. 
Ibid. at sec. 135/2. 
[A)ny person providing forces, arms, properties or any support for the commission of terrorism is considered 
to be committing an act of terrorism. 
Ibid. at sec. 135/3. 
[C]nminalizes - stockpiling weapons, providing or compiling property, or organizing any preparation or 
conspiracy in order to commit a terrorist act. (availaDle at www.interpol.int, last visited nov.1, 2006). 
232 Koninklijke Brill N.v 2004. The Internal Security Act (lSA) 1960, Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights 
and the Law 1 :86-203, 2004. 
· P.I, sec.2 defines "terrorist" as meaning a person who: 
· by the use of any fire- arm, explosive or ammunition acts in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or to 
the maintenance of public order or incites violence or counsels disobedience to the law or to any lawful 
order; 
• carries or has in his possession or under his control any fire - arm, ammunition or explosive without lawful 
authority; or 
- demands, collect or receives any supplies for the use of any person who intends or is about to act, or has 
recently acted, in a manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order 
[1]he ISA prohibits a wide variety of conduct, apparel and objects including: 
· P.tl, sec.3 and sec. 7. manufacture, use, sale, display or possession of uniforms, other dress or emblems 
of political or quasi-military organization; 
· P.tl, sec.5quasi- military organization; 
• P.II, sec.6 illegal training in the use of arms; 
• P.II, Chap.lIl, sec.22, 25, and 27. possession, printing, sale etc of documents and publications or the 
POSing of placards that incite violence, counsel disobedience to the law, is likely to lead to a breach of the 
peace, is prejudicial to the national interest; 
oP.tI, Chap. IV, sec.35. holding of any entertainment or exhibition detrimental to the national interest; 
• P.tl, Chap.v, sec.41 B. use of a school or educational institution for a purpose detrimental to the interests of 
Malaysia or the public, for instruction detrimental to the interests of the public or pupils, or as a meeting 
place of an unlawful society; 
• P.III, Chap. III, sec.57 and sec.58. offences relating to fire-arms, ammunition and explosives, including 
COnsorting With, or being a person who, carries or has possession of arms or explosive; and 
• attempting to commit any of the above acts. 
233 
See AUstralian National Security, available at, www.ag.oov.au. 
~he Anti-Terrorism Act (No.2) 2005 is an act to amend the law relating to terrorist acts, and for other 
urposes. The principal features of the Act are: 
~ an .extension of the definition of a terrorist organisation to enable listing of organisations that advocate 
rronsm; 
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Although Thailand does not specifY what types of acts constitute terrorism, her 
does not exclude the possibility of cyber-attacks or infiltration of security 
systems as forms of terrorist attacks. Further the Money Laundering Control Act 
B.E.2542(1999) states "terrorist offence" to be "predicate offences" in the Act. Further, 
it could be observed that the Penal Code of Singapore does not contain an offense of-
committing a terrorist act," but covers the planning, preparation, and perpetration of 
terrorist acts that involve murder, causing injury,. hijacking, kidnapping and other 
offenses covered by the criminal.2J4 
. A number of States define terrorism in terms of criminalization because the act of 
terrorism is clearly seen bY' many as a criminal act even without this additional element 
that links the act of violence to the State through the "undertaking," "assisting," 
"encouragement" or "tole~tion" by State authorities?35 
a new regime to allow for 'control orders' that will allow for the overt close monitoring of terrorist suspects 
pose a risk to the community; . 
a new police preventative detention regime that will allow detention of a person for up to 48 hours without 
where it is reasonably necessary to prevent a terrorist act or to preserve evidence of such an act; 
updated sedition offences to cover those who urge violence or assistance to Australia's enemies; 
. strengthened offences of financing of terrorism by better coverage of the collection of funds for terrorist 
, 
new regime of stop, question, search and seize powers that will be exercisable at airports and other 
places to prevent or respond to terrorism; 
new notice to produce regime to ensure the AFP is able to enforce compliance with lawful requests for 
that will facilitate the investigation of a terrorism or other serious offence; 
nArlrln'''n'~ to ASIO's special powers warrant regime; 
amendments to the offence of providing false or misleading information under an ASIO questioning 
to authorize access to airline passenger information for law enforcement and intelligence 
, 
creation of a legal basis for the use of video surveillance at Australia's major airports and on aircraft; 
additional implementation of FATF Special Recommendations covering criminalizing financing of 
altemative remittance dealers, wire transfers and cash couriers. 
at, HYPERLINK "htlp:llwww.interpol.intlPubliclBioTerrorism/NationaILaws/Singapore.pdf' 
.intlPubliclBioTerrorismlNationaILaws/Singapore.pdf (last visited Nov.1, 2006). 
S. Sucharitkul, cited in note 203 supra at p.14S. 
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According to the attempt to identify such criminals through available investigative 
tools, granting liberal permission for intelligence gathering in order to target those who 
commit or support terrorism. Often States authorize a military response (in certain 
circumstances), allocate resources, create and refine legal responses and call upon 
. 1 d' t . 236 internatlOna an III eragency cooperatIOn. 
One of the central reasons for defining terrorism in such a way is to consecrate the 
offense with a seriousness that elevates it. from an ordinary crime made punishable under 
domestic law to the top category of the gravest international crimes, an "offence against 
the peace and security of mankind," with all the grave consequences that inevitably 
237 follow. 
Without a definition from the United Nations, the ICC cannot adopt terrorism as a 
separate crime in the Statute. The reason for this was the lack of a definition that was 
generally acceptable and would not include acts committed in the context of a people's 
struggle for self-determination.238 
III - 3 The Al Queda Network in Southeast Asia and its efforts 
on Southern Thailand 
Because of the events of September 11, 2001, the term "terrorist" has been 
indelibly linked to Al Queda and Osama Bin Laden. I wish to take a few moments to 
-236 J .---.-. ------
. oint US mlhtary Advisory Group Thailand (JUSMAG THAI). 
Zl7 
See S. Sucharitkul,cited in note 203 supra. at p.145. 
;H~CO kOijer, Terrorism and the Military International Legal Implications, Terrorism as a Crime 125 0/Vybo 
re ed., Cambridge University press 2003). 
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explore the complex history of this Al Queda terrorist organization in order to better 
explicate the circumstances in Thailand and the problems in southeast Asia.239 
Al Queda is an international organization founded in 1979, a virtual clearinghouse 
for Muslims opposed the invasion of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. After one 
year, the Services Office-run by Bin Laden and the Palestinian religious scholar 
Abdullah Azzam-recruited, trained, and financed thousands of foreign mujahadeen, or 
holy warriors, from more· than fifty countries.24o After the Afghan war was over, Bin 
Laden returned to Saudi Arabia where he inherited a fortune estimated at US $300 
million. However, he was expelled in 1991 and has his political status revoked as a result 
-of his political activities. He then moved to Sudan, where he established training camps 
for his followers who were incensed by the presence of America troops on Saudi soil 
during the Gulf war. Under pressure from the US, Sudan expelled him. He then headed 
back to shelter under the new Taliban Government in Afghanistan.241 Al Qaeda worked 
out of Pakistan along the Afghan border, or inside Pakistani cities during 1991 -1996. 
Until today Al Qaeda is still an international terrorist network run by Osama bin Laden. 
The goal of this international organization was to rid Muslim countries of what 
Was seen as the profane influence of the West and replace their governments with 
fundamentalist Islamic regimes. 242 One of the principal goals was to pressure the United 
States armed forces out of Saudi Arabia and Somalia.243 Even though the terrorist 
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violence occurred around the world, the most prominent and desirable target has always 
been the infrastructures of the US?44 However, many countries (even those which are not 
strong US allies) have been the victims of terrorist threats. 
Al Qaeda has strong connections to other "terrorist organizations that operated 
under its umbrella." To further its objective of a global Jihad Al Qaeda has had a 
longstanding interest in utilizing leaderless terrorism245 such as: the al Jihad group based 
in Egypt, the Islamic Group, formerly led by Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, and other jihad 
groups in other countries.246 Moreover, Al Qaeda has an underground branch connection 
to no less than 100 countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, 
France, Spain, Germany, Albania, Uganda, and elsewhere. 247 The list of major groups in 
Asia and several groups have been accused of the linking with Al Qaeda and the 
movements in the region are : Jemaah Islamiah (JI), Laskar Jihad (Ll), The Front 
Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front-FPI), Abu Sayyaf (Bearer of the Sword), The 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MIL F), and The New People's Army (NPA).248 
242 See B. Zeliz~r, cited in note 239 supra. 
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Because Al Queda uses a religious connection and Muslims have a long history of 
contact with co-religionists in Southeast Asia and the Middle East,249 there are long-
standing economic and trade connections between Southeast Asia and Middle Eastern 
and South Asian countries. Many of them are connected to each other by way of legal 
financial channels without any formal government links. For example, the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury designated the Philippine and Indonesian branch offices of 
.the Saudi-based International Islamic Relief Organization (lIRO) for facilitating fund 
raising for Al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groupS.2S0 
These have facilitated the transfer of funds from the Middle East and South Asia 
to radical groups in the region.2SI The Asian Financial crisis in 1997 put pressure on 
regional governments to stimulate the economy but spending on crucial areas such as 
education remained restricted. Because local schools were under-funded, there was an 
increase in the popularity of religious schools (for instance, Ponok school in Thailand). 
Furthermore, well-funded Islamic radical movements have been able to offer 
financial support both to adherents and their families (for example, in the event of death 
in combat). This has had considerable appeal to those in outlying and economically 
disadvantaged areas. Meanwhile, socio-economic factors have fostered further support 
for radical Islamic groups in the region. Efforts to attain autonomy by Islamic movements 
have often either been resisted by central governments or have been implemented 
249 Thailand _ August 2003, Asian Analysis, Asian Focus Group, the Faculty of Asian Studies, The 
Australian National University. http://www.aseanfocus.com/asiananalysis/article.cfm?articleID=668(Iast 
visited Nov.1 2006). 
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ineffectively (as in the southern Phllippines)?S2 In addition to these factors, domestic 
security lost funds, borders were porous, and immigration control became weak. 
Malaysia, for example, has not until recently required visas for anyone from Muslim 
countries who is a member of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). Another 
example of weak immigration control is Thailand, where there is an influx of illegal from 
Burma, Laos, Cambodia and Malaysia. The system in the Philippines is similarly lax; 
there it is easy and common for foreigners to marry Filipino citizens so as to effectively 
change their identity. Administrative requirements can also be circumvented through 
corruption, graft being an all-too common result of drug trafficking, traditional ethnic 
allegiances or both. 253 
It initially appeared to many experts that the terrorist organization responsible for 
the hijackings of September 11 had used Southeast Asia as a transit zone between 
Al Queda's base in the middle east.254 However, 'British-based terrorist's experts have 
calculated that 20% of Al Qaeda's organizational strength has always been in Asia, 
including volunteers from Central Asian, China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines?55 
Most notably, the geographically extensive and porous archipelagos of Indonesia 
and the Philippines afford a suitably remote base for training camps. Southeast Asia is 
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towards western culture, and some of Ai Qaeda' s views have gained popularity with the 
great numbers of individuals living below the poverty line. The bombing in Bali in 2000 
caused panic not only in Southeast Asia, in the US and abroad but it was also an 
irrefutable sign that modem terrorist activities are expanding across the Asia-Pacific 
region. 
The Bali bombings in Indonesia on October 12, 2002, have directed attention to 
the issue that Southeast Asia is a region that continues to cultivate both indigenous. and 
international terrorist groups. The two are closely interlinked.256 Shortly after the 
September 11 th attacks, for instance, the Indonesian police raided the safe house of 
Jemaah Islamiya (1I) senior member Noordin Mohammed in Wonosobo, Central Java. 257 
Although there has been great suspicion that JI is linked with Al Queda, arrests of many 
members of JI have weakened its power in this region. Despite these arrests, JI was 
responsible for terrorist acts, twice in Jakarta and in Bali. So even though a lot of JI 
member have been arrested, JI has survived partly because of its financ.ial backing of 
At Qaeda and the fact that it is held together by an intricate pattern of kinship bonds. JI 
members tend to cement ideological bonds by marrying the sisters and daughters of their 
comrades-in-arms. This is a unique tool utilized for recruitment and for further 
engagement in the JI cause, thus limiting disengagement options for JI members and 
blocking effective counter-terrorism tactics. Generally, people do not gravitate to JI due 
to some individual pathology. Indeed, most recruits look, dress and behave like normal 
individuals, at least until they are given a deadly mission or are deeply engaged with the -;;---------------------
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n ideology and group. The choice to become a terrorist or engage in terrorist activities is 
a gradual process with many routes toward this type of political violence. 
It becomes difficult for a member to defect from 11 without seeming to betray his 
family in the process of disengagement. Kinship ties help to keep the network secure 
from infiltration. 11 as a case study offers several examples that highlight the complexity 
of kinship links in terrorist organizations (such relationships include: two or more male 
siblings, in-laws, fathers and sons, as well as more distant kinship relations)?58 These 
familial connections demonstrate that far from terrorism tearing connections between 
individuals apart, it is precisely those close bonds that allow a terrorist network to 
undertake jihadi operations.259 Even the Indonesian Government's attempt to lunch 
-counter-terrorism measures has not been entirely successful because the central 
government is unable to fully control what goes on in its far-flung outer islands. 
In the Philippines, the Government keeps an eye on the Abu Sayyaf rebels in the 
southern Philippines, given that they have closed links to Al Queda?60 The group has its 
base in the Basilan Island in the South, and these rebels have plagued the Government in 
Manila for decades. Abu Sayyaf's link to Al Queda has not been questioned, although 
more recent reports suggest that there are stronger ties between the MILF (Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front) members and Al Queda. Abu Sayyaf has about 2000 members, some 
of whom have trained in Afghanistan, and are fighting to establish an Islamic State. The 
group is responsible for bombings, killings and a multitude of kidnappings, where the 
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ransom money was used to buy weapons and speedboats.261 However, the current 
cooperation between the Philippines and the United States, in which joint military 
exercises have been able to strengthen the capacity of the Philippine military for 
counterterrorism, has seen by many as attempting to stem the violence but not the 
underlying deep-seated problems responsible for the terrorist acts. 262 
Singapore has a long history regarding anti-government violence, beginning with 
communist terrorists active from 1950 to 1970. It is not surprising why the Singapore 
Government believes that there are many more members who are hiding and planning to 
carry out more attacks. Moreover, Singapore, with its weak immigration control, has been 
a safe haven for those terrorists in the region. During the JI arrests, those JI members 
able to return to Singapore managed to escape lSD's arrests. Even though there were 
more than 200 11 members arrested in Southeast Asia, the regional 11 has been recruiting 
more members to fill the ranks of those who have been arrested, seeking cooperation with 
other terrorist groups. This group has the manpower and resources to continue their terror 
plans in Southeast Asia and Singapore. Although Singapore supports the policy to 
provide information to neighboring governments on the 11, which led to the JI members 
there being arrested, Singapore also fears that 11 would take revenge on their "brothers" 
Who have been caught as a result of Singaporean operations?63 
261 Ibid. at 76. 
262 Filipino Muslims Need More Than Economic Development, United States Institute of Peace, 
Vol. VIII, No.3, available at http://www.usip.org/peacewatchl2002l4/filipino.html(last visited Nov. 1,2006). 
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Mr Wong Kan Seng, Minister for Home Affairs, The Official Launch of The Counter-Terrorism Security 
Briefing for Taxi Drivers at Yio Chu Kang Community Club (Jul. 11, 2005) as follows: 
[T]errorism has posed a threat to Singapore for many years, even before our independence. We fought the 
COmmunist terrorists in the 1950s to 1970s, and dealt with other terrorist groups in the following years.The 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist group was plotting to bomb key installations in Singapore, which would also 
have killed many Singaporeans. The JI wanted to use violence to overthrow the governments in Indo~esia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore. The JI's plot against Singapore was prevented by ISO, 
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Given the network of terrorist acts in Southeast Asia in the age of global 
terrorism, it is reasonable that the Thai Government would be concerned that 1I and Al 
Qaeda would choose Southern Thailand as the new home for terrorists operations. 
Thailand would seem to be a desirable target for Al Qaeda operations because of its large 
Muslim community that might provide support as well as asylum for those dissidents 
·d· t 264 hi mg ou. 
Furthermore, the arrest of Hambali, who was nicknamed the "Osama bin Laden of 
Southeast Asia," in Thailand as well as the JI member at Ayutthaya caused the Thai 
government to panic (justifiably) that terrorists have found Thailand a place to elude 
authorities in their own country. According to police intelligence networks in Singapore, 
Malaysia and the Philippines, Hambali was involved with (if not orchestrated himself) 
. the foiled terrorist assaults at the US Embassy in Singapore.265 Intelligence experts also 
pointed out that Hambali was not only a mastermind and operations planner for the 
region but also one of the key links between the regional terror group Jamaah Islamiyah 
(JI) and Al Qaeda.266 
Also, the arrests of Jemaah Islamiah (11) associates in Thailand and Cambodia, 
where members were attempting to buy radioactive material for making a 'dirty' bomb, 
and its network in Singapore has since been crippled, but this does not mean that Singapore is now 
completely safe. The JI network across Southeast Asia still views Singapore as a target, and they will 
COntinue to try to attack us. One reason is that we have arrested more than 30 JI members in our security 
OP~rations, and placed many others on Restriction Orders. Singapore also provided information to 
neighbouring governments on the JI, which led to the JI members there being arrested as well. The JI, 
therefore, would want to avenge their "brothers" who have been caught as a result of our operations against 
them. Additionally, radical elements in the region, including the JI, who see the US as their principal enemy, 
aSSociate Singapore as a US ally, because of our strong support for US actions against terrorism. 
264 
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have dramatically raised perceptions of a terrorist threat in Thailand. This group member 
were reportedly planning a Bali bomb attack on major centres for foreign tourists, and 
against five embassies (Israel, the US, Britain, Australia and Singapore )267 as well as the 
Thai detainees accepted that there are contacting with a Singapore J1 member detained in 
k 268 Bangko . 
Even the British Embassy warned British tourists that there is a high threat of 
terrorism throughout Thailand 269 and the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 
in the u.S. Department of State also mentioned that Thailand's Muslim support of 
Afghanistan's Muslim popUlation makes Thailand a possible terrorist-safe haven (even 
though British-based terrorists experts do not mention Thailand as a possible place for 
. such asylum).27o 
The pattern of violence in southern Thailand created a new phenomenon. Before 
the presence of terrorist networks, violent acts were typically the result of individual 
conflicts. Even when there were moments of anti-government sentiment, such violent 
outbursts were contained in discrete episodes. Subsequent to the attacks in southern 
Thailand, there is not only an ongoing threat to public safety and a serious risk to the 
damage of property but there is a threat to the infrastructures of the Government. Even 
267 
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t ". 
symbolic targets as in the September 11 attacks, the close proximity in time between the 
attacks in southern Thailand (2004), the Bali attacks (2002) and the incidents of 
September 11, 2001, suggest that a growing global terrorist threat has a connection to 
Southeast Asia. Although the British-based terrorist experts have concluded there is no 
basis of an international terrorist group located in Thailand, the very serious incidents of 
violence in the southeast region suggest that Thailand might someday serve such a 
purpose. All of these are the reason why the Thai Government has concerns that 




Not only Thailand has been active III arresting a number of nationals with 
suspected links to these organizations27I but the weak of legal process attracts the 
terrorist-related activities such as: trafficking in drugs, persons, and weapons, organized 
crime, official corruption.272 The connection between Al Qaeda and JI is all the more 
likely if the Thai Government cannot stop a multitude of criminal activity of any sort. 273 
Furthermore, although there has been no terrorists group on this scale, Thailand has had a 
long history of internal violence and many groups that operated in her country since 
1959. These include: 
1. Barasi Revolusi Nasional (BRN/ 74 
2. Barisan National Pember-Basan Pattani (BNPPIBIPP/75 
3. Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULa) 276 
271 Ibid. 
272 See U.S. Department of State cited in note 220 supra. 
273 See Asian Focus Group cited in note 249 supra. 
274 The Barasi Revolusi Nasional (BRN) was founded in 1960. Its goal is to achieve Self-Determination in the 
southern provinces against the central government of Thailand. It is an underground operation. However, it 
was separated in two groups because of interest and ideological conflicts. Then, it was further split into 
three groups: the BRN Coordinate (not active in Thailand but carrying out political activity in Malaysia), the 
BRN Congress (chaired by Rosa Burako conducting military affairs), and the BRN Uram (the most active 
group headed by the late Hajji Abdul Karim consolidating the entire armed units). The last group still 
Operates in southern Thailand but its headquarters are in Malaysia. 
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In the Dsungnyor rebellion, Adul Saiburi, the leader was arrested and imprisoned. After he was released, 
he fled to Kalantan in Malaysia and founded the Barisan National Pember-Basan Pattani (BNPP) in 1959; 
however, the name was changed to the BIPP. The group ceased its activity for a while. Until 2002, it was 
thought to have been involved in the acts of violence in southern Thailand. 
276 
The Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) is the largest and most active organization that 
operates in southern Thailand. It was founded in 1968 by Tuanku Biyo Kodoniyo. This organization also 
~perates in various Mi~dl~ Ea~tem countries. It joined the vio~ent. activitie? in Libya a~d S~ria by sending 
fieenage~s to operate Within their groups. However, the organization split Into two factlons.1n 1992: 1. The 
rst faction was headed by Dr. A-rong Muleng. Its logo is a symbol of a dagger crossed With a sword. Its 
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United Front for the Independence of Pattani (Bersatu) 277 4. 
5. Mujahideen Pattani Movement (BNP) 278 
6. Gerkan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP)I Pattani Islamic Mujahideen Movement279 
Even though there is no firm evidence that these groups are connected to 
international terror groups operate in Thailand, there is strong suspicion. In joint military 
exercises to strengthen the capacity of the military for counterterrorism, the Thai Corps' 
and the Government officials are preparing for the possibility of activity by those rebel 
groupS in the southern region whether or not there are concrete ties to international 
terrorist organizations. 
militia unit is called the "Caddan Army." However. this faction was split again and set up a new organization 
called "PULO 88" or the Abu Jihad PULO, 2. The second faction was lead by Hayihadi Mindosali who is the 
founder of PULO army Command Council [MPTP). It has an eagle for its logo and the name of its army is 
"Abudaban," and its militia is called Caddan Army. This group supports Tuanku Abdul Kade i~ southern 
Thailand. Both factions have headquarters in Malaysia and have joined forces with the military and political 
operations in a few areas of the three southern border provinces. 
217 The United Front for the Independence of Pattani, also known as Bersatu, was established on August 31. 
1989, by joining of the United Liberation Organization Mai (New PULO). the original PULO, the Barisan 
Revoluis Nasional Melayu Pattani (BRN), the Barisan National Pember-Basan Pattani (BNPP) and the 
Mujahideen Pattani under an umbrella organization. At first the name of this group was Payong 
Organization. In 1992. it adopted its current name. Bersatu was founded in order to unify many terrorist 
groups into a single entity in order to avoid any confusion in accepting money from foreign countries. 
Operating both political and military activities, Bersatu carried out guerrilla actions by using ambush tactics 
on the government officers and positions and conducting sabotage in public places. Moreover. it has issued 
propaganda blaming the Thai government for mistreating Muslim citizens. The group might have intended its 
action to cause serious rifts between Thai Buddhists and Thai Muslims and bring foreign intervention. 
Nowadays, a part of Bersatu is conducting activities in Sweden hoping to get help from the Nobel 
Foundation. 
278 
Intending to fight for the independence of the southern border provinces, the Mujahideen Pattani 
Movement was formed on September 16. 1985. Its mission was to try to combine many separatist 
?rganizations and emphasize personal training and political cooperation. The Mujahideen Pattani Movement 
IS headquartered in Malaysia. Most of its important leaders have left the BIPP in part because the BNP's 
performance has not been particularly successful. It was then subsumed by other separatist allies to 
establish Bersatu. 
279 
til This group was founded in 1995 and is possibly the only significant armed force conducting activities in 
cae !ower south of Thailand. This group does not have a unique pattern of organization. However, it has 
t3a ~ed out so-called moderate terrorist acts such as urban sabotage and theft. As with the GMIP, the 
rnil~san Revelusi Malaysia (BRN) was supported by the Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia and Malaysian 
itants, and they have been revived and transformed into insurgency groups. 
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The incidents of September 11280 brought about three significant changes ill 
international relations such as: 
1. Economic globalization 
Despite advances in technology, science and industry, economlC globalization 
continues to polarize the world into the haves and have-nots, between the information-
poor and the information-rich, between the premodern, the modernizing, and postmodem 
worlds. Religious, ethnic, and political ideologies are often employ~d in this warfare 
largely to mobilize sympathizers, but it would be a serious analytical error to consider 
this warfare between the Islamic world and the Western, Christian, and secular world, 
even though the geographic boundaries coincide with that definition of the problem. The 
Islamic world as the rest of the less-developed world is itself deeply divided between the 
have and have-nots demonstrating corresponding pro and con sentiments vis-a- vis the 
West. 
2. Technological globalization 
The drastic changes in technology have created a global communication network 
(computers, satellites, telephony, internet) employed by transnational corporations, 
territorial states, civil society movements, as well as terrorist and counter-terrorist 
organizations. In contrast to the previous state-centric wars, the new "netwar" is global in 
reach and employs both conventional and unconventional weapons. In this war, small-
scale conflicts such as that in Afganistan become globalized while global issues, such as 
Weapons of mass destruction and biochemical warfare, play important roles in what 
Majid Techranian, The Center cannot hold: Terrorism and Global Change 53-54(Uwe Johanannen, Alan 
,James Gomez eds., Select Publishing Pte, 2003). 
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would have been seen a hundred years ago as a smaller-scale conflict (such as those in 
the Arab-Israeli and India-Pakistan). 
3. cultural globalization 
This change has brought about a consciousness of the interconnected nature of 
world economy and with it a consciousness of the ever-widening divide within and 
between nations. It has also created a global dual pathology focused on commodity 
fetishism and identity fetishism, consumerism and envy, ~rrogance and anger. At the 
same time, cultural globalization has also gotten governments to focus on the promotion 
of international security through cooperation rather than competition, democratic 
participation, sustained and sustainable development, and global unity in diversity. 
Dr. Sompong Sucharitkut2s1 claims that international terrorists p_ersist in their 
relentless efforts to inflict untold pain, sorrow and sufferings through a menacing reign of 
terror that strikes indiscriminately at countless members of the international community, 
regardless of their creed, religion, belief, gender, age, nationality or political ideology and 
affiliation?82 Further, the targets of modern terrorism generally are not the actual victims 
of the terrorist acts, but government infrastructure and public safety. The hope is that 
such violence will trigger fear, repulsion, intimidation, overreaction, etc.283 The desired 
outcome is to make people remember the incident as long as possible and consequently, 
an important element is that the terrorist commits suicide rather than surrender. The word 
;-----------------------
Ll A~sociate Dean and Distinguished Professor of Intemational and Comparative Law, Director, SJO and 
U ~ tn. International Legal Studies Program; SA (Honours), B.C.L., MA., D.Phil., and D.CL., Oxfor_d_ 
A nlverslty, England; Docteur en Droit. University of Paris, France; LL. M, Harvard, Diploma. Hague 
cademy of International Law, of the Middle Temple, Barrister at Law. 
282 
p S?mpong Sucharitkul, State Responsibility and International Liability: Recent Developments in the 
ractice of States and Intemational Organizations 2. 
283 
See JUSMAG THAI cited in note 236 supra. 
112 
'terrorists' is synonymous with a violent act in which both innocent people and the 
terrorist him or herself are killed. 
Still in this modem era, the main characteristics and elements of terrorism are not 
dramatically different from the past because the character of terrorist acts can be seen as 
bearing similarities to the basic methods of the Zealots-Sicarii case, even if in that case 
the weapons were daggers and 'swords not guns and grenades. 
The modem terrorist acts have obviously much more far-reaching means of terror, 
examples not the least of which include weapons of mass destruction, cyber attacks or 
bioterrorism. Even violations that are not directly violent can be construed as terrorist 
actions if they are related to tactics and strategies that are intended to cause terror. The 
classic characteristics of terrorism can be said to involve the following attributes. A· 
terrorist act 
- involves serious criminal actions to public, major targets or irifrastructure; 
- the use of violence against innocent people or the government for political and social 
purposes; 
- a racist or religious motivation; 
- a method by which public fear is instilled by a psychology strategy. 
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The violence in southern Thailand raises the question about whether or not these 
acts are, in fact, acts of terrorism or not. The patterns of violence in this region could be 
characterized by the following elements. All of the acts have challenged the power of the 
State, taken as their targets indiscriminate and helpless people (e.g., infants, teachers, 
either Muslim or Buddhist), involved villagers (e.g., the incident at Takbai), lead to 
religion conflict (e.g., killing monks) and aimed to capture international attention through 
the media. 
It is not difficult to argue that these acts of violence seem to be terrorist acts by 
the classic characteristics of terrorism or by the standards many have become familiar 
with as a result of the incident of September 11.284 The elements of these crimes 
correspond closely to the description of acts of terror in· the Thai Penal Code Section 135: 
A conduct made with the intention to intimidate a population. to 
threaten or compel the Royal Thai Government or any 
government or international organization to do or abstain from 
doing any act. 
Given these class characteristics, the violence seems to be the conduct of terrorists. 
However, according to section 59 of the Thai Penal code: 
A person shall be criminally liable only when such person 
commits an act intentionally ... 
In some cases, it is impossible to say such acts are, strictly speaking, terrorist acts 
since it is very difficult to prove the intentions of the criminal. Even if the acts of 
violence look like they meet the criteria for terrorism, the Thai -Penal Code makes it clear 
that proof of intention through the process of the court system is still necessary. Namely, 
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a terrorist group must operate as a ranking organization. The group must have a strict 
chain of command and framework which are able to operate as a chain network. 
Bowever, if the terrorist section in the Thai Penal Code does not apply, other serious 
crimes still shall apply to these acts. It is just more difficult to prove in a court of law the 
intentions of a criminal who has in his or her mind the attack is an attack against the State 
but it does not mean that the offender will be not be punished. 
Whether or ~ot one can truly distinguish between a terrorist organization and a 
group seeking self-determination, such groups are nevertheless still beholden to Thai 
domestic law. So when perpetrators of acts of violence are tried in Thailand even if those 
crimes do not meet the standard of Terrorist section (they do not apply by the offence in 
terrorist section), it ·is unavoidable that those convicted will be tried for equally serious 
cnmes. 
B. Self-Determination 
The question why the United Nations failed to reach consensus and has not 
accepted a terrorism definition is understandable. It is impossible to distinguish in many 
cases "one State's "terrorist" from another State's "freedom fighter." These arguments 
inevitable come up against the word "Self-Determination," a concept crucial to the 
origins of so many different nations (including the US). The scope of self-determination 
has been expanded since 1945285 and as a result, neither the definition of Terrorist nor 
Self-Determination had ever been ultimately established. Within the framework of the 
United Nations, the concerns of State powers have come into the conflict with the equally 
----------------------285. 
C E~lzabeth Chadwick, Self -Determination, Terrorism and the International Humanitarian Law of Armed 
onfllct 3-4, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1996. 
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jrnportant need of equal rights and self-determination of the people.286 For example, 
united States, Canada and Australia, the initial concerns voiced by or on behalf of the 
indigenous peoples can be seen four steps: 
they would like to have their collective indigenous rights 
recognized; 
they would like to have their territorial rights restored and their 
land returned; 
they would like to have right to self -determination as an 
autonomy or a self-government within the established 
community; 
they would like to have their status recognized by the 
international community. 287 
It is no surprise why there is no singular definition of "Self-Determination." The 
widespread use of the expression "Self-Determination" has made it a catchall phrase that 
is an expansive rather than a restrictive term.288 This is unavoidable given that the term is 
used in so many different contexts and in relation to such div~r~~ ethnic, cultural and 
national problems. Even when States concede that people's right to self-determination 
exists, giving "Self-Determination" a distinct legal definition could undermine the way in 
which conflict is resolved through traditional mechanisms of the sovereign State's 
-~/b-'-------------------td. 
287 
R' Sompong Sucharitkul, Tile Inter-Temporal Character of International and comparative Law Regarding the 
Ights of the Indigenous Populations of the world 13; The American J. of Com.Law Val.l, 2002. 
28a 
See E. Chadwick cited in note 285 supra. 
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coIJ1lIlunity.289 That most nation states are more comfortable to exercise and make a 
definition for "terrorism" than "Self-Detennination" suggests that the term terrorism is 
itself heavily weighted towards the point of view of State sovereignty. 
One of the reasons that suggest the violence in the South is not purely a result of a 
coherent separatist movement seeking Self-Determination is that there have many 
instances of Muslims killing other Muslims. For instance, Muslim tree farmers were· 
killed by Muslim extremists when they were caught working on Friday, a day deemed to 
be a holy day of rest.290 In another instance, Muslim extremists killed other Muslims who 
had close relations to Buddhists or to members of the Thai Government. In these cases, 
moderate Muslims who did not obey the strictures of the Koran or follow the ideological 
path of the more extreme separatists were considered heretics, obstructionists or 
supporters of the Thai Government. 
In the public eye, however, Muslim extremists wish to make their cause seem to 
be one uniformly supported by moderate and extreme Muslims alike. For instance, on 
June 15, 2006, a date representing the 'national day' of Pattani rebellion, there were 
several bombings in towns, villages and government buildings. This made it seem as if 
such a day had the support of the entire Muslim community because it seemed like a 
well-coordinated attack on symbols of the Thai Government and expressed political and 
ideological aspirations. 
So although the Thai Government is concerned about the separatist movement, 
the right of self-determination will be left open to question someday. Although the 
United Nations states that everyone has the right to a nationality and that no one should 
See Kankavi cited in note 175 supra, at p.166. 
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be arbitrarily deprived of a nationality or denied the right to change nationality, the 
situation in southern Thailand is not one unambiguously driven by self-determination. It 
. remains to be seen to what degree these acts of violence are the result of a powerful but 
small minority of Muslim extremists and to what degree these acts of violence are the 
necessary steps towards reclaiming the cultural and ideological independence of a 
separate nation-state. 
C. The Status of Prisoner of War 
The situation in the South raIses the question about POW status. Are those 
arrested by the Thai military authorities to be tried as criminals or do the laws of war 
apply to these cases, in which case the individuals would be considered prisoners of war? 
Ifthe dissidents are local groups and the level of the conflict in southern Thailand has not 
risen to the level of armed conflict then these cases are tried under the Thai Penal Code. 
However, the situation is more complex if -- The violence is wide-spread and protracted 
and the Thai Government cannot control the situation; -- The perpetrators were under a 
chain of command within an international network of organized terrorists (such as Al 
Queda, which has support under the new Taliban Government in Afghanistan) or any 
international organization that took as its ambition the downfall of the '-Government. 
Therefore, I will explore the question of whether the situation in the south of Thailand 
118 
Even though there is no settled definition of "armed conflict" in international law, 
and a case by case analysis has often produced unsatisfying results,291 many international 
organizations agree that the laws of war do not apply to situations of internal disturbances 
·and tensions such as riots, sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature.
292 
The violence in the south of Thailand does not fit prevailing conceptions of "war" or 
"armed conflict" because the acts of violence were not overtly carried out by 
transnational criminal group acting on behalf of any State. The attacks were seemingly 
sporadic and infrequent, even though they were clearly well-planned and organized to 
create fear and terror in the public eye. Importantly, the group responsible for the attacks 
did not seek-at least not explicitly seek-- to administer or control any part of Thailand. 
Moreover, recently there is no precise evidence that the dissident groups operated 
within a chain of command under Al Queda or J1. Moreover, it is not clear that those 
who committed the acts of violence in this region have anyone clearly formulated center 
of command. The acts of violence were quite possibly perpetrated by various groups 
with a similar ideological stance. Their connections, therefore, are at times unstable and 
in many instances members of these groups acted like common criminals. 
For these reasons, I do not believe that the status of POWs pertains to the 
situations in Southern Thailand at this moment. However, if the violent situation reaches 
291 
Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of wars, 28 Yale J.lnt'L.1, winter 2003. 
292 
. See paragraphs 215-220 of the ICJ decision in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 1986I.C.J. 14 (Jun. 27). Also, for a lucid assessment of 
the difficulties in establishing when Protocol II applies, see Arturo Carillo, Hors de Logique: Contemporary 
Issues in International Humanitarian Law as Applied to Internal Armed Conflict, 15 AM. U. INTL L. REV. 1, 
at 66-97; No. IT-94-1-AR72, Appeal on Jurisdiction, paras. 66-70 (Oct. 2, 1995), 351.L.M. 32 (1996). The 
leTY Appeals Chamber provided useful clarifications regarding the appropriate geographic and temporal 
frames of reference for internal armed conflicts. 
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to the scope of an international armed conflict, the law of war will be applicable. 
According to Article 4 (1) and (2) of Geneva Conventions III defmes prisoners of war as: 
-- Members of the armedforces of a Party to the conflict, as 
well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of 
such armed forces. 
-- Members of other militias and members of other volunteer 
corps, including those of organized resistance movements, 
belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside 
-their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided 
that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized 
resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions: 
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his 
subordinates; 
(b) that of having a fIXed distinctive sign recognizable at a 
distance; 
(c) that of carrying arms openly; 
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the 
laws and customs of war. 
These groups in Southern Thailand, therefore, does not seem to automatically 
qualify for POW status. However, the content of Geneva Convention is so broad and the 
of what constitutes armed conflict is always changing, the Article goes on to 
Anderson, Law of War and Just War Theory Blog, available at 
.blogspotcom/2004/12/wsj-editorial-on-icrc.html (last visited Nov.l, 2006). 
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Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed 
a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, 
belongs to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such 
persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention 
until such time as their status has been determined by a 
competent tribunal. 
The Thai Government has to maintain that no doubt.could arise with respect to 
any dissident prisoner, or it must preserve the option of a determination by a tribunal if 
there are suspicions concerning a group or an individual. 
But whatever status is accorded to these dissident groups (whether they qualify as 
. POWs according to the law of war), there is no doubt that the law and actions issued from 
Thailand's central government cannot contradict to the concepts of Humanitarian Law 
Human rights Law which I will discuss in detail in the next chapter. 
- 4. Action Taken by the Thai Government Responding to 
United Nations 
The Resolution l373 in Chapter VII of the United Nation Charter of September 
2001, created the principle known as "no safe haven for terrorists" 294 in response to 
attacks of September 11. The counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate 
which was designated by UNSCR 1535 to enhance their powers to monitor the 
- Conventions Against Terrorism, The United Nations, August 7,2006, available at 
.unodc.org/unodclen/terrorism_convention_overview.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2006). 
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implementation of Resolution 1373, also adopted certain 'measures to combat 
. international terrorism, given that the attacks in the US threaten international peace and 
security. These measures were intended to prevent and suppress the financing and 
.. preparation of any act of terrorism in a State's territories through all lawful means. The 
resolution reaffirmed support that all States are obliged to supplement international 
agreements by taking additional measures to prevent and suppress terrorist activity in 
• ., 295 
theIr terntones. 
Indeed, Thailand has the cooperation with the United Nations against terrorism 
since 1963, Thailand was a party to three Conventions and one Protocol such as: The 
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963), 
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970), and The 
, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 
. (1971), and The Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports 
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 1988.296 Even though there 
twelve terrorist Conventions today and Thailand cannot be Party all of them, it does 
mean that Thailand disputes the other Agreements. Rather, Thai domestic law must 
made to abide by the Conventions and that could take a lot of time. 
Adel Maged, Terrorism and the Military International Legal Implications: International Legal Cooperation: 
Essential Tool in the War against Terrorism 178-179 rNybo P.Heere ed., Cambridge University Press 
See also Surakiat Sathirathai, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thailand (Sep. 16, 2001) as follows: 
the terrorist acts against the United States, a long time friend and treaty ally, Thailand has 
clear our position. We condemn in the strongest terms such acts of terrorism and join the United 
General Assembly in adopting unanimously the resolution ·condemning the attacks and calling for 
ltlm"ti"',n~1 cooperation to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of the outrages of 11 
~ptembE~r 2001." 
will join any international coalition to combat terrorism. 
time friend and treaty ally, Thailand will render all possible assistance to the United States as 
has done consistently in the past. 
Report on Thailand's Implementation of Counter - Terrorism Activities, Ministry of Foreign 
. ~ingdom of Thailand, available at http://www.mfa.go.th/internetldocumentfTerrorism%20Report.doc 




Concerning the effects of terrorism in Thailand, the Govemment has adopted laws 
protecting terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. On December 21, 1999, the Thai 
Cabinet resolved, pursuant to Security Council 1267 (1999) and Security 1333 (2000), to 
instruct all authorities concerned to comply with these Resolutions. 
According to the freezing of transfer of funds or financial resources belonging to 
the Taliban, Osma Bin Laden, persons or entities associated with him as identifie"d by the 
security council committee including Al Queda network, the Bank of Thailand has 
circulated a note to all commercial banks and financial institutions requesting their 
cooperation to comply strictly with the said Cabinet reso lution. 297 For instance, all 
financial institutions are required to report any transfer of funds in cash equal to or 
greater than 2 million Baht, or transfer of assets equal to or greater than 5 million Baht 
(approximately $125,000 US dollars), and any suspicious financial transactions by their 
clients to the Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO),298 which requiring all persons or 
entities to report any remittance in the amount equal to or over US$ 10,000 to the Bank 
of Thailand and will soon have to report to AMLO, which maintains these financial 
records in its electronic database.299 
Moreover, the Exchange Control Act of B.E. 2485, which sets out the principles 
of control under which Notifications and Notices for documenting all major financial 
transactions, is an important tool for monitoring terrorist activities. Also, the Anti-Money 
Laundering Act of B.E. 2542 calls for imprisonment as punishment for the offence of 
---'29"/ ----------.•. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand 
. . The Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO) is now acting as the Thai national financial intelligence unit 
and has become a member of the EGMONT Group of Financial Intelligence Unit since 2000. AMLO is 
to sign an MOU with all 69 members of the EGMONT to help facilitate the exchange of information on 
finanCing and tracking of blacklisted groups.(See www.mfa.go.th • last visited Nov.1. 2006). 
See Ministry of Foreign Affairs cited in note 297 supra. 
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money laundering300 and the amendment of the latest Penal Code B.E.2546 (2003) 
stipulates that a terrorist act is a serious crime with severe punishment. 
Because the Government has attempted to stop the transfer or funds or. financial 
resources of alleged terrorists and their collaborators, the punishment outlined in the 
Penal code is not only intended for perpetrators of the crimes but also their accomplices, 
300 The Anti-Money Laundering Act of B.E.2542 (1999), Peeraphan Prempooti version sec.60. 
[A]ny individual who is found guilty of the crime of money laundering shall receive a tenn of imprisonment of 
one to ten years, or a fine of twenty thousand to two hundred thousand Baht, or both. 
Ibid. at sec 61 . 
[A]ny juristic person who is found guilty of an offense under section 5, 7, 8, or 9 shall receive a fine in the 
amount of two hundred thousand to a million Baht 
A Director, Manager, or any person responsible for the operation of the .juristic person under the first 
paragraph which is found guilty of an offense shall receive a term of imprisonment of one to ten years, or a 
fine of twe·nty thousand to two hundred thousand Baht, or both, unless he can prove that he had no part in 
the commission of such offense of the juristic person. 
Ibid. at sec 62. 
[A]ny individual who is found guilty of an offense under section 13, 14, 16, 20, 21, 22, 35, or 36 shall receive 
a fine not exceeding three hundred thousand Baht 
Ibid. at sec 63. 
[Wjhoever reports or makes a statement according to section 13,14, 16, or 21 paragraph two with the 
assertion of a falsehood or the concealment of the facts which should be revealed to the officials shall 
receive a term of imprisonment not exceeding two years, or a fine of fifty thousand to five hundred 
thousand Baht, or both. 
Ibid. at sec 64. 
[A]ny individual who fails to appear or refuses to testify, or to submit an explanation in writing, or to submit 
the aCCOunt document, or evidence required under section 38 (1) or (2), or who obstructs, or fails to 
COOperate under section 38 (3) shall receive a term of imprisonment not exceeding one year, or a fine not 
eXceeding twenty thousand Baht, or both. 
Any individual acts by any means to leak restricted information to others under section 38 paragraph four, 
except in the course of doing one's job or according to the law, shall receive penalty set forth in paragraph 
one . 
.• Ibid. at sec 65 
.... ~]ny person ~ho diverts, damages, destroys, conceals, take away, loses or renders useless the document, 
. emoranda, information, or asset which has been ordered seized or restrained by official action, or which 
knows or should have known will be forfeited to the State according to this Act, shall receive a tenn of 
not exceeding three years, or a fine not exceeding three hundred thousand Baht, or both. 
person who knows or should have known confidential govemment information in proceeding 
to this Act, acts in any means to let others know or may have the knowledge of that confidential 
··VIII laru-", except in the course of conducting one's work or according to the law, he or she shall 
a tenn of imprisonment not exceeding five years, or a fine not exceeding one hundred thousand 
Or both. . 
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including persons or entities making funds or financial assets available to them.301 This 
policy aimed to prevent terrorist organizations to use Thailand as a base for operations of 
the terrorist attacks within or outside the country. According to the Ministry of Interior, 
Thailand has tightened its registration procedure at all temporary shelter areas to ensure 
that displaced persons seeking shelter in Thai territory are not members of any terrorist 
organization according to the Immigration Act B.E.2522 (1979).302 All of these laws and 
policies suggest that Thailand has endeavored to take action pursuant U~ited Nations 
Security Council such as Security Council Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1269 (1999), 1333 
31)1 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs cited in note 297 supra. 
3:i2The Immigration Act B.E. 2522 (1979), Immigration Bureau version art. 12 
(A]liens which fall into any of the following categories are excluded from entering into the Kingdom. 
1. Having no genuine and valid passport or document used in lieu of passport; or having a 
genuine and valid passport or document used in lieu of a passport without Visaing by the Royal Thai 
Embassies or Consulates in Foreign countries; or from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, excepting if a visa 
is not required for certain types of aliens in special instances. 
Visaing and visa exemption will be under the learn and conditions as provided in the Ministerial 
Regulations. 
2. Having no appropriate means of living following entrance into the Kingdom. 
3. ~aving entered into the Kingdom to take occupation as a laborer or to take employment by 
uSIng physical without skills training or to work in violation of the Ministerial Regulations. 
4. Being mentally unstable or having any of the disease as prescribed in the Ministerial 
Regulations. 
5. H~ving not yet been vaccinated against smalllpox or inoculated or undergone any other 
medical treatment for protection against disease and having refused to have such vaccinations 
administered by the Immigration Doctor. 
6. ~aving been imprisoned by the judgement of the Thai Court; or by a lawful injunction; or by 
th~ Judgement of the Court of foreign country, except when the penalty is foe petty offense or negligence 
orlsp~ovided for as an exception in the Ministerial Regulations. 
7. ~avlng behavior which would indicated possible danger to the public or likelihood of being a 
~u~ance or.constituting any violence to the peace or safety of the public or to the security of the public or 
8 R e securIty of the nation , or being under warrant of arrest by competent officials of foreign governments. 
. ~as?n to believe that entrance into the Kingdom was for the purpose of being involved in 
:~tltutlon , the trading of woman of children, drug smuggling, or other types of smuggling which are 
9 ra~ to the public morality. 
10 ~v~ng no money or bond as prescribed by the Minister under him 
11' B e~ng a person prohibited by the Minister under Section 16. 
~ .elng deported by either the Government of Thailand that of or other foreign countries; or 
the ~~ht of stay in the Kingdom or in foreign countries having been revoked; or having been sent out of 
S/talllngd~m by competent officials at the expense of the Government of Thailand unless the Minister 
.1'he cons~der. exemption on an individual special case basis. 
,E Opete~amtnal1on and diagnosis of disease of a physical or mental nature, including protective 
.~, a Ions as against disease, shall be conducted by the Immigration Doctor. 
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~oot), and 1373 (2001) by launching her domestic laws intended to suppress acts of 
terrOrism and comply with counter-terrorist measures. 
Ul - 5 Conclusion 
Many countries and organizations around the world have terrorist laws, yet 
terrorist activity has hardly decreased. Obviously, laws are not enough. Solving the 
problem requires more than changing the laws. However, this doesn't mean that these 
laws are not meaningful, only that the reasons for people not respecting and obeying 
these laws need analysis. In this chap.ter, I not only examined the act of the terrorism but 
the Government response (the legal, 'political and military response) to such acts that are 
inneed of being examined as well. In the next chapter, I will analyze more details about 
the applicable of Thai law and the action of Thai Security Forces in relation to 
international humanitarian law. 
***** 
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~CHAPTER IV 1 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
IV - 1 Introduction 
A. The Incidents 
When compared to armed conflicts in other parts of the world, the conflict in the 
Pattani region of Thailand would likely be classified as a lower-intensity armed conflict. 
This classification would likely be based upon the understanding that the conflict is 
essentially an interna~ armed conflict with little outside news coverage. An important 
consideration for making such a classification would be the fact that the death toll and the 
number of individuals injured from Pattani incident is relatively small.303 This 
characterization seems appropriate when one considers that during the armed conflict in 
Bosnia 200,000 people died or went missing, and more than one million people left the 
country and were scattered throughout the world.304 However, in the four years since the 
conflict began, the level of violence in the Pattani province of Thailand has increased 
steadily which has, in tum, caused the Thai Government to become increasingly 
Concerned with the likelihood of a separatist movement growing in the south. Further, 
;;----------------------
h Srisomphop Chitpiromsri, head of research team of Prince of Songkhla University. province of Pattani 
~ OWed total of dead and injured people in Southern Thailand from year 2004 through 2006 were 1.730 and 
.510. International Herald Tribune. Sep.3, 2006. 
304 
Bosnia and Herzegovina from Recovery to Sustainable Growth 3, USA World Bank Publications1997. 
127 
d 
the nature of this conflict also has caused the Thai Government to become increasingly 
concerned with unconventional tactics associated with this conflict. 305 
To address these concerns and in response to violence on January 4, 2004 where 
about thirty gunmen raided an army depot in Narathiwat province to steal a cache of 300 
weapons to commit arson on 18 schools in the same area, and the subsequent theft of 
military weapons at the Army camp in Narathiwat province,306 the Thai Government 
declared martial law on the provinct?s ofNarathiwat, Pattani, Yala307 and Songkhia308 To 
replace martial law, the imposition of martial law was followed soon after by the 
Emergency Decree On Public Administration in Emergency Situation, B.E. 2548 
(2005)(the "Emergency Decree") which came into force on July 16,2005.309 
During this period of martial law (January 5, 2004 until July21, 2005),310 several 
incidents took place that give rise to questions of a state's obligations under international 
law when dealing with domestic unrest. Specifically, on April 28, 2004, 30 Muslim 
dissidents were killed by Thai Military Forces during a demonstration at the Krue - Se 
mosque in Pattani. Then, on October 25, 2004, 80 Muslim demonstrators who had been 
arrested and loaded into government transport vehicles after a demonstration at the Tak 
305 F . 
or Instance, the Thai Security Forces arrested of Riduan lsamuddin (so-called Hambali), an Indonesian 
suspected of being the operations chief for Jemaah Islamiah (JI), a group allegedly linked to AI Qaeda and 
blamed for last year's Bali bombing and other attacks. 
306 
See more details in Chapter 2. 
307 
On 05 January 2004 at 6 a.m., Lieutenant General Pongsak Ekbannasingh, Fourth Region Army 
~ommander, declared martial law in the provinces of Narathiwat (Districts of Rueso, Takbai, Su-ngai Padi , 
I-ngo and Su-ngai Kolok), Pattani(Khok Pho District)and Yala (Raman District). 
30s 
On 03 November 2004 at 10 a.m., Lieutenant General Kwanchart Klaharn, Fourth Region Army 
C(T~mmander, declared martial law in the provinces of Songkhla (Districts of Chana (Chenok) and Thepha 
Iba)). 
309 







sai Police station were later found to have suffocated while in the custody of Thai 
Security Forces. 311 While there have been no other major incidents, the region remains 
under martial law and Emergency Decree. The violence continues, and as of this writing, 
there have been more than 2,000 casualties.312 
B. The Legal Issues 
These incidents raise several questions as to whether the Thai Government may 
have violated its obligations under international law. Specifically: 
(I) Were the Martial Law and Emergency Decree consistent with 
Thailand's obligations under human rights law, humanitarian law, 
and the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of 
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of the 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and of the 1993 Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling 
and the Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction? 
(2) Were the actions of the Thai Military Forces in suppressing the 
demonstrations at Kru Se Mosque in Pattani province and Tak Bai 
Police Station in Narathiwat province consistent with their 
obligations under international humanitarian law (or the law of 
armed conflict) as specifically defined in the Geneva Conventions, 
the Hague Conventions, and customary law? 
---311 ---------See more details in Chapter 2. 
312 
See S.Chitpiromsri cited in note 303 supra. 
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In short, we must ask the difficult question of whether the military operations by 
the Thai Armed Forces respect the "law of war." 
According to Prime Minister Dr. Taksin Shinawatra, Foreign Minister Dr. 
Kantathi Suphamongkhon, and Director-General of the Department of Information and 
Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr. Sihasak Phuangketkeow, the most 
disturbing aspects of the southern violence are the attacks on civilians by the group of 
dissidents3!3 and the failure of the Thai authorities to protect Thai citizens.314 Although 
the Thai Government has stated that "Thai Muslims are not mistreated and enjoy all 
rights as Thai nationals, as enshrined in the Thai Constitution," 315 there is growing 
concern by many international organizations regarding alleged human rights violations 
. which have arguably increased in recent years as a direct result of this conflict, namely, 
Human Rights Watches, has been paying close attention to the violence in the southern 
provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat where Thai Security Forces have committed 
widespread human rights abuse.3 !6 Further, the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
has been critical of Thailand's efforts to end Islamic militant violence in the largely 
Muslim provinces in the country's south. As the speech of H.E. Prof. Ekmeleddin 
lhsanoglu, Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference has said on 
March 15, 2005 that "the recent abuses of human rights against a section of Muslim Thai 
313 
See more details in Chapter 2. 
314 
See Kankavi cited in note 175 supra at p. 186-187. 
~ . 
. ~rit Garnjana-Gooncbom, Press conference, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
MlllIster of foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Tnadand (Jun. 7, 2004); See also Thai Constitution BE 
2540( 1997)secA. 
{T]he Human dignity, rightafld liberty of the people shall be protected. 
316 
Thailand: Blacklists Create Climate of Fear, available at 
http://hrw.org/er:glish/docS/2005/12/16/thaila12317.htm (last visited June 26, 2006). 
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citizens in Southern Thailand are another source of concern. " JI7 Further still, the United 
Nations has criticized certain provisions of the Emergency Decree which granted 
emergency powers to the Thai Armed Forces to combat insurgents in the three 
predominantly Muslim provinces.JIS This use of military force, according to the United 
Nations, violated the terms of international human rights which protects the basic rights 
of peoples. Since Thailand is a party to many Conventions which enhance well 
cooperation among the Parties, the United Nations and several other organizations, not 
only Human Rights Watches and OIC, but the Asian Human Rights Commission, 
Amnesty International and mores, have voiced concern that the Emergency Decree 
violates Thailand's international legal obligations as a signatory to an international 
agreement. 
In order to propose more effective peacekeeping means in southern Thailand, I 
will discuss the interplay?f international and domestic law while focusing not only on 
the alleged violations of international humanitarian law but also on whether or not the 
Thai Government's actions are consistent with its obligations under applicable human 
rights standards. This chapter will attempt to explain the complex issues at stake in 
Thailand's peace-keeping force by examining: (1) the applicability Thai domestic law, 
(2) the applicable of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, 
and (3) the nature and extent of any violations. I will conclude this Chapter by analyzing 
;;---------------------
Speech, H.E. Prof. EkmeledffiifTfiSanoglu, Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic 
~~ference, before the sixty-first session of the United Nations commission on human rights, Geneva -
wlizerland(Mar.15,2005). . 
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step by step both the facts (Kru Se and Tak Bai cases) and the law that was practiced in 
southern Thailand. 
IV - 2 Applicable Laws 
The following is a discussion of those laws pertinent to the Thai Government's 
response to the aforementioned incidents in Southern Thailand. 
A. Domestic Law 
1. Thai Criminal Law 
Since Thailand became a constitutional monarchy in 1932, the effects of a 
democratic system upon the Legal and Judiciary systems have been profound and far-
reaching. The Constitution is vested by the judiciary power of the Courts. Judges 
perform their duties on behalf of the King and are free from political influence when 
working on cases according to the law.319 
The Thai Penal Code was first promulgated in 1908 during in the Period of King 
Rama V. This first version was founded by Prince Rabi of Ratchaburi who played a 
leading role in introducing a modem system of judicial administration according to the 
politics of Gradual Reform.32o Up to now Thai laws have been changed many times 
towards improving the recent situation of the country. The Thai Penal Code was renewed 
;;---------------------
. The Judiciary of Thailand, The court of Justice, Thailand, available at 
http://www.judiciary.go.th/englthejudiciary.htm#t1 (last visited Jul 18, 2006). 
320 
111 B.J.Terwiel, Thailand's political History from the Fall of Ayutthaya to recent times 203, River Books 2005. 
lllhe changes that were to take place in 1892 have been called the" great transformation," and a "general 
reOrganization of government", statements that give the impression of a sudden metamorphosis. 
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21 times, and the Code of Criminal procedure was amended 29 times. Due to both, laws· 
have undergone many structural changes.321 For instance, Section 135/1-3 of the Thai 
Penal Code has been proposed to define the scope of terrorism which would treat terrorist 
acts as serious offences, and criminalize all steps in the terrorism process which came 
into force on August 9, 2003. Furthermore, some sections of the Thai Criminal 
Procedure Code which abridged the rights and freedom of people guaranteed by the Thai 
Constitutional at that time were abandoned and amended to be consistent with the 
. . 1322 ConstltutlOna . 
Section 4 of the Thai Penal Codes states: "whoever commi1s-m1 offence within 
the Kingdom shall be punished according to the law n323 even if such. a crime is only a 
partial offence.324 This is the principle of jurisdiction which is applied in all Thai courts. 
However, the "offences within the Kingdom" refers to crimes committed not only within 
the territorial boundaries of Thailand but also to those crimes committed in another 
jurisdiction outside the country but where the effects and consequences of those crimes 
:vould be felt within the country.325 The jurisdictional reach of Section 4 and Section 5 of 
the Thai Penal Code extends to the acts of a co-principal; as such, a supporter or 
321 
See Government Gazette, Thailand. 
322 
Government Gazette vol 121 , part 79a Dec.23 8.E.2547 (2004). 
323 Thai Penal Code sec.4, Lueng Dulyasath·Pathiweth' s version (Suchart Jiwachart ed.). 
l'N)hoever commits an offence within the Kingdom shall be punished according to Thai law. 
324 lb' 
Id. at sec.5. 
~e~e~er any offence is even partially committed within the kingdom, or the consequence of the 
.. mm~sslon of which, as intended by the offender, occurs within the kingdom, or, by the nature of the 
. mmlssion of which, the consequence resulting therefrom should occur within would occur within the 
it shall be deemed that such offence is committed within the Kingdom or it could foreseen that the 
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inStigator (as opposed to a perpetrator) of a crime within the Kingdom326 or a crime in a 
foreign jurisdiction that has effects or consequences within Thailand would, according to 
Section 4, be punished according to Thai law. Further, under Section 7 and Section 8 of 
the Thai Penal Code, the punishment of such crimes must be administered in the country. 
2. The Martial Law Declaration Act B.E. 2457(1914) 
Although Thailand has codified criminal law principles into the Thai Penal Code 
and the Thai Code Criminal Procedure Code, there are certain provisions in both statutes 
that are applicable to the security of the country and, as such, are relevant to the incidents 
at K.ru Se Mosque in Pattani Province and Tak Bai Police Station on Narathiwat 
Province. Specifically, Section 2 of the martial law provides for the imposition of martial 
law in the event of circumstances that could be considered as a threat to the security of 
Thailand. 
Accordingly, on July 5, 2004, martial law was imposed on the southern area of 
Thailand in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat Province. Unfortunately, the imposition of 
martial law had profound effects in these thre.e provinces, especially during periods when 
confrontations between demonstrators and government officials became violent incidents. 
Martial law existed in Thailand before the Thai Constitution was drafted, 327before 
the adoption of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and before the four Geneva 
,''''"'-------------
~/b· Id. at sec.6. 
any offense is committed within the Kingdom, or is deemed by this Code as being committed 
the Kingdom, even though the act of a co-principal, a supporter or an instigator in the offence is done 
the Kingdom, it shall be deemed that the principal, supporter or instigator has committed the offence 
the Kingdom. 
Constitution law has long practiced in Thailand since1933. 
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conventions were ratified by Thailand. Martial law, as it is used in Thailand, was 
adapted from French martial law and has been periodically imposed in Thailand over the 
last 90-plus years. Currently, martial law can be imposed in exceptional situations where, 
the Government perceives a threat to the security of the nation (either within or outside of 
the country, such as a time of wars and riot).328 Pursuant to Section 6 of martial law, the 
provision provides the Thai military personnel with law enforcement and riot control 
capabilities that are greater than those normally available to the civilian officers at 
arms.329 For example, under martial law, Thai military personnel may ask police officers 
or civilian officers to assist for the peaceful mission. In essence, martial law potentially 
provides military full authority to the civilian officer, and arguably, the imposition of 
martial law could give rise to questions of it limiting some of the rights and liberties of 
the Thai people. However, the imposition of martial law is supposed to be a temporary 
measure.330 
In fact, martial law has been imposed from time to time throughout the twenty 
provinces of Thailand33 ! but to place this law has not been broadly criticized by the 
media and human rights organizations until martial law was imposed in the provinces of 
328 
The Martial Law Declaration Act B.E. 2457(1914), translated by the author [hereinafter Thai Martial Law 1 
sec. 4. 
PIn the time of war or rebellion, the military commander who is responsible for military personnel no less 
than a battalion or who is the commander of a citadel or of a military base, shall have the power to declare 
martial law in his military jurisdiction and shall report to the government promptly. 
329 Ibid. at sec.6. 
[II~. any region under martial law, military officers shall have authority over civilian officers as relating to 
m~l~tary affairs, ban, maintenance of peace, and public security. Civilian officers must follow the order of 
military officer under martial law. 
330 This law shall be applicable only emergency situation. 
331 
p G.overnment Gazette vol 108, part 77 2 May B.E.2534 (1991) . 
. C~ovinces of Kanchanaburi, Chanthaburi, Chiang Rai, Chiang Mai, Trat, Tak, Narathiwat (only districts of 
." anae, Ra-ngae, Waeng, Si Sakhon and Sukririn), Nan, Buriram, Prachin Buri, Phayao, Phitsanulok,Mae 
Son, Yala (Than To, Betong, Bannang Sata,Yaha), Loei, Sisaket, Songkhla (Na Thawi, Sadao, Saba 
(Sebayu)), Satun, Surin, Uttaradit, and Ubon Ratchathani. 
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Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala. Even when martial law was replaced by an Emergency 
Decree, this law was widely held as damaging to Thailand's record of human rights. 
However, this martial law could be construed as appropriate to the southern area. The 
Government announced the Emergency Decree to be applicable on July 16, 2005 instead 
of martial law. 
3. Thai Emergency Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situation 
B.E.2548 (2005) 
The public outcry ill'.eL possible human rights abuse as well as the deprivation of 
basic legal rights under martial law forced the Thai Government to announce the 
. Emergency Decree on July 16, 2005. This came about when martial law lent itself to 
civil disobedience. Thai citizens had the feel of a dictatorship, whereas laws instituted 
and executed by the state were more likely to be obeyed because of the popular view that 
these laws maintained a tenable connection to democratic ideals. When the Emergency 
Decree was set in motion, it invoked Section 218 of the Thai Constitution332 in which a 
comprehensive system of statutory laws was called upon for necessary measures to 
manage internal security. However, martial law and the Emergency Decree often 
~;' 
.• ~ amounted to the same type of rules. Some international organizations333 still blame the 
Thai Constitution B.E.2540 (1997), at sec 218. 
the purpose of maintaining national or public safety or national economic security, or averting public 
, the King may issue an Emergency Decree which shall have the forces as an Act. 
~~ International Federation for Human rights (FIDH) and its member organization in Thailand, the Union 
CIVil Liberties of Thailand (UCL), expressed their deep preoccupation at the various infringements of 
human rights obligations within the Decree which can be applied to the whole, or any part of the 
(avail~ble at www.figh.org, last visited Jan 1, 2006). 
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emergency Decree for exacerbating the conflict and deem it to be a threat to public 
safety, arguing that a change in terminology will not help stem further conflicts. 334 
The above-mentioned Thai laws were applicable in the situation in southern 
Thailand with both the Islamic dissidents (Kru Se Mosque case) and the riots at the Tak 
Bai police Station. Both of these incidents violated the Thai Penal Code, which has 
jurisdiction over all individuals involved pursuant to Sections 4, Section 7,335and Section 
8,336 and which asserts what in the provinces of Thailand still can impact or threaten the 
nation as a whole. 
Because Thailand has sovereignty and jurisdiction over their citizens, the Thai 
Penal Code and the Thai Criminal Procedure Code are applicable in such situations even 
though these incidents occurred during the declaration of ·martial law and Emergency 
Decree. This is because Thai Criminal justice aims to impose sentence within properly 
determined petitions. The question is whether or not the provisions of Thai laws that had 
an affect on this situation defy the concept of human rights and humanitarian law. 
See Thai Martial Law, at sec.7. 
commits an offence outside the Kingdom shall be punished in the Kingdom, namely: 
Offences relating to the Security of the Kingdom as provided in Section 107 to 129; 
Offences relating to Counterfeiting and Alteration as provided in Sections 240 to 249, 
254, Section 256, section 257, and Section 266 (3) -(4).; 
relating to Robbery as provided in Section 339, and Offence relating to Gang-
as provided in Section 340, which is committed on the High seas. 
Ibid. at sec.8. 
commits an offence outside the Kingdom shall be punished in the Kingdom, 
that: 
the offender be a Thai person, and there be a request for punishment by the 
of the country where the offence has occurred or by the injured person; or 
offender be an alien, and the Thai Government or a Thai person be the injured 
and there be a request for punishment by the injure person. 
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International Law 
A court of justice (IeJ) has the task of deciding legal disputes between states and 
'assisting the operations of international organizations by giving them its opinions on legal 
questions. The disputes cover the most varied aspects of .public and private law, concern 
all parts of the globe, and often call for a re-examination of various legal systems and of 
wide-ranging state practices including those domestic policies connected to international 
organizations. However, not every case with which this court deals has to be of 
paramount significance, and not every aspect of a particular case which has to be 
-submitted for -its decision is considered. What matters is that the court should help in 
resolving disputes and thereby contribute to the maintenance of peace and to the 
development of friendly r~lations among states.337 
Article 38 of the Statute of International Court of Justice which has the function 
of making decisions in accordance with international law on such disputes as are 
submitted states: "The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international 
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
A. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states; 
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
D. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary meansfor the determination of rules 
a/law. " 
The Court is an organ of international law, available at http://www.icj-






















This court order asserted the rule of international law and shown that it was the 
product of one or more of three law-creating processes: treaties,338 international 
customary law, or general principles oflaw organized by civilized nations.339 As a result, 
in principle, international law will govern the situation where there is a relationship 
among States, or where States are deemed to have rights and obligations that are 
internationally recognized as being regulated by international law.34o Further, although 
customary international law is not written, it reflects state practice because the rules of 
customary law govern questions not regulated by the provision of the present convention. 
Many rules of treaties have become part of customary international law, and many 
. provisions of international law are now accepted as customary law.341 That is, as all 
states are governed by internationallaw,342 then Thail~nd is a country whose rights and 
obligations are governed by international law regardless of internal or international 
affairs so long as political authority is restricted by international law. It is entirely 
possible that the provisions of a treaty and conventions could apply to conflict within 
existing domestic law yet international law has no direct application to Thailand's 
particular situation. 
338 
6 Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, UN Doc NConf 39/28, UKTS 58(1980),8 ILM 
79. 
~eaty' means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by 
International law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and 
,Ylhatever its particular designation. 
~339 
} D.J.Harris, Cases and Material on Intemational Law 20, Sweet and Maxwell 1991 (4th ed. 1991)(1973). 
Thomas Buergenthal and Harold G.Maier, Public International Law 2-3, West Publishing 1990(2nd 
1990). 
Treaties and customary international humanitarian law, available at 
. icrc.orglweb/eng/siteengO. nsfliwpList2/H uma nitarian Jaw: Treaties_and _customary Jaw?OpenOo 
(last visited Jun. 26, 2006). 
See T. Buergenthal and H. G.Maier cited in note 340 supra. 
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'1. International Humanitarian Law . 
Professor Warren E. Sma1l343 views international humanitarian law as a subset of 
human rights law, and international humanitarian law is also known to be part and parcel 
to a main body of rules for the laws of war or the laws of armed conflict {often 
abbreviated to "LOAC") which is concerned with the relation between States that are in a 
State of armed conflict. Principles of international humanitarian law are only applicable 
in cases of armed conflict because its objective is to limit the effect of armed conflict. 
Basically, international humanitarian law is not meant to pertain to the conflicts occurring 
within states or to non-international tensions. The main purpose of international 
humanitarian law is to reduce the damage and pain and suffering from such conflicts, to 
. 344 
save the combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering, and to protect 
persons who are not or who are no longer participating in the hostilities. The main bodies 
of the humanitarian law can be found in: 345 
Captain Warren E. Small, Esq. spent his twenty - five years in the U.S.Navy as a commissioned officer. 
earned his J.D.from Golden Gate University, where he specialized in international law. He joined the 
faculty in 1996 to complement his private practice which specializes in all aspects· of domestic and 
II .... ,'~" •• - law. 
Joint Publication 1-02 (2001), DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 
Operational Law Handbook 31, The Judge Advocate General's School Charlottesville (2003). 
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• the Hague Conventions 346 
• the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (4 Conventions) m 
• the Geneva Protocols I and II of 1977 348 
• Customary International Law 
• Treaties 349 
• Regulations 
The basic concept of "Law of the Hague" and "Law of the Geneva" are generally 
based upon the concept of a universal humanity. The nature of these conventions 
provides not only recommendations for military procedures, but also concern for the 
victims. This simple concept forbids any attack on an enemy that causes unnecessary 
suffering, injury, or destntction. The use of force must not exceed the minimum required. 
to achieve that basic objective. That is to say, the Law of the Hague is a term used to 
346 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, 14 May 
1954, 249 U.N.T.S.240 - 88 (entry into force Aug.7, 1956) [hereinafter 1954 Hague Cultural Property 
Convention]; Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907, T.S.539, including the 
regulations thereto [Hereinafter Hague IV]; Convention M Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral 
Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907,36 Stat.2310, 2 A.J.I.L.(1908) 
Supplement 117-127; Convention (IX) Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, The 
Hague, 18 October 1907, 754 U.N.T.S. 73, 8 ILM 68; Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, 14 May 1954,249 U.N.T.S. 358 [hereinafter Protocol I to the 1954 
Hague Cultural Property Convention. 
me -. onvention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Force in the Field, 
Geneva, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S.1950 31 - 831949 (entry into force Oct 21, 1950)[hereinafter 
Geneva Convention I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick and 
?hipwrecked Members of Armed Force at Sea, Geneva, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S.1950 85 - 133 (entry 
~t? force Oct 21, 1950)[hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
nsoners of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S.1950 135 - 285 (enlty into force Oct 21, 
~950)[hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Convention Relative to Protection of Civilians in Time of War, 
ceneva, 12 August 1949,75 U.N.T.S.1950 287 - 417 (entry into force Oct 21, 1.9(0) [hereinafter Geneva 
onvention IV]. 
34a 
Vi ~rotocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
I.~ctlms of International Armed. Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 Ju.ne 1977, : ~25 U.N.TS.1950 (1979) 3-6~~, 16 
toi~·(1977) 1391-441 (entry mto force Dec 7, 1978) [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional 
Arm e Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of:V.fCtims of Non-International 
I.l~d Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.1950 (1979) 609-99,172 A.J.I.L.457 (1978) 16 
.(1977) 1442 - 9 (entry into force Dec 7,1978)[hereinafter Additional Protocol II]. 
349 
See Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties, cited in note 338 supra.23. 
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denote an attempt to regulate the means and methods of warfare (prohibiting the use of 
certain weapons such as poison) that promote war-time humanitarian concerns (such as 
warning the civilian population before bombardment). The primary rule is derived from 
regulations respecting the laws and customs of war on land,35o Meanwhile the Geneva 
conventions and their additional protocols provide an extensive legal framework for the 
protection of persons not or no longer participating directly in hostilities.351 
Recently, more than 190 States of the world have agreed to the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 are customary international law (although the Geneva Protocols I 
and II of 1977 are still being debatable). However, it could be addressed that the Geneva 
Conventions and their additional protocols are, in fact, international treaties of a sort 
since they make the most important contribution in limiting the barbarism of war.352 The 
Geneva Convention and additional protocols mark the most significant development from 
"a 'legal perspective toward an attempt at international legislative response to armed 
conflict. These four Geneva Conventions were intended to apply to all international 
anned conflicts, regardless of whether or not war has been declared, or whether there is a 
partial or total occupation of another state's territory.353 
As Thailand has lead an ongomg effort to promote and cooperate with 
peacekeeping forces that follow these principles laid out by the Charter of the United 
~~Nations, Thailand has ratified the four Geneva Conventions and the Hague Conventions. 
lft~ 
See Operational Law Handbook cited in note 345 supra. 
Jean - Marie Henckaerts, The law of armed conflict: problem and Prospects, Chatam House, Apr. 18-19 
available at http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/pdf/researchlillllParmedconflict.pdf (last visited Jun. 26, 
Geneva Conventions: the core of international humanitarian law, available at 
.icrc.orgM'eb/Eng/siteengO.nsf/htmllgenevaconventions (last visited Jun. 26, 2006). 
The Conventions had changed the use of technical term of 'war' to 'armed conflict cited by Leslie C. 




;.ccordingly, it is legally bound to comply with the standard law of anned conflict 
required by these Conventions. 
After reviewing the four Geneva Conventions, there is another question regarding 
whether the two additions to the protocol of the Geneva Convention are universally 
customary or not. 
In recent times, Additional Protocol I has been ratified by more than 160 states, 
meanwhile Protocol II also ~as been ratified by almost 160 states. There are only a few 
states in which non-international armed conflicts are taking place (including Thailand) 
that have not ratified such protocols. Although Thailand has not ratified Protocol I and II, 
many of the provisions of the protocols may be applicable as customary law. 354 That is, 
the main source of humanitarian law for centuries has stated that no States shall violate 
international humanitarian both in international and in non-international anned conflict. 
355 Since customary international law consists of rules of law derived from the 
consistent conduct of States acting out of the belief that the law required them to act that 
way,356 it is in Thailand's best interest not to be contrary to the rules which are derived 
from its very own legal tradition. 
354 
See Operational Law Handbook cited in note 345 supra. 
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The rule of customary international law is derived from state practice and has developed out of conflicts 
Iha~ fall within customary law rather than in treaty law, which is exemplified in military manuals, national 
~Islation, official statements [protests, declarations, uprises de position"], positions adopted by States in 
International conferences [unanimity in adopting some provisions, or the prohibition of reservations] , official 
reports on battlefield behavior and case law [decision of the courts]. 
As Such, the rule of customary international law normally binds on all States even in those cases when the 
!tate is a not a party to such treaties. Under article 38 of Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties states: 
Nothing in Article 34 to 37 precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third as a 
CUstomary rule of international law, recognized as such." Also, article...38-{1) of Statute of the International 
COurt of Justice established the court's function as E means to decide whether international law applies to 
SUch disputes: (a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
~~gnized by the contesting states; (b) intemational custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted 
aw, (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. 
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Although the latest violence that erupted in Thailand occurred within its national 
bOrders and appeared to be the result of internal conflict, it is difficult to establish 
whether these incidents reached the level of armed conflict in which the Hague and 
Geneva treaties apply. In general principle, the scope of international humanitarian law 
is limited to what is considered to be internal armed conflict. However, under Common 
Article 2 and Common Article 3, the laws of armed conflict still are not limited to war 
between States. The law appears to apply to many situations because Common Article 2 
ofthe Geneva Convention provides: 
The law of armed conflict applies to all cases of declared war or 
of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or 
mor~ of the High Contracting Parties. 
This formulation establishes that a State of war may exist even if the State· does 
not officially recognize the other party and it also applies to all cases of partial or total 
occupation of the territory by a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets 
with no armed resistance. Because internal armed conflicts lead to extreme violence and 
cruelty, many States accept that they cannot treat some situations as merely internal 
conflicts. And Common Article 3 goes on to state: 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character 
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, 
each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum 
144 
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:::~ .... ,,'" 
This Common Article 3 provides an exception to the law of war that otherwise 
to be devoted solely to international conflict insofar as Article 3 carves out a 
area for domestic as well as international human rights. This Article could be 
. read to pertain directly to the case of internal anned conflict occurring within the territory 
of one of the High Contracting Parties. Therefore, the internal incidents, which involve 
either regular armed forces fighting groups of armed dissidents or armed groups fighting 
each other, could be governed by this Common Article 3.357 
Since these two Articles were repeated in all four Conventions, it could be said 
that all these rules are intentionally deemed customary. The situation in Thailand, 
however, will be governed under Geneva Convention.s if the violence goes beyond the 
scope of internal disturbance because the conventions fonnulated in the four Conventions 
can be applied to the level of internal armed conflict. But Thailand does not need to be 
contrary to the fundamental law of Hague Convention or any law which seems to be 
customary law. 
2. Human Rights Law 
Human rights have emerged as a significant moral and legal force in modern 
domestic and international relations and universally apply as much to individuals as to 
govemments. J58 Apart from obligations undertaken by a treaty, a State is entitled to treat 
both its own nationals and stateless persons equally, but how civilians and stateless 
-----------------------357 
The Law of-Armed Conflict: Non-International Armed Conflict, ICRC, available at 
http://WWW.icrc.orgNVeb/eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/5P8EX4/$FileILAW10_final.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2006). 
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persons are treated is not a matter with which international law, as a rule, generally 
concerns itself. Human rights law has developed from international law and seeks to 
become binding across States as customary law. They apply to all States that are not 
subject to the party of such treaties. The hope is that each state will establish protective 
measure to diminish any violation of the basic concepts of human rights, such as 
deprivation ofliberty, torture, inhuman treatment, murder, and other cruelties. Even if the' 
applicability of human rights law is different within different States, every State has to be 
concerned with violations of human rights. 
Today, Thailand is a party to international human rights instruments and has 
already acceded to five core United Nations human rights instruments.359 It IS 
unavoidable that Thailand must not violate the human rights fundamental. 
3. Treaties 
The distinguishing factor of the law of treaty is that it has garnered the consent of 
those States that have been increasingly turning to treaties as a source of international 
law. The law of treaties penn its a State to make a reservation if such a reservation is not 
----------------------
359Thailand has been proactive in becoming a Party to international human rights instruments and has 
already acceded to five core UN human rights instruments as follows: 
~Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), G.A. res. 
1180,34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. N34/46, (entered into force Sep. 3,1981) 
CEDAW] ; 2) Convention on the Rights of the Child, NRES/44/25 (entered into force Dec. 12, 
[hereinafter CRC] ; 3) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on 29 January 1997, GA 
22QOA (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. N6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered 
force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPRj ; 4) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
(CESCR), GA res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. N6316 (1966), 993 
.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976. [hereinafter CESCR] ; 5) International Convention on Elimination 
U Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), G.A. res. 2106 (XX), Annex, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 
.N. Doc. N6014 (1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4,1969) [hereinafter CERDj. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand available at www.mfa.go.th/web/24.p\1p. last visited Jan1 , 2007). 
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prohibited by the treaty that the State has signed.36o This means that traditional 
international law emphasizes the respect of State sovereignty and fundamental freedoms. 
States can have the sovereign right to exploit their own resources and enjoy their rights so 
long as their policies ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to any other States or areas beyond the limits of their national jurisdiction. 
When States sign and ratify any treaty, it means that they are expressing consent to be 
bound by such treaty and must refrain from acts that would defeat the objective and 
purpose of such treaty. Therefore, not only considering the four Geneva Conventions and 
customary law, Thailand has to bear in mind other treaties that the country has signed and 
its duties regarding the implementation of such treaties. 
C. Conclusion 
'. 
That is to say both domestic law and International law are applicable to the 
violence in Southern Thailand. Although some Treaties and Conventions of international 
law are not applicable at this moment, Thailand has to realize that the Thai Security 
Forces shall not violate either Thai law or international' law especially human rights. 
Furthermore, to operate in hannony for the peace of the country and the world, Thailand 
should inspect its law against the concept of international law. I shall examine further 
how Thai law and the actions of the Thai Security Forces comply with the international 
law in human rights and humanitarian law and treaties in the following discussion. 
-
;---------------------
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
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IV - 3 Is Thai Domestic Law inconsistent with International 
I1umanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: 
What is the Applicable of Thai Law regarding Pattani? 
In Southern Thailand, the domestic laws applicable to the situation are: Thai 
criminal law, martial law and the Thai Emergency Decree. There have been questions as 
to whether these laws violate fundamental humanitarian law and human rights law 
because Thai law has set up a system of tribunals empowered to impose punishment for 
serious offences, punishments that include the death penalty, long-term prison sentences, 
and severe restrictions on rights and liberties. 
Although the concept of martial law was replaced later by the Emergency Decree, 
the statutes are not strikingly different. Both place a prohibitive framework upon normal 
civilian life and allow for responsive military action in the event of a threat to national 
security. Both have the potential to impact human rights and set dangerous precedents. 
All of the above regulations can generally be justified in the scope of international law. 
But are these laws endangering individuals and jeopardizing public support for 
Government authority? 
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~. punishment to Ensure a Measure for Safety 
1. Death Penalty 
Punishment in Thai la~61 is strongly weighted toward retribution as opposed to 
rehabilitation, and the most extr~me form of punishment that the Thai Penal Code 
provides is the death penalty. The death penalty, however, does not apply strictly to 
threats to the well-being of individuals. A recent Penal Code includes the death penalty as 
also applicable to those acts of terrorism warranting maximum punishment. The 
amendment, therefore, that pertains to terrorist activity is in keeping with the domestic 
legal tradition. 
The meting out of punishment through criminal procedure is determined by court 
penalties according to the degree of individual guilt and the background of the offender. 
Although there are campaigns geared toward eradicating the death penalty for any 
person, the campaigns are not popular among Thais. Many believe the death penalty is 
still necessary for a developing country and that what limited budget the government has 
should not be spent on rehabilitating criminals but on compensating victims.362 
361 Th . al Penal Code B.E.2499 (1956). 
(O]ffenses include Regicide; Sedition or Rebellion; Offenses against the external security of Thailand; 
Offenses against the friendly relations with foreign States; Bribery; Malfeasance in Judicial Office; 
terrorist(cited in Chapter 3); Offenses relating to causing public dangers; Arson; Rape; Offenses against life 
and body; Kidnapping; Robbery resulting in death. 
Military Code B.E.2454«1911). 
(O]ffenses include Desertion; Absence without leave during war time or before the enemy; Disobeying a 
~mmand.er; Duties-and-Orders Offenses; Failure to Obey an Order or Regulation; Combat-related 
ffenses Include Misbehavior before the Enemy; and Misconduct as a Prisoner. 
·Narcotics Act B.E.2522 (1979). 
~]ffenses include Produce, Import or Export for the Purpose of Disposal; Use of Force against Other 
ersons to Consume Narcotics. 
362 
Th 
~ Seminar on Death Penalty in Thailand, JUI.3-4, 2006, The National Human Rights Commissions, 
alland. 
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a. Human Rights Law 
Socialists view the concept of human rights as being based on the proposition that 
rights are guaranteed by the State. This view shifts the emphasis from individual 
to social and economic rights (that is, those freedoms an individual enjoys 
the context of the community).363 The question becomes: what is the limitation of 
right? Does the death penalty violate human rights laws? 
Recently, there are 137 countries that have abolished the death penalty,364and 
organiza~ions365have campaigned to abandon this punishment because it is deemed 
be an act of cruel and inhuman punishment.366 Another reason is that to many human 
activists view, the death penalty does not solve the root of the problem because 
is no causal relation between capitol punishment and serious crimes.367 
If, however, we scrutinize the Universal Declaration of Human 'Rights and the 
,"'llllUUVll .... Covenant on Civil and Political Rights article by article, there are no rules 
the death penalty. In keeping with the socialist view, the death penalty can be 
a way to ensure the protection of certain freedoms rather than as a basic 
.~, .. t:;'-'>J"'-'lll of human rights so long as it is just punishment for a capitol crime. This 
Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law 210, Routledge, Taylor and 
Group1997 (1970). 
,.,w."w"",w.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty (last visited Aug. 11.2007). 
have abolished the death penalty in law or practice; 60 countries retain and use the death 
most often as a punishment for people convicted of murder; At least 1,252 people were known to be 
in 24 countries during 2007. The true figure was certainly higher; 88 per cent of all known 
in 2007 took place in China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the USA. 
Amnesty, Human Rights Watch and World coalition organization. 
declaration of the 3rd World Congress Against the Death Penalty, available at 
.worldcoalition.org/bcoaldecla.htm (last visited Jan 31.2007). 
Penalty Q&A, available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/abolish/dp_qa.html(last visited Jan.31, 
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perspective takes the goal of the social world as more important than individuals and that 
certain freedoms must be sacrificed in order to maintain a healthy and functioning 
society. 
There have been movements dedicated to abolishing the death penalty, such as the 
second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
Aimed at Abolishing the Death Penalty. In this case, the protocol was undersigned by 50 
countries, a number that is too low to justify it as customary law. Thailand was not party 
to this protocol. We might compare this to Human Rights instruments and International 
Criminal Court(ICC) , both of which do not prohibit the death penalty and are customary 
laws because there are more than 190 countries party to those treaties. 
h. Humanitarian Law 
The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols have not banned the 
death penalty outright. The regulations of those Conventions regarding the death penalty 
establish rules that ban capital punishment for those individuals less than eighteen years 
of age at the time they committed the offence.368 
Although Thai law provides the punishment of death penalty for serious crimes, 
provisions in Section 288 of the Thai Penal Code prohibit the execution of a person 
is under eighteen years.369 In addition, this Section also bars the execution of any 
. Geneva Convention IV, at art 68. 
any case, the death penalty may not be pronounced on a protected person who was under eighteen 
of age at the time of the offence. 
Additional Protocol II, at art 6 (4). 
~eath penalty shall not be pronounced on persons who were under the age of eighteen years at the 
o the offence and shall not be carried out on pregnant women or mothers of young children. 
151 
woman at the time of her pregnancy.370 In this respect, Thailand has made a deliberate 
effort to make domestic laws compatible with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, or Geneva 
conventions (to which Thailand is Party). For example, in 2003 the Thai Criminal 
Procedure Code, was amended so that the "conventional" form of execution was by the 
use of lethal injection (as opposed to firing squad). In making these changes, Thailand 
has attempted to make certain laws compatible with the generally agreed-upon concepts 
of human rights. Therefore, even though Thailand continues to have the death penalty, it 
is legally still in keeping with humanitarian law insofar as it bans execution for those 
under the age of eighteen and bars the execution of pregnant women. 
2. Arrest, Detention and Imprisonment 
As most countries have a law prohibiting dangerous acts. Certainly, Thailand 
does. The body of Thai criminal law deals with crime and the legal punishment of 
criminal offences. The Thai criminal law permits an authority to arrest, detain, and 
imprison suspects in response to a criminal offence. If we focus on both of the laws -
tnartiallaw and the Emergency Decree - that were used to respond to the waves of 
in attempt"to maintain stability in the Southern area, Section 15 (bis) of the 
law provides that so long as there are reasonable grounds for suspicion, a person 
be arrested and detained, although no more than seven days. Also, Section 12371 of 
Thai Penal Code, at sec.288. 
cases of murder offences. the penalty options that judges may select to impost are death, 
for life or imprisonment of fifteen to twenty years. 
Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situation, BE 2548 (2005), Thai Law Reform 
Version [hereinafter Thai Emergency Decree] sec.12. 
f and taking suspected persons into custody under section 11(1), the competent official shall 
Or leave of a court of competent jurisdiction or the Criminal Court. Upon obtaining leave of the court, 
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the Emergency Decree permits an authority to arrest and detain any person who is 
suspected under Section 11 (1) 372 of its provision. The overseeing official shall ask 
perIl1ission from the court to arrest or detain the individual for a period not exceeding 
seven days. If it seems necessary, competent officers shall ask the court's permission to 
extend such a detention period by seven days at a time but the total period shall not 
exceed thirty days. The suspected person shall be taken into custody at a designated place 
that is not a police station, detention center, penal institution, or a prison and shall not be 
treated as convict.373 Although the Emergency Decree aimed to revise and refine martial 
law, it still provides the authorities with the power to arrest, detain, and imprison a 
suspect. The question is do such laws violate human rights law and humanitarian law? 
There are two legal issues involving detention of suspects in Thai law and international 
law covered here. The first issue is whether the detention of criminals in Thai law is 
compatible with human rights and humanitarian law. The second issue is whether 
detention lasting longer than seven days is still within the accepted understanding of 
"promptly" and "reasonable time" as those tenns are used in the framework of human 
rights law. 
the competent official shall be empowered to arrest and take the suspected persons into custody for a 
pe~iod not exceeding seven days. The suspected persons shall be taken into custody at a designated place 
Which is not a police station, detention centre, penal institution or prisons and shall not be treated as a 
COnvict. Incase where it is necessary to continue the detention in order to remedy the emergency situation, 
th~ competent official shall apply for the leave of the court to extend such detention period by seven days at 
~ time: provided that the total period shall not exceed thirty days Upon the expiration of such period, if the 
etenllon is still required, the competent official shall proceed under the Criminal Procedure Code. 
372 
I~id. at sec.11 (1). 
[TJo ISSue a Notification that a competent official shall have the power of arrest and detention over persons 
:uspected of having a role in causing the emergency situation, or being an instigator, a propagator, a 
s~PP~rter of such act or concealing relevant information relating to the act which caused the emergency 
~ uall?~, provided that this should be done to the extent that is necessary to prevent such person from 
fa mmlttmg an act or participating in the commission of any act which may cause a serious situation or to 
ster cooperation in the termination of the serious situation. 
373 
See Thai Emergency Decree, at sec.12 cited in note 371 supra. 
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a. Human Rights Law 
According to Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "No one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention ... " Also, Article 9 (l) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: "Everyone has the right to 
liberty and security oj person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. 
No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with 
such procedure as are established by law. " 
In these provisions, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
guarantees the rights and liberties of the individual and human rights law allows States to 
arrest people suspected of crimes so long as it is done according to the rules and 
regulations of the law of that country. The Universal Declaration of.Human Rights also 
considers the prohibition of arbitrary arrest and detention. What this means is that the 
State is entitled to judge who can be subject to this law, and why and how they should be 
handled so long as the treatment is fair, legitimate, and customary.374 So although 
detention itself is compatible to human rights law, Article 9 (3 )of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights restricts the rights of States regarding the nature of 
this detention: "Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought 
promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and 
shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release." The person who has 
been arrested, charged, or detained shall have the right to due process of law without any 
delay. Because human rights law uses the word "promptly" and therefore does not 
rify the exact amount of time, the law is open to interpretation. Thus, Thailand must 
H Weston, Human Rights in the World Community 96-97: Issues and Action, Richard Pierre 
ed., University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992. 
154 
~e it upon itself to see that detention of suspects follows a procedure this is standard 
and customary compared to other countries. However, if the period of allowable 
detention in Thailand is longer than periods in other countries, it does not necessarily 
JIleaIl there is a violation of human rights because each country has its distinct problems 
that require different types of solutions. But Thailand has to prove that the process is 
necessary and reasonable and the government has to support significant efforts (and 
intends on continuing these efforts) to improve laws to. meet the international standards, 
compared to other developed countries. 
h. Humanitarian Law 
The Geneva Conventions do not prohibit detention, internment or imprisonment 
as exemplified in Article 89 (4)375 of the Geneva Convention III and Article 119 (4) 3760f 
the Geneva IV, which states confinement shall be permitted for disciplinary punishment. 
Article 68377 of the Geneva IV allows internment or imprisonment for the person who 
commits an offence. Even Article 70378 of the Geneva IV states that the protected 
375 
See Geneva Convention 111, at art. 89. 
[T]he disciplinary punishments applicable to prisoners of war are the following : 
(1) ... , (2) .... (3) ... , and (4) Confinement. 
376 
See Geneva Convention IV. at art. 119. 
fTlhe disciplinary punishments applicable to internees shall be the following: 
(1) ... ,(2) ... ,(3) ... and (4) Confinement. 
In. 
Ib/d. at art.68 
[~rotected persons who commit an offence which is solely intended to harm the Occupying Power. but 
'NhIC~ . does not constitute an attempt on the life or limb of members of the occupying forces or 
:m~n~strat~on, nor a grave collective danger. nor seriously damage the property of the occupying forces or 
ministration or the installations used by them, shall be liable to internment or simple imprisonment. 
provided the duration of such internment or imprisonment is proportionate to the offence committed. --
378 Ibid. at art.70 
~rot~cted persons shall not be arrested. prosecuted or convicted by the Occupying Power for acts 
III mmltted or for opinions expressed before the occupation. or during a temporary interruption thereof. with 
e exception of breaches of the laws and customs of war. 
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persons shall not be arrested, prosecuted or convicted by an Occupying Power when such . 
an act is committed before the time of occupation or temporary interruption. Article 70 
also provides for the ability of the state to detain suspects during the period of occupying 
power if the law of the occupied State justified extradition in time of peace. Therefore, 
such persons can be arrested, prosecuted or convicted under Geneva Conventions. Article 
117379 of the Geneva IV also respects the laws in force in the territory in which these 
individuals are detained. This Article .only limits the punishment to disciplinary 
punishment in the case where those same criminal acts were committed by persons who 
were not internees. These fundamental rules are not different from their Additional 
Protocols.380 Those provisions are supported by the theory of state sovereign immunity, 
379 Ibid. at art. 117. 
[S]ubject to the provisions of the present Chapter, the laws in force in the territory in which they are detained 
will continue to apply to internees who commit offence~ during internment. 
380 See Protocol Additional I , at art.75. 
(3) Any person arrested, detained or interned for actions related to the armed conflict shall be informed 
promptly, in a language he understands, of the reasons why these measures have been taken. Except in 
tases of arrest or detention for penal offences, such persons shall be released with the minimum delay 
possible and in any event as soon as the circumstances justifying the arrest, detention or internment have 
ceased to exist. 
4. No sentence may be passed and no penalty may be executed on a person found guilty of a penal offence 
related to the armed conflict except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by an impartial and regularly 
!:<Instituted court respecting the generally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure, which include 
following: 
the procedure shall provide for an accused to be informed without delay of the particulars of the offence 
against him and shall afford the accused before and during his trial all necessary rights and means 
defence; 
no one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual penal responsibility; 
no one shall be accused or convicted of a criminal offence on account or any act or omission which did 
constitute a criminal offence under the national or international law to which he was subject at the time 
it was committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that which was applicable at the time 
the criminal offence was committed; if, after the commissionuf1he offence, provision is made by law 
the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby; 
anyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law; 
anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be tried in his presence; 
no one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt; 
anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses 
him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same 
. as witnesses against him; 
no one shall be prosecuted or punished by the same Party for an offence in respect of which a final 
acquitting or convicting that person has been previously pronounced under the same law and 
procedure; 




which holds the basic principle that just jurisdiction belongs solely to the State under 
Article 2(7).381 However, the provisions of the Geneva Convention state that the place of 
detention must be in buildings or quarters that meet the appropriate health and safety 
standards during acts of war. 382 These laws also state that there should be no forms of 
cruelty during the imprisonment 383 and such detained persons shall be treated humanely 
during the period of detention. 384 
Ol a convicted person shall be advised on conviction or his judicial and other remedies and of the time-limits 
within which they may be exercised. 
381 Charter of the United Nations with the Statute of the International Court of Justice annexed thereto, 26 
June 1945, 59 Stat. 1 031 , T.S.993, 3 Bevans 1153 (as amended, Dec.17, 1963, T.I.A.S.5857; 557 
U.N.T.S.143 Dec 20, 1965, 19 U.S.T.5450; T.I.A.1.6529 and Dec.20, 1971, 24 U.S.T.2225; T.I.A.S.7739) 
(entry into force Oct.24, 1945) [hereinafter UN Charter] art.2(7). 
[N]<rthing contained in the present Charter· shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which 
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the ~Members to submit such 
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chap~er VII. 
382 See Geneva Convention IV, at art.85. 
fnhe Detaining Power is bound to take all necessary and possible measures to ensure that protected 
persons shall, from the outset of their internment, 'be accommodated in buildings or quarters which afford 
every possible safeguard as regards hygiene and health, and provide efficient protection against the rigours 
of the climate and the effects of the war. In no case shall permanent places of internment be situated in 
unhealthy areas or in districts, the climate of which is injurious to the internees. In all cases where the 
district, in which a protected person is temporarily interned, is in an unhealthy area or has a climate which is 
harmful to his health, he shall be removed to a more suitable place of internment as rapidly as 
circumstances permit. 
The premises shall be fully protected from dampness, adequately heated and lighted, in particular between 
dusk and lights out. The sleeping quarters shall be sufficiently spacious and well ventilated, and the 
internees shall have suitable bedding and sufficient blankets, account being taken of the climate, and the 
age, sex, and state of, health of the internees. 
shall have for their use, day and night, sanitary conveniences which conform to the rules of 
and are constantly maintained in a state of cleanliness. They shall be provided with sufficient water 
soap for their daily personal toilet and for washing their personal laundry; installations and facilities 
for this purpose shall be granted to them. Showers or baths shall also be available. The 
time shall be set aside for washing and for cleaning. 
it is necessary, as an exceptional and temporary measure, to accommodate women internees 
are not members of a family unit in the same place of internment as men, the proviSion of separate 
quarters and sanitary conveniences for the use of such women internees shall be obligatory. 
forms of cruelty without exception are forbidden. 
persons who are confined pending proceedings or serving a sentence involving toss of liberty, 
dUring their confinement be humanely treated. . 
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Because human rights and humanitarian law have no provlSlon to prohibit 
attention, detention can be seen as a potentially necessary peace-keeping measure even if 
aJllight appear to violate the concept of basic human rights. However, Martial law made 
no stipulations about the place that suspects were to be detained (so as to risk violating 
interoationallaw), whereas the Emergency Decree provides a designated place that is not 
a prison cell. Then, the Emergency Decree has a better solution not against any 
intemationallaw. _ 
3. Expulsion 
Section 15 of the Martial law has the authority to expel a person who has no 
domicile or who has a temporary resident status if he or she has, on reasonable grounds, 
been suspected as someone who has jeopardized the security of the state. Also, section 
11(8) 385 of the Emergency Decree allows authorities the power to instruct an alien to 
leave the Kingdom in the case that such a person is deemed to be a supporter of the group 
:,lIausing the emergency situation. Although an international judicial body has yet to judge 
issue, the expulsion could be regarded as a crime against humanity under international 
as the International Criminal Court stands today.386 I will consider then whether the 
. n of someone from a country by either Martial law or Emergency Decree can be 
"tted by human rights and humanitarian law or not. 
• S~e Thai Emergency Decree, at sec.11 (8). 
ISSue a Notification that a competent official shall have the power to instruct an alien to leave the 
in the case where there are reasonable grounds to believe that such person is a supporter in 
the emergency situation, provided that the law on immigration shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
ExPUlsion of Germans after World War 11 Expulsion of Germans after World War II, available at 
wikipedia.org (last visited Jan. 1, 2007). . 
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a. Human Rights Law 
Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that: "No one shall 
be subjected to arbitrary exile ... " Also, Article 9 (1) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights provides: "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of 
person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be 
deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as 
are e~tablished by law. " 
It was seen that Human rights law basically prohibits forced exile but it also 
provides exceptions in cases that jeopardize the security of the State. These laws (Martial 
Law and Emergency Decree) were intended to protect the integrity of the country and to 
. stabilize Southern Thailand, and they do not contradict the concept of human right laws. 
But the question as to whether it is appropriate to use the expUlsion measures is a 
question that needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis and should not be regarded 
.asa general principle that applies to any and all instances. 
h. Humanitarian Law 
Even if Geneva Conventions has no provision prohibiting forced exile, Article 45 
Convention IV states that protected persons shall not be transferred to a country that is 
a party to the Convention, or to any country where he or she may have reason to fear 
"--~UllUll for his or her political opinions or religious beliefs. 
Martial law and Emergency Decree also do not designate a place of exile but 
Decree ensures extradited persons are sent to countries where they are not 
for political or religious beliefs. Further, it does include language that 
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teCDgnizes treaties with other countries because it provides the condition to expel 
individuals by following the "mutatis mutandis" of immigration law that is consistent to 
Geneva Convention and holds states accountable to the treaties they signed as 
International agreements. The effectiveness of the ratification of Geneva Convention can 
be enhanced Thailand, such as the Senate issued the Geneva Act, B.E.2S22, in 1990. 
~\though Thailand supports initiatives toward achieving this objective, it is important to 
stress that each military officer has an obligation to comply with the Geneva 
Conventions. The implementation and compliance with this Act is required by every 
military member to perform their duties. 
Because Martial law does not specify the scope of expUlsion there is a risk that 
such a law could violate the-Geneva Conventions and this broad provision of Martial law 
(even justified for peaceful purposes) should be amended. 
4. Enlistment 
Not only Thailand but almost every country in the world (including civilized 
countries such as United States of America, Canada, and the United Kingdom) has a 
means by which citizens are recruited as military members.387 Thai law also allows for 
Martial law, which takes effect when there is a threat to national security, and which 
authorizes military officers with the power to enlist civilians to assist any military effort 
In protecting the country. In fact, enlistment has been practiced in Thailand before the 
period of the Sukothai Kingdom (1238-1438).388 Even the Emergency Decree does not 
Pairoj Nuchaja, Relationship between the military and politics in Thai history 68-69, Royal Thai Army War 
1990. 
160 
the provision of enlistment, although it could be implied that Section 11 (6)389 allows 
enlistment because it empowers the Prime Minister to perform such an act if it is 
necessary and is for the security of the country. Is enforced enlistment, in other 
words, a form of servitude as it is defined by Article 4 of the Universal Declaration? 
Does the provisional status of national emergency make enforced enlistment a necessary 
steP toward stabilizing a country and ensuring the peace or might these laws serve to 
justify forms of slavery and abuse? 
a. Human Rights Law 
Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, states that: "No one shall 
be held in slavery or serv.itude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their 
forms." The Article was meant to guarantee minimum standards of protection and· 
support for the freedom of people, standards that are consistent with fundamental rights 
,articulated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Also Article 8 
prohibits any person to be held in slavery in any form, including servitude. It might be 
[argued that enforced enlistment is a type of servitude but the covenant includes an 
distinction between military service and other forms of service in those periods 
national emergency: "Any service exacted in cases of emergency or calamity 
the life or well-being of the community. " This exception under Article 8 in 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights understands the real meaning of 
S~e Thai Emergency Decree, at sec.11 (5). 
ISsue a Notification the prohibition of any act or any instruction to perform an act to the extent that is 
for maintaining the security of the state, the safety of the country or the safety of the people. 
See Thai Constitu.tional B.E.2549 at sec.59. 
person shall have a duty to defend the country, serve in armed forces, pay taxes and duties, render 
""'''''n,._ to the official service, receive education and training, protect and pass on to conserve natural 
and the environment, as provided by law. 
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peace, not an ideal state of goodwill and community (enlistment impacts people's 
Uberties), but rather a long-term political stability in which certain measures must be 
taken in order to ensure that longevity. 
Although no provisions prohibit particular forms of enlistment that Martial law 
deems as appropriate, there are laws that prohibit the State from arbitrarily enlisting 
citizen or doing so without legislation. The military has to respect basic human rights for 
this reason regardless of whether recruitment is "necessity" or "regular." Thailand must 
ensure that all individuals are treated equally, even when the issue at stake involves the 
security and national interest of the country. 
h. Humanitarian Law 
Humanitarian law also prohibits slavery or servitude under Article 4(f) of the 
Additional Protocol II states: " Slavery and the slave trade in all their forms. " As well as 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court stated that enslavement is 
one of the acts designated as a "crime against humanity." But these do not include the 
term "enlistment" as a form of servitude. Then, enlistment, which is provided by the 
legislation of State, seems to be a reasonable demand so long as the measures uphold 
principles of constitutional law, protects State sovereignty, and obeys international 
standards of human rights law. 
For that reason, martial law and Emergency Decree do not violate human rights 
~and humanitarian law because there are the system of laws that take effect in the period 
.. an emergency, and the body of law imposed by the military over any and all civilians 
discrimination. Normally, Martial law shall not allow persons to be enlisted 
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unreasonably except by the standards of the Thai Constitution. But because of these 
~treme circumstances, the law provides that it is a duty for everyone to protect the 
country. Enlistment is a "necessary" practice in an urgent situation. 
5. Search, Seizure, Demolition, and Modification 
A right of ownership assures the owner the right to dispense with property in a 
manner he or she sees fit, whether to use or not use the property, or to exclude others 
from using it. As John Locke said: "Every man has a property in his own person. This 
nobody has a right to, but himself" 390 Generall)'J2roperty rights are protected by Thai 
laws found in the form of Thai Constitutions and the Civil Codes. In some cases, 
however, the laws allow the officer, against the right of'ownership of person, to search 
without a warrant as Thai criminal law authorizes the issuance of a search warrant to 
search and seizure so long as there are reasonable grounds.391 For example, Martial law 
390 John Locke (Aug.29, 1632 - Oct.28 , 1704) was an influential English philosopher. His ideas had an 
enormous influence on the development of political philosophy, and he is widely regarded as one of the 
most influential Enlightenment thinkers and contributors to liberal theory. His writings reflected in the 
American Declaration of Independence. (available at www.wikipedia.org, last visited Jan' 1 ,2006). 
391 The Thai Criminal Procedure Code of Thailand, Such art Jiwachat & Lertchai Jiwachat 's version 
[hereinafter Thai Criminal Procedurej sec . .69. 
[TJhe grounds upon which a warrant of search may be issued are as follows: 
(1) to discover and seize any article which may be used as evidence in the course of an inquiry, preliminary 
examination or trial' 
(2) to discover and' seize any article the possession of which is an offence, or which has been unlawfully 
obtained or which is reasonable suspected to have been used or intended to be used for committing an 
offence' 
(3) to di~cover and rescue any person who is wrongfully restrained or confined; 
(4) to discover any person against whom a warrant of arrest has been issued; 
(~) to discover and seize any article according to the judgment or order of a Court, in the case where such 
discovery or seize cannot be otherwise effected. 
Ibid. at sec.92. 
INjo search may be made in a private place without a warrant of search, unless it is made by an 
administrative or police official and in the following cases; 
(1)where there is a cry for help emanating from the private place; 
(2)where a flagrant offence is evidently being committed in the private places; 
(3)':"here a person having committed a flagrant offence has, whilst being pursued, taken refuge; or there are 
senous grounds for suspecting that such person is concealing, in the private place; . 
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provides that military officers have full power to carry out searches, or inspect suspicious 
itemS, seize property that may have been possessed by illegal means or without any prior 
consent by a Government officia1.392 Furthermore, Section 8 of Martial law also provides 
military officers with the full power to demolish any buildings or to enter people's 
dwellings if it seems appropriate for military interest. They also have the right to use all 
vehicles, animals, foods, armaments, and any appliances' of person or company for 
military affairs. Section 11 (3)393 and Section 11(4i94 of the Emergency Decree provides 
that competent officials shall have the power to issue search warrants. Also, Section 
11(4) of the Emergency Decree permits competent officials the power accompanied by a 
notification from the Prime Minister to issue a warrant for removal, withdrawal, or 
demolition of buildings, structures, or obstructions. However, these provisions of the 
Emergency Decree are different than martial law because the Emergency Decree permits 
competent officials such power only on reasonable grounds to seize items if they are 
(4) where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that an article obtained through an offence is 
concealed or to be found inside, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that by reason of the delay in 
obtaining a warrant of search the article is likely to be removed; 
(5) where the person to be arrested is the head of the household of such private place and there is a warrant 
for his arrest, or the arrest is to be made under Section 78 
When the search is made by superior administrative or police official acting in person, no warrant of search 
is necessary but it must be a case where a warrant of search may be issued or where a search may 
'otherwise be made under this Code. 
392 
00 See Thai Martial law, at sec 9. 
o [Mjilitary officers have full power to inspect persons, vehicles, and buildings for any reason, at any place, 
and at any time. They may also inspect letters, telex, parcels, or censor books, broadsheets, newspapers, 
advertising pictures and articles. 
See Thai Emergency Decree, at sec. 11 (3). 
iSsue a Notification that a competent official shall have the power to seize or attach arms, goods, 
products, chemical products or any other materials in the case where there are reasonable 
to suspect that such objects have been used or will be used to commit or support an act which 
an emergency situation. 
I~;d. at sec. 11(4). 
ISSue a Notification that a competent officials shall have the power to issue a warrant for the search, 
, withdrawal or demolition of buildings, structures or obstructions as necessary for the exercise of 
in order to promptly terminate a serious situation where a delay might render the situation beyond 
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suspected of having been used or suspected of being used in the future to "commit or 
support an act which causes an emergency situation." But the Emergency Decree does 
not have any provision to permit an officer to enter a dwelling without a warrant, modify 
any building, or commandeer property. However, Section 11(6) of the Emergency Decree 
still provides that the Prime Minister shall have the power to issue a notification to 
prohibit or allow any act, ·if such an act is deemed necessary and is for the security of the 
country. Although this power can accrue to the benefit of the military, permission from 
the Prime Minister is required, not from a military commander. 
a. Human Rights Law 
Article 17 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
provides: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home, or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and 
reputation. " 395 
Basically human rights law prohibits "arbitrary interference" in order to protect 
-. 
individuals against the abuse of those laws (such as Martial law) that have ostensibly 
peaceful intentions.396 Traditionally, those rights include: L control of the use of 
property,' 2. the right to any benefit from the property (examples: mining rights and rent); 
3. the right to transfer or sell the property; and 4. the right to exclude others from the 
~-------------------
1 J.G A.H. Robertson, Human Rights in Europe: A Study of the European Convention on Human Rights 
38, Manchester University Press 2001. 
39s 
U .Parvez Hassan, The Word (Arbitrary( As Used in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Illegal Or 
MnJust?,( 10 Harv. Int'l L. J. 225 (1969); Christopher Keith Hall, Contemporary universal jurisdiction, in 
A ?b~en Bergsmo, ed., Human Rights and Criminal Justice for the Downtrodden: Essays in Honour of 
s J0rn Elde11 0 n.3 (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2003). 
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property.397 Thus, everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association 
with others. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her property.398 
h. Humanitarian Law 
According to the fundamental provision of "grave breaches," under the Geneva 
Convention, any act that was committed against the property, if it was extensive 
appropriation and not justified by military necessity, is deemed to be carried out 
unlawfully and wantonly.399 Namely, Article 85 (3) (b)400 of the Additional Protocol I 
prohibits making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of an 
. 
indiscriminate attack. Moreover, Article 52 (2)40.1 of the Additional Protocol I provides 
. that attacks shall be limited strictly to military objects, and the Hague Convention,402 
397 Available at www.wikipedia.org ( last visited Jan.1, 2007). 
398 Available at www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/humanrights/declaration/17.asp (last visited Jan. 1, 2007). 
399 See Geneva Convention I, at art. 50. 
IGlrave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if 
COmmitted against persons or property protected by the Convention: willful killing, torture or inhuman 
including biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or 
and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried 
unlawfully and wantonly. 
See Additional Protocol I, at art.85 (3). 
. an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian objects in the knowledge that 
attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects. 
Additional Protocol I, at art. 52 (2). 
shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives 
to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to 
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at 
,offers a definite military advantage. 
1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention, at art.19. 
not of an international character: 
C eVent o.f an armed conflict not of an internatio~al character occurring within the territory of one of the 
, ontractmg Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the provisions of 
Convention which relate to respect for cultural property. 
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O
vides protecting of cultural properties as a whole, irrespective of origin or ownership, 
pc 
and prohibiting acts of aggression toward historic monuments, works of art, or places that 
do not directly aid military support.403 Although international law permits each State to 
have the right to protect its citizens, it was noted that the process of the law has to be 
followed by a humanitarian legal framework as well. 
Considering Martial law, the law attempts to provide how to use military power as 
a necessary means only in the emergency situations. Although martial law authorizes 
military officers to demolish and modify any buildings, the provision-- consistent with 
the fundamental aims of Geneva Convention-permits this only in the cases of military 
necessity. But these considerations are not enough because this law does not prohibit the 
using of extra power by the military officers. The provision does not limit the time period 
in which this might be carried out nor does it clearly define the phrase "full power." The 
scope of the provision does not allow for the military to wage war; the actions taken by 
the military might, actually, fan the flames of enemies of the State because the operatives 
are not deemed to be legitimate, and these might violate humanitarian law. Moreover, 
the permission to use all vehicles, animals, foods, armaments, and any appliances of 
person or company for military affairs might violate Geneva Convention IlI. 404 Even 
---------------
~/bid.at art.16. 
[P)rotection of cultural objects and of places of worship: 
~thout prejudice to the provisions of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
h.ven~ of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954, it is prohibited to commit any acts of hostility directed against 
~tonc monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of 
oples, and to use them in support of the military effort. 
404 
(A See Geneva Convention III, at art.18. 
c Shlilieffect~ and articles of personal use, except arms, horses, military equipment and military documents, 
al remain in the possession of prisoners of war, likewise their metal helmets and gas masks and like 
iSsued for personal protection. Effects and articles used for their clothing or feeding shall likewise 
in their possession, even if such effects and articles belong to their regulation military equipment. 
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¢cle 97405 of the Geneva Convention IV permits this authority if it is in accordance 
with established procedure, but the issues and details in martial law are not sufficient and 
do not cover for the operation and risk to causes effects on the violation of proportional 
fulldamental. 
These problems were resolved, in part, by Emergency Decree, which, although 
having the basic premise as Martial law, uses different terms for the operation. It added 
the phrase "necessary and promptly" and did not include the phrase "full power," as this 
law was explicitly designed to be a provisional set of rules in times of emergency. 
The Emergency Decree permits only the reasonable grounds to seize the suspected object 
and obeys the concept that searches must be conducted for a reason 406 and that such 
'. 
reasons can be articulated and based on general principles of law. The scope pf the 
Emergency Decree is much narrower than· that of Martial law in that the power it 
authorizes the military is not justified merely on the grounds that such acts benefit the 
military as a whole but so long as acts such as search and seizure might work to prevent 
prolonging the emergency situation. Then, this provision suggests that such seizure and 
search might not violate human rights law if the search is implemented pursuant to the 
SCOpe of impartiality and could not be categorized as an arbitrary act. Moreover, the 
transferring of military power to Prime Minister Power was intended to make such 
Operations accountable and to limit the use of this exception as it exists by military 
See Geneva Convention IV, at art.97. 
th . shall be permitted to retain articles of personal use. Monies, cheques, bonds, etc., and valuables 
elr POssession may not be taken from them except in accordance with established procedure. 
Law of Armed conflict, Lesson 12 23,ICRC. 
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One concern is that such laws will be either unjust or merely the prerogative of a 
dictator or other powerful political figure. Therefore, when the Government declares 
martial law, it must ensure all concerned that the action is to promote the welfare and 
safety of the general populace, and not to further the objectives of any exclusive or 
special interest group. If the government meets this standard, a declaration of Martial 
laW and Emergency Decree will not be contrary to the edicts of humanitarian law. 
B. Prohibitions 
Although the Thai Constitution of 1997 was given extensive power to regulate 
and control gov~rnment and public agencies as well as to provide and protect individual 
rights and liberties,407 Martial Law and Emergency Decree still were in effect during that 
period. Thus, although the Thai Constitution of 2006 continues to affirm the right and 
liberty of people, it continues to allow for the possibility of Martial law' and 'Emergency 
Decree. 
1. The Assembly or Gathering of Persons 
Ordinarily, Thai .Constitution of 1997 provides for freedom of assembly and 
association, and the government generally respects these rights in practice. 408 However, 
Martial law states that the assembly or gathering of persons shall be prohibited,409 
----------------------407 
Thanet Aphornsuvan, The Search for Order: Constitutions and Human Rights in Thai Political History, 
Faculty of Liberal Arts, Thammasat University, Bangkok Thailand. 
4il8 
.. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 
",ar.B, 2006. 
4il8 
See Thai Martial law, at sec.11 (1) 
[B]anning of public meeting and suspension of the activities of associations: 
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whereas Emergency Decree410 states the assembly or gathering of persons shall be 
prohibited only if such an assembly or gathering seems to be unruly. But these provisions 
were not used during the year 2005.411 
a. Human Rights Law 
Dr. Manfired Nowak noted freedom of assembly as a fundamental human right 
and functioning of democracy: "As a political right, [freedom of association} is 
indispensable for the existence and functioning of democracy, because political interests 
can be effectively championed only in community with others (as a political party, 
professional interest group, organization or other association for pursuing particular 
public interests}." 412 Freedom of assembly is guaranteed by Article 20 (1) of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that: "Everyone has the right to 
freedom of peaceful assembly and association. " Also the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights provides: "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association 
with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his 
interests. " 
As a fundamental of human rights, the right of peaceful assembly without arms is 
recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and every person has the right to assemble and maintain a 
~-------------------
See Thai Emergency Decree, at sec. 9 (2). --
\T]o prohibit the assembly or gathering of persons at any place or the commission of any act which may 
cause unrest. 
411 
See Country Reports cited in note 408 supra. 
412 
1999 Reports, Human Rights Watch 
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public group without any prejudice. To restrict such a right must be prescribed by law 
and is only necessary in a democratic society in order to protect the interests of national 
security, public safety, or public order. According to the emergency situations, Article 21 
oflntemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: No restrictions may be 
placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law 
and which are 'necessary in a democratic society in the interest of national security or 
public safety, public order (ordure public), the protection of public health or morals or 
the protection of the rights andfreedoms of others. 
Although every person has the right to organize meetings or to take part in 
meetings in a peaceful way, the provision of martial law can suspend such meetings if the 
peace of the country is deemed to be at stake. Such restrictions on public gatherings may 
be imposed for the preservation of security. This provision appears potentially tyrannical 
and can be seen to restrict people's liberties. However, if the State cannot control people 
during an emergency period, it is hard for the State to aid, shelter, and protect their own 
citizens. Therefore, this prohibition to assemble and gather during martial law may limit 
the human rights but only insofar as it intends to re-establish safety through peaceful 
means. However the provisions of Emergency Decree seem to be more lenient. 
h. Humanitarian Law 
There are no provisions to restrict any states that seek to institute martial law in 




Even though Thailand has had a democratic system for no less than 75 years, 
censorship remains in place in a whole country as a result of the emergency 
instituted in the southern area. The injunction given by the Thai Government to 
media was to report all the news and events in a constructive and honest manner in 
to create the harmony and reconciliation in the South.413 
Section 11 (2) and (3) of the Martial law prohibits the release, sale, distribution of 
release, book, newspaper, or article, and prohibits the freedom of the 
including receiving and sending radio or television waves. Section 9 (3)414 of 
Emergency Decree prohibits the press release, distribution, or dissemination of letters, 
, or any means of communiQation, which may cause fear amongst the people 
have the intention of providing information that intentionally misleads the public 
the emergency situation. The Government may restrict print or broadcast media by 
legislation in times of crisis. The Decree empowers the Government "to prohibit 
/UUI.l\,<l,UlJ1ll and distribution of news and information that may cause the people to panic 
with an intention to distort information." The Emergency Decree also authorizes the 
to censor newspapers and ban publications, although these powers have not 
used since 2005. 415 
, Thailand: Coup Leaders Must Restore Fundamental Rights, Oct. 2, 2006, Human Rights Watch. 
Ibid.at sec. 9 (3). 
prohibit the press release, distribution or dissemination of letters, publications or any means of 
containing texts which may instigate fear amongst the people or is intended to distort 
which misleads understanding of the emergency situation to the extent of affecting the security 
state or public order or good moral of the people both in the area or locality where an emergency situation 
been declared or the entire Kingdom. 
See Country Reports cited in note 408 supra. 
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a. Human Rights Law 
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that: Everyone 
haS the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold 
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontier. Also Article 19 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: Everyone shall have the right to 
freedom. of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in 
print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. These provisions 
recognize the freedom of expression, but in the name of protecting national security and 
preserving public order, the statute of International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights allows the State to restrict such freedom. This restriction is provided by law and is 
derived out of necessity: The exercise of the rights ... may therefore be subject to certain 
restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary. 
Democratic principles require that the people shall have the freedom to express 
ideas in public because the fairness system depends on the free flow of information. 
People shall enjoy the freedom to express whatever they like without political 
interference. However, during this emergency period, media expression might cause 
more violence and more chaos. Protecting security as a nation remains a priority because 
it is in the national interest to maintain the economic stability, protect citizens' rights, and 
preserve the democratic system within the country. If national security is not consistent, 
no one shall enjoy their cherished freedom again. Therefore, these provisions of martial 
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law and Emergency Decree do in fact work to preserve rather than erode the concept of 
human rights law. 
h. Humanitarian Law 
Article 79416 of Additional Protocol I is a measure to protect journalists but 
because the law states that every person is entitled to humane treatment, it stipulates the 
standards for international law in humanitarian concerns. It does not limit the right of the 
State to prohibit any press release but it does protect certain rights and duties of a 
democratic system of the people. Thus, these provisions are consistent with humanitarian 
law. 
3. Freedom of Movement 
In general practices, authorities respect citizens' rights by the Constitution law. 
Thus, people can change their homes and workplace at their will, or travel freely within 
the Kingdom. However, there are with some exceptions.417 Namely, Sections 11(4) 418and 
(6)419 of the Martial law prohibit any person to use public transportation and to depart 
416 
See Additional Protocol I, at art.79. 
[M]easures or protection for journalists: 
1.Journalists engaged in dangerous professional missions in areas of armed conflict shall be considered as 
civilians within the meaning of Article 50, paragraph1. 
2. They shall be protected as such under the Conventions and this Protocol, provided that they take no 
action adversely affecting their status as civilians, and without prejudice to the right of war correspondents 
aCcredited to the armed forces to the status provided for in Article 4 (A) (4) of the Third Convention. 
~. They may obtain an identity card similar to the model in Annex \I of this Protocol. This card, which shall be 
~Ssued by the government of the State of which the Journalist is a national or in whose territory he resides or 
In Which the news medium employing him is located, shall attest to his status as a joumalist. 
417 
See Country Reports cited in n0te408 supra. 
418 
See Thai Martial law, at sec.11 (4). 
[B]anning of using public transport either on land, water or air including by train and tram. 
419 
Ibid. at sec.11 (6) 
[B]anning the leaving out of dwelling during determined period. 
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from a dwelling place during the period of martial law. Sections 9 (1),420 (4),421 (5),422and 
(6)423 of Emergency Decree prohibit any person from departing from a dwelling place and 
the use of routes or vehicles. They also prescribe conditions on the use of routes or 
vehicles and the right to enter into or stay in any place. Moreover, such provisions call 
upon the State to specify the chosen area of safety for people to stay. Up to this day, 
Thailand extends a State of emergency in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat to Cleal with the 
escalating violence. The Decree extends the period for which suspects can be detained, 
and limits freedom of movement. 
a. Human Rights Law 
Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, states that: "Everyone 
has the right to freedom of movement ... " The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is 
the first international document that explicitly recognizes the rights of persons to freedom 
of movement. Normally, all people are entitled to the recognition of this inherent dignity, 
which is a "foundation of freedom and justice in the world." Freedom of movement is 
part of the "liberty of man" (Jagerskiold) and creates one of the most basic human 
rights.424 However, Article 12 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
420 
See Thai Emergency Decree, at sec.9(1). 
[TJo prohibit any person from departing from a dwelling place during the prescribed period. 
421 • 
IbId. at sec.9(4). 
[TJo prohibit the use of routes or vehicles or prescribe conditions on the use of routes or vehicle. 
~ Ibid. at sec.9(5). 
[:qo prohibit the use of buildings or enter into or stay in any place. 
-423 
Ibid.at sec.9(6). 
~~vacuate people out of a designated area for the safety of such people or to prohibit any person from 
ntenng a deSignated area. 
4<4 
htt ~reedom of movement, Human rights Education Associates, i3vailable at 
P.flWWw.hrea.org/learn/guides/freedom-of-movement.html(last visited Aug.1, 2006). 
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provides that the right to liberty of movement can be restricted if: those which are 
provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), 
public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the 
other rights recognized in the present Covenant. " Due to the fact that this Article 
provides limits on the freedom set forth in the Covenant and Universal Declaration, 
measures derived from the provisions 'can only be legitimate so long as they are 
exceptional, reasonable, and of a temporary nature. The State should carefully consider 
whether these restricted measures are necessary and appropriate for the situation. The 
State has to ensure that such limitations are in accordance with domestic law, so that the 
provisions of martial law and Emergency Decree will meet such standards and will not be 
inconsistent with the fundamental of freedom of movement. 
b. Humanitarian law 
Article 35425 of the Geneva Convention IV pennits the State the r-ight to refuse 
any request for permission to leave the territory, if such departure would be contrary to 
the security interests of the State. As every State has its own system based on its own 
laws, all countries could exercise their jurisdiction through appropriate laws and have the 
~s 
See Geneva Convention IV, at art.35. 
[AlII protected persons who may desire to leave the territory at the outset of, or during a conflict, shall be 
entitled to do so, unless their departure is contrary to the national interests of the State. The applications of 
SUch persons to leave shall be decided in accordance with regularly established procedures and the 
d7cision shall be taken as rapidly as possible. Those persons permitted to leave may provide themselves 
Wit~ the necessary funds for their journey and take with them a reasonable amount of their effects and 
articles of personal use. 
If any such person is refused permission to leave the territory, he shall be entitled to have refusal 
~dered, as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative board designated by the 
Ul:lalnlng Power for that purpose. 
UpOn request, representatives of the Protecting Power shall, unless reasons of security prevent it, or the 
~rson~ concerned object, be furnished with the reasons for refusal of any request for permission to leave 
e territory and be given, as expeditiously as possible, the names of all persons who have been denied 
PermiSSion to leave. 
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right to secure the safety of their country. Thus, these provisions are consistent with 
humanitarian law. 
4. Freedom of Communication and Correspondence 
Although the Thai Constitution avowedly protects a "person's family rights, 
dignity, reputation or the right of privacy," in which "the assertion or circulation of a 
statement or picture in any manner whatsoever to the public that violates or affects a 
person's family rights, dignity, reputation or the right of privacy, shall not be made 
except for the case which is beneficial to the public," there has been a good deal of 
criticism that legislation and administrative directions under the Constitution have 
primarily concerned data handled by government agencies, rather. than the private sector. 
426In the case of emergency, the freedom of receiving and sending radio or television 
waves is prohibited by Martial law. Section 11(St27 of the Emergency Decree provides 
that a competent official has the power to issue an order teo-inspect letters, books, printed 
matters, telegraphic transmission, telephone communications, or any other means of 
communication as well as to cancel or suspend any contact or communication even 
though Thai law guarantees: "Persons have the freedom to communicate with one 
another by lawful means. " 
Asia and the Pacific, Caslon Analytics, available at www. http://www.caslon.com.au/privacyguide6.htm 
visited 
See Thai Emergency Decree, at sec.11(5). 
issue a Notification that a competent official shall have the power to issue an order to inspect letters, 
, printed matters, telegraphic transmission, telephone communications or any other means of 
'rlIr'~T"'n as well as to cancel or suspend any contact or communication in order to prevent or 
the serious incident provided that the rules prescribed in the law. 
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a. Human Rights Law 
In general, everyone shall have the right to freedom of communication and 
correspondence; these rights are basically guaranteed by Article 12 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, states: No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference 
with his .... correspondence. As well as Article 17 (1) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights states: No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation. 
This right is a common right for all mankind, regardless of age or gender. These 
provisions recognize that these are inherent rights and should be protected. However, if 
we consider the world 'arbitrary or unlawful interference,' the freedom of 
correspondence is obviously limited as it is related to this law. What this means is that 
there are situations that are consistent with justice and domestic law and that this right 
can be narrow. 
b. Humanitarian Law 
There are no provisions of humanitarian law that forbid the State's temporary 
regulation of these provisions that are not against the fundamental nature of humanitarian 
law 
C. Justice and Remedy 
1. Judicial Proceedings 
When martial law is in effect, a military court will be provided for cases that do 
not fall under military jurisdiction. However, the Emergency Decree did not mention 
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jurisdiction under the military court because the case will be heard in any court that has 
jurisdiction over non-military cases. 
a. Human Rights Law 
Even though the concept of human rights law has encouraged countries to create 
the domestic infrastructure needed to support a fair justice system, legislation is needed in 
order to provide the legal basis for national legal systems that have the power to stop 
violence and bring peace to nations and people. Therefore, the appropriate system is 
needed to exercise a response to violence and to bring perpetrators to trial and just 
punishment. Articles 8, Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 
9(3), and Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights assert 
every person shall have the right to a fair trail by the court. Human rights law does not 
differentiate military courts from non-military courts as long as the judicial process is 
done in accordance to the constitution or the law, and the Judge is independent and free 
from influence of any political party. The Thai military court, therefore, shall not be 
prohibited to trying any case or adjudicating a case against an individual who is under 
military's jurisdiction so long as the military procedure is conducted without 
discrimination and prejudice.428 However, military court procedures state that the verdicts 
for cases that are related to emergency conditions under section 61 429 shall be final. This 
-------------------------428 
The Act on the Organization of Military Courts B.E. 2498(1955), Judge Advocate General's Department's 
VerSion, sec. 13. [hereinafter The Act on the Organization of Military Courts]. 
(~].military court shall be competent to try and adjudicate and inflict punishment to any person who violates 
1ll~I~tary law or other laws of criminal nature in the case which the offender in under the jurisdiction of the 
Illilitary court at the time of committing of offence. 
429 
See The Act on the Organization of Military Courts, at sec. 61. 
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'~Il""-"'~ the rights of victims because Article 14 (5) of the International Covenant on 
and Political Rights provides: "Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right 
his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law. " 
military procedure violates the concept of human rights law because a system of 
tribunals prohibits the right to appeal but not by reason of providing a military 
h. Humanitarian Law 
The law of armed conflict permits the adjudication of many types of cases m 
tary courts. For example, Article 84430 of Geneva Convention III states that the 
has to be provided due process by military court. However, Article 106431 states 
every prisoner of war has the right to appeal. Then, the Martial procedure might 
the humanitarian law. On the other hand, there is no provision to prohibit the right 
appeal by Emergency Decree. 
appeal nor dika appeal shall be lodged against judgments or orders of military court in an abnormal 
See Geneva Convention Ill. art. 84. 
prisoner of war shall be tried only by a military court. unless the existing laws of the Detaining Power 
... ~tJl~SS,IV permit the civil courts to try a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power in respect of the 
"~. "',",U',d' offence alleged to have been committed by the prisoner of war. 
Ibid.at art. 1 06. 
prisoner of war shall have. in the same manner as the members of the armed forces of the Detaining 
• the right of appeal or petition from any sentence pronounced upon him. with a view to the quashing 
reviSing of the sentence or the reopening of the trial. He shall be fully informed of his right to appeal or 
and of the time limit within which he may do so. 
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Z. Restitution and Reparation 
According to Section 16 of the Martial law, the provision does not provide the 
right to compensation by giving the reason that it is necessary for the protection of the 
nation, religion, and the King. However, Section 17432 of the Emergency Decree 
provides that victims shall have the right to seek compensation from the Government. 
a. H umall Rights Laws 
Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: " Everyone has 
the Fight-to an eJJectiveremedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the 
fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law." Also, Articl~ 9(5) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: Anyone who has been the 
victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation. 
Further, Article 2 provides: "To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as 
herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the 
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity. .. " 
According to international law, the compensation or other means of remedies 
shall be done at a local level before seeking an international intervention. This rule 
intends to allow the State to make the correction to the damage done. People whose 
rights or freedoms have been violated should pursue the legal redress domestically before 
seeking an international committee, court, or other tribunal. 433 These remedies are not 
;--------------------
ITJh~ee Thai Emergency Decree, at sec.17. 
OOI;S ~?es not preclude the right of a victim to seek compensation from a government agency under the law 
ability for wrongful act of officials. 
433 
12noternational Norms and Standards relating to Disability, available at http://www.un.org(lastvisitedJan 
07). 
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limited to property losses but including death, personal injury, property losses, losses of 
income, loss of support, loss of housing, loss of medical expenses, or costs of 
434 
departure. 
So therefore, the regulation of the applicable of broad provision of martial law is 
clear-cut in that it is contrary to the provision of human rights law even though its 
operation might seem just for the protection of a nation. 
h. Humanitarian Law 
Although humanitarian law does not have a provision to remedy the victims, 
according to Article 68 435under the Geneva Convention III, the compensation provided 
for the injury is as a prisoner of war. The broad provision of martial law might have 
violated this article because it applies in all circumstances. However, the Emergency 
Decree does not violate the Geneva Convention because all victims have the right to 
compensate. 
D. Conclusion 
Martial law and the Emergency Decree might seem to abridge the rights and 
liberties of civilians. However, if we look to the human rights laws and humanitarian 
laws, any government restrictions on freedom for reasons of the nation and security can 
bedone. Even the Universal Declarations of Human Rights recognizes the standard rights 
~------------------
~uke T. Lee, The Issue of Compensation for Palestinian Refugees, Compensation as Part of a 
.. prehensive Solution to the Palestinian Refugee Problem. 
Geneva Convention III, at art.58. 
claim by a prisoner of war for compensation in respect of any injury or other disability arising out of 
shall.be referred to the Power on which he depends. 
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of people; under Article 29 (2) provides as follows: "In the exercise of his rights and 
freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law 
solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms 
of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general 
welfare in a democratic society." In addition, the International Covenant has a provision 
. that is similar to the Universal Declarations of Human Rights but more explicit. It could 
be said that such rights and freedoms are exercised if there is support for the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations. The issuance of these laws are not contrary to 
international law. Nonetheless, such laws must have a clear legal basis for reasons of 
security, necessity, and proportion. According to Thai domestic law, there are some 
provisions of the martial law that risk violating human rights and humanitarian law. 
Because the Thai Government knew that the martial law might be obsolete because this 
law occurred before the Universal Declarations of Human Rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights existed, they issued the Emergency Decree. From 
my analysis, it was found that the Emergency Decree does not violate both human rights 
and humanitarian law, but there were some provisions of the martial law that violate both 
laws. Then, such provisions of martial law should be abandoned. 
IV - 4 Nature and Extent of Violence 
While the military and police forces exercised their powers in the K.ru Se Mosque 
and the Tak Bai case, there were other accusations against these Thai Security Forces that 
Illade matters worse. It is true that a few aspects of the operations violated human rights 
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law and raised questions whether all the methods used by the Thai Government violated 
humanitarian law. 
1) Consider the Kru Se mosque case. According to the Thai authorities, 30 
Islamic dissidents opened fire by launching rifle shots at the police outpost, killing two 
security officers in the Pattani province. After the gun fire ceased, the dissidents escaped, 
carrying off AK - 47 and M -16 rifles to the Kru Se mosque, and continued to fire from 
the mosque at Thai Security Forces. However, after the Thai Security Forces already had 
used force, it was found that most of these deceased dissidents only had machetes and 
only few carried rifles. 436 
As State members "pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the 
United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, " the use of force by the Thai Security Forces must not· be 
against the fundamental of the Universal Declaration and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights that contains a number of provisions which constitute the 
foundation for resolutions based on the principle of equal rights. 437 Although the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights forms the fundamental normative basis on which 
international norms provides: "Everyone has the right to ... life," these rights and lives 
must include not only the dissidents but shall cover the life of the officers as well. As the 
436 See more details in chapter 2 . 
. 437 
International Norms and Standards relating to Disability, available at http://www.un.org(lastvisited Jan 
. ,.31,2007); See also the Universal Declaration and the International Covenant on Civil and Political. 
"recognized that the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
. family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world." In Article 7 of the Universal Declaration 
states: "All are equal before the law and are entitfed without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. 
~IJ are entitfed to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any 
incitement to such discrimination." Also Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights 
P~ovides: "EachState Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals 
lV~thin its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without 
dIstinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
SOcial origin, property, birth or other status" 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Article 29 (2) states: "(2) In the exercise of his 
rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined 
by law solely ... ", and Thai law states: "every person shall obey the law ... " In this case, 
we might consider whether the treatment of these dissidents qualifies as a violation of the 
fundamentals of human rights law or not. The use of force to stop the violence after the 
dissidents launched grenades upon the officers (killing an officer at the outpost) in order 
to prevent further violence seemed justified because it came after a warning and a failed 
negotiation for surrender. This incident occurred while there were approximately 4,000 
onlookers who started fighting with Thai Security Forces. 438 Thai law439 permitted the 
officers to use reasonable power to keep the public at peace as long as the operations of 
the Thai Security Forces had been performed without prejudice and treated every person 
fairly and equally. At this point, we could see that this was not against the concept of 
human rights laws. In other words, the Thai Security Forces have the right to operate 
according to human rights laws because their duty was to protect the security of the 
country. 
In cases where the law of armed conflict applies, they would be related to 
humanitarian law under the Geneva Convention under Common Article 3. Then, the 
second question is whether the method of Thai Security Forces violates the concept of 
Common Article 3 because most of these dissidents only had machetes and few carried 
rifles. 
438 
Tak Bai and Kru Se Report, The National Reconciliation Commission, TMailand. 
439 
The Criminal Procedure Code ofThailand, at sec.2(16) 
(A]dministrative or Police Official" means an official invested by law with the power and duty to keep the 
; Public peace. 
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As with the concept of Common Article 3,440 the provision protects the person 
who laid down their arms. This is indeed not the case of the dissidents as they did not lay 
down their arms, still fired, and threw grenades to the Thai Security Forces; thus, they 
lost protection under Common Article 3. The following question is whether the use of 
force is to be deemed excessive and indiscriminate. If so, does that violate the Additional 
protocols in Article 51 (4)? In this case, the dissidents armed with AK -47 and M -16 
rifles, and they barricaded themselves in the mosque. The confrontation was made more 
perilous by the fact that a number of civilians, apparently hostile to the Thai Security 
Forces, had gathered outside the mosque. As time dragged on, and fearing that the crowd 
was on the verge of assisting the dissidents in the mosque, the Thai Security Forces 
decided that stonning the mosque would be the best operational procedure. Therefore, 
this did not constitute an indiscriminate target so as to be characterized as an impulsive 
reaction or an excessive use of force. The acts of the Thai Security Forces did not violate 
the humanitarian law. 
Moreover, in discussing whether Thailand's use of force in the Kru Se situation 
violated the law or not, it is important to not only look at human rights and humanitarian 
440 The Four Geneva Conventions Common art.3. 
[I]n the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High 
Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following 
provisions: 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down 
their arms and those placed' hors de combat' by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in 
all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or 
faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. 
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever 
with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating a~degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a 
r~gularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by 
Civilized peoples. 
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law, but also at other treaties that Thailand is party to. According to the Thai Security 
Forces stormed this mosque by using tear gas and firing several rounds of vehicle-
mounted recoilless guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and an RPG Missile. As Thailand is 
a State Party to the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of the Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,441 and of the 
1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development; Production, Stockpiling, and 
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction which entered into force on April 29, 
1997,442 it raises questions about whether the use of such weapons violated such treaties. 
As the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or 
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare and the 1993 Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons 
and on their Destruction do not allow Thailand to use chemical weapons as a method of 
warfare. They allow, however, the right to use chemical weapons in response to special 
cases such as rebellions and riots. These Conventions do not apply to internal affairs. 
Therefore, the Thai Security Forces still have the right to use tear gas, liquids, or similar 
substances to control agents under Thai law so long as the conflict is not an armed 
conflict and the using of such instruments are proportional. Considering the use of 
grenades and bombs on the mosque, such an attack seems to fit the category of 
"incendiary weapons" that falls within the scope of 1980 Convention on prohibitions or 
441 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacttlriological Methods ofWarfare,17 June 1925, 94 L.N.T.S.65 (Hereinafter 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol]. 
442 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on their Destruction, Paris 13 January 1993, 32 I.L.M.800 (entry to force Apr.29, 1997) 
(hereinafter 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention]. 
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restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons that may be deemed excessively 
injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. However, Thailand has not acceded to this 
Convention and is not bound by it, even if the weapons that I mention are designed to set 
fire to objects or to cause burning injuries to persons through the action of heat and flame 
from shells, rockets, bombs, and other incendiary weapons. 
2) Consider the Takbai case. This violence began when a crowd gathered at the 
Takbai 'police station in the Narathiwat province and asked for the unconditional release 
from detention of six men who were accused of stealing weapons in January of 2004. 
In this assembly, the protesters injured three officers and overturned two military 
trucks and one police car. Besides, the evidence showed that the protesters had knives, 
machetes, and grenades which were recovered from the area of the protest during.their 
attempt to storm the police station. The Security Forces managed to stop the attack and 
forced the protestors to surrender, after which approximately 1,300 people were arrested 
and detained. Ultimately, they were put into military trucks to be transferred to detention 
centers but during that trip, it was reported that 78 prisoners died as a result of 
suffocation or dehydration.443 The question is in this cases is whether the Thai Security 
Forces violated human rights and humanitarian law. 
Both human rights and humanitarian law absolutely prohibit all forms of torture 
and the killing of defenseless people. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
recognizes the rights of all people and all nations. These people were protected under 
human rights law, and they were legally protected from being treated inhumanely under 
Common Article 3 of humanitarian law. 
443 
Tak Bai and Kru Se Report, The National Reconciliation Commission, Thailand. 
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In this case, the evidence showed that the demonstrators or protestors had 
weapons and attempted to stonn a police station by demanding the release of six detained 
Muslim security guards.444 They would not be protected by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in Article 20, which states: " Everyone has the right to freedom of 
peaceful assembly and association. " As a result, the State has the right to keep the peace 
to detain or arrest by due process of the law. Although the Fact-Finding Commission 
presented to the Cabinet on December 28, 2004 that the State exercises its legal authority 
in taking control of the situation and maintaining public order, dispersing the crowd and 
taking custody of the demonstrators, it concluded that the transportation of those held in 
custody was conducted in conformity with laws and was reasonable given the necessity 
dictated by the prevailing circumstances. However, serious mistakes occurred during the 
transportation process in which the commanding officers failed to carry-out their duties 
properly which resulted in many unfortunate deaths.445 According to Article 5 provides: " 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. "and as Article 9 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: No one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detain ... ", It could be pointed out that the Thai 
Security Forces had violated the human rights law because of the fact that people were 
detained face down with hands tied behind their backs inside the trucks without any prior 
warning. In this case, it could be said that the Thai Security Forces also violated Common 
Article 3 of Geneva Conventions because the Thai Security Forces did not treat them 
However, a conflicting report suggests that some deaths were due to 
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as a result of religious fasting. 446 Therefore, to analyze this case without 
prejudice, one would have to compare the treatment of the protesters to others put in a 
siJIlilar situation without having fasted. Could anyone have withstood this treatment? 
Such a question can only be answered by a medical doctor and such a judgment can only 
be passed through the process of the justice system. Any person who violates the law 
shall be punishment. 
IV - 5 Conclusion 
To impose an Emergency Decree on three provinces seems to limit the rights of 
the people and would not be in the best interests of all Thai citizens. However, violence 
in Southern Thailand has impacted the peace and stability of the country. If we consider 
the families of those killed by the violent acts, then they need protection to ensure the 
safety and well-being of Thai citizens as protected by Thai laws. The aim of such laws is 
to protect innocent persons and their properties during the eruption of a crisis. The State 
has a duty to prevent and block unlawful acts, and perpetrators must be brought to justice. 
Additionally, the most important thing that Thailand shall realize is that legislative and 
practical means have to fall within the scope of the standard of humanitarian law and the 
principles and purposes by charter of the United Nations. As an active member of the 
United Nations, Thailand has participated in numerous treaties, international conventions 
and international agreements. After ratifying such conventions or agreement, the Thai 
domest-itr-laws have to be implemented accordingly. It could be said that the concepts of 
;------~.--~~~~~--
78 perished in custody, The Nation, Oct. 27,2004, available at 
h( ttP:llwww.nationmultimedia.com/search/page.arcview .php?clid=2&id= 1 08077 &date=2004-1 0-27 
last visited Aug.1, 2006). 
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international laws influenced the Thai laws, which were created to be conformity with 
them. Although certain conventions Thailand has not yet ratified (such as the Second 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aimed at 
Abolishing the Death Penalty, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and any 
other treaties), all are currently under active consideration and there are no government 
policies that suggest they would be denied. Thailand has leaded an ongoing effort to 
promote and cooperate with peacekeeping forces that follow these principles laid out by 
the Charter of the United Nations. Thailand has also ratified the four Geneva Conventions 
and the Hague Conventions. Accordingly, there was not a case that Thailand defied or did 
not cooperate with the United Nations. The evidence suggests that Thailand accepts in 
-principle the existence of customary international law, and as a consequence, is legally 
bound to comply with the standard law of armed conflict required by these Conventions. 
That is to say both domestic laws and International laws are applicable to the violence in 
Southern Thailand. Although the Geneva Convention and the Additional Protocols do 
not apply to lately situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated 
and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature in Thailand, Thailand has 
to realize that the Thai Security Forces shall not violate either Thai law or international 
law especially human rights according to a common standard of achievement for all 
peoples and all nations. Thailand has to bear in mind that these rights are the basic rights 
and freedoms to which all humans are entitled. Furthermore, to operate in harmony for 
the peace of the country and the world, Thailand should ensure that its laws respect the 
concepts of international law even though some Conventions have not yet been ratified. 
The most fundamental purpose of Human Rights and International Law is to protect the 
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To violate this most basic hUrtlan right is to not only deny individuals their 
nlU'''''''''~''.-~' moral entitlement but to make a country vulnerable to "crimes against 
Additionally, there is a support for the International Criminal Court in the Asian 
'region, which is crucial for the growing global fight against impunity and for the defense 
... of fundamental human rights. Thailand has already signed such a statute even though it 
haS not ratified the Rome Statute. Thailand played a crucial role to support the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court and remains a staunch supporter of the 
main idea behind this Statute. For that reason, Thailand has to take measures to ensure 




SOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
v - 1 Introduction 
In the last four years, there has been an increase in seemingly unpredictable, 
sporadic and pointless acts of violence in southern Thailand. A few of the conditions that 
have perpetuated the conditions for such violent acts include weaknesses in the 
infrastructure, long-standing miStlilderstandings of the history and culture of ethnic 
groups, and the lack of coordination between government agencies across the country.447 
Thus, there is no single flawed policy of the Thai Government that might fix this serious 
dilemma but rather multifold reasons that are intricately woven into the conflicts of 
society and culture, economic factors, domestic and international organizations as well as 
domestic and international laws and policies. This chapter will examine the solution of 
problems in this area by addressing the following important points: 
-- Ethnic diversity in Thailand must be understood, its history must be made 
and its differences must be publicly as well as privately appreciated so that the 
conflicts can be diminished. This is an important part of Thailand's domestic 
that can have significant international implications. 
-- An analysis of security measures - of both preventative measures and of the 
""U'""'-'_~ made in the past of what security forces did (or did not perfonn)-will help find 
to resolve the immediate and long-tenn violence . 
. Michaellgnatieff, Humanitarian Interve~tion : Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas 302, (J.l.Holzgrefe 
RObert O.Keohane., ed., Cambridge University Press 2003). 
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The studying and comparison of Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and the 
violence in southern Thailand by analyzing the strategies, tactics, and techniques are to 
. provide the policies for the Thai Government to adjust for the current situations. 
The goal to stem violence cannot be merely something that Thailand tries to 
achieve by itself. Rather, it needs the cooperation of international organizations and 
other countries. 
Pattani has long been recognized as one of the most important of the ancient 
empires in Malayu. Pattani's history is one rife with conflict with the Siamese Empire 
and the profound differences between Pattani's and Siam's religious, political' and 
cultural history have been (and continues to be) sources of great misunderstanding and 
prejudice. Historically, Pattani has embraced Islam and the vast majority of citizens 
. identify themselves as either practicing Muslims, or belonging to the Muslim community. 
As with most traditional Muslim communities, notions of religion and the law are 
inextricably tied to one another. In Thailand, however, monarchal rule is in many ways 
. the result of enlightenment ideals of the separation of church and State. This is a point of 
: contention between Siam and the former colonized country, in which the Koran continues 
to dictate moral and legal precedent for the vast majority. 
To complicate matters, Thailand has suppressed the history of Pattani in the 
education of its youth out of fear that being too explicit about Pattani's past might give 
cause for more dissident in the name of self-determination in that troubled southern 
n. Siam has, for centuries however, been able to incorporate diverse ethnic 
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populations where traditional values and practices have survived within the increasingly 
modernized world of Southeast Asia. 
In general, Thai policies have proven to be contentious issues for the southern 
region because the uniformity of such laws lacks a particular responsiveness to the 
distinct cultural differences found in the south. So even when Pattani, Yala and 
Narathiwat seem to be congenial to certain policies of Siam, all policies, however 
seemingly innocuous, have far-reaching impact. For example, despite the goals of the 
government to improve the structure of these provinces, policies that required Thai 
language as the official language alienated those in the south who were not native Thai 
speakers. This is one of many examples that suggest that, prior to launching any policy, 
. 
the government should study how these policies might impact this important minority 
population. Any policy concerned with sustaining and maintaining a peaceful community 
in Thailand must have a healthy balance between the people's needs and State's needs. It 
is impossible to have a peaceful community if only one side is satisfied. 
In this thesis, I recommend the first goal for improving government policy-
making is to make an attempt to understand the diversity of cultural, religious and 
political histories that make up the main subgroups in Thailand. As the well-known 
aphorism would have it, those who fail to learn the lessons of history are doomed to 
repeat it.448 According to Adam Garfinkle, history is "an art just like painting or 
architecture and is designed like them only to give intellectual and artistic pleasure.,,449 
But most of those who seek knowledge from history have more purposeful ends in mind, 
448 Adam Garfinkle, How to Learn Lessons from History- And How Not To, Foreign Policy Research 
Institute, May. 2001, Vol. 7, No.1, available at . 
http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/071.200105.garfinkle.lessons.html(last visited Aug. 1, 2006). 
449 Ibid. 
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particularly policymakers and policy analysts who discern a moral responsibility to 
protect their nations and their fellows from gratuitous harm. Thailand should apply this 
idea towards improving its domestic policies because the past is the only data we have 
from which to glean patterns of behavior, the endurance of which are features of human 
nature, relevant to our own times and problems.45o 
Because an understanding of history and traditions of peoples helps the State to 
launch the appropriate policy, the State should publicly avow respect of people history. 
For instance, public schools should therefore include more history of Pattani in their 
curriculum. So although the history of Pattani might cause pain for many of those who 
have suffered during Siam's conquest, no State is without prior conflict and we can learn 
how to solve such programs from understanding better the world's history. It's hard to 
find the "perfect" solution but improvements can be made. For instance, I mentioned fhat 
Pattani's people are proud of their history and that Thai schools should include such 
history in their curriculum. I understand this is not only to benefit the people 
intellectually but is, more importantly, a sign of the Thai Government's sincere intention 
to recognize and support this difficult past. By including such a history, it is less likely 
that Pattani children will reject studying in a state school. 
B. Culture 
In order to have a better understanding of Pattani's people history, the next step is 
to attempt to understand more about the distinct cultural, social, religious and ideological 
beliefs and values. According to Mathew Arnold, culture is a constantly evolving 
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component of a healthy democratic State, but rather than assuming that these values exist 
in the abstract and are the same for all human societies, values, behaviors, and ideologies 
obviously differ from people to people.451 To better understand the culture of a people is 
to better understand how policy might exacerbate or allay the conflict between the State 
and various ethnic, religious or educational problems. 
After the Government clearly understands more about the culture and nature of 
ethnic peoples, the Government will be able to better manage the system through various 
kinds of responses to religious, political and military conflicts. For instance, when the 
Thai police or military want to search, seize person or things especially in the respectful 
place or the Muslim temple, it has to be done in a manner that's respectful and not against 
the religion of Islam. The use of police dogs should be the last option to the operation. If 
it is unavoidable to using dog police, the Govemment should ask for the recommendation 
of Muslim leaders first. To create a peaceful community, the Governnlent needs to show 
concern for all types of people and belief systems . 
. 451 
. Matthew Arnold, Culture is "High Culture" From Culture and Anarchy. 1869, available at 




Today, there are more than 500 pondok schools that operate in southern Thailand. 
These schools were originally religious schools that took as their aim the continuation 
and promotion of Muslim customs, beliefs and culture. However, only about 300 of them 
are registered with State authorities. The Thai Government suspects that some of these 
traditional schools foster religious extremism and harbor militants. 300 of these 500 
schools are suspected of being places where preaching violence is a cO!11I1lonly accepted 
practice.452 Recently, research conducted by the Prince of Songkhla University (Pattani) 
found that up to 64% of the Pattani people desired general education for their children 
rather than Ponok schools in spite of the fear that secular education will not provide a 
balance of religious instruction and other forms of education~ 453 Therefore, the challenge 
of the Thai Government is to distinguish between the illegal ponok's school and the 
traditional pondok's school. 
This implies that many people still see the benefit of a State funded education and 
these findings are not only a sign of confidence in the Thai education system but also an 
acknowledgement of the power that such.a system has in regards to future employment. 
The Thai Government has a plan to develop the education in this region but the 
management of these institutions has to start· with the balance between culture and 
education. By this I mean that the development of an educational system and 
socioeconomic development has to be consistent with the region's culture.454 The final 
452 Joseph Liow, The truth about pondok schools in Thailand, Sep. 3, 2004, Asia Times, available at 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FI03Ae04.html(1ast visited Nov. 1, 2006). 
453 Ibid. 
454 Overcoming Violence Through the Power of Reconciliation: Executive Summary, the National 
Reconciliation Commission, Thailand. . 
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report of UNESCO-UNICEF on March 1, 2006, suggested that the Thai Government 
should support such policies as followS:455 
• Work (in cooperation with Southern leaders) to support a written 
Malay language since the Ministry of Education still has no clear 
policy on use of language in mother tongue language and writing; 
• Make more government resources available since the Th.ai state is 
weak in the South, and (regarding the decentralized system) insure 
better quality to promote the participation of all in learning, and for 
education management; 
• Provide more resources from the state to support better 
development of .rural areas and especially under privileged 
children, particularly in pondoks and tadikas; 
• Provide government advisors in pondoks; 
• Give more scholarships for Muslims to study abroad (and then teach 
the next generation in Southern Thailand); 
• Provide the best teachers for Southern Thailand (not now a priorit) 
To develop the education system, therefore, will be to help solve some of the 
deep-seated poverty of this region since more education also means more job 
opportunities for a region traditionally saddled with low income and lacking job 
opportunities. To improve the quality of the education, Thai public schools need to 
include more culturally sensitive understandings of the Thai ethnic past so that there is a 
viable option for trying to solve not only ethnic divisiveness but also economic disparity . 
. 455 Final Report, UNESCO-UNICEF on March 1st 2006 workshop on: [E]ducation for Peace-building in 
Southern Thailand: Reflections on Human Security. 
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D. Economics 
One of the mam causes for the radical separatist sympathies in southeastern 
Thailand is the impoverished conditions that the majority of Muslims in this area contend 
with. The disparity between the rich and poor has generated dissident groups that 
galvanize various Muslim factions and often justify crimes on the grounds of social 
equality and economic justice.456 The Thai Government cannot ignore this crucial 
element of the conflict in this region. The Gov.emment should not only be concerned with 
the GOP or SET index but should pay attention to the ways of life particular to the 
cultural and social context. The plan to support the weak economy in this region has been 
effective and needs to find continual support in the coming years. It advises:457 
- Promoting the halal food industry to enhance job opportunities and stimulate 
economic growth in the south; 
- Providingfinancial assistance and tax incentives to attract investments; 
- Ensuring that financial services provided be in accordance with the 
Islamic prinCiples; 
- Providing assistance in developing local products and enhancing its market 
accessibility; 
- Providing low interest rates to expand the economy; and 
- Improving the transportation system to enhance the flow of goods and services. 
456 Asep Chaerudin, Countering Transnational Terrorism in Indonesia afld-the Phillipines, Naval 
Postgraduate, 2003. 
457 Developments in the Southern Provinces of Thailand, Royal Thai Consulate-General, Jeddah, Saudi 
Arabia. . 
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The important thing that the Government has come to realize is that developing 
economic initiatives must be undertaken in a long-term and comprehensive manner. 
Although the government does not have the capacity to develop all of these areas in a 
short period of time, at least one of the three provinces should be the focus of a 
developing tourist or agricultural industry. 
E. Creation of a Unifi~d Society 
The Phibulsongkram policy only proved that the attempt to unify the country by 
compelling the subjects to accept Buddhism as the state religion was a failure. Muslim 
people could not accept such policies because they did not allow for the integration of the 
ideas, beliefs and values of Islam. However, the Government's need to create a unified 
society need not depend upon the notion that all subjects share the same religion. A more 
persuasive idea, in fact, is that a shared sense of community is built upon the principle 
that people come from very different origins, religions or cultures. The key is how 
government integrates the varieties of people to live together in the same community or 
country. China has managed to create a nation in which over fifty different languages are 
used on a daily basis and the United States is another good example of how a unified 
society might integrate diverse populations. In many cities, such as Los Angeles, San 
Francisco and New York, there are big Chinese communities with vibrant Chinese 
cultural traditions and most Americans have the impression that the Chinese in the United 
States live in these Chinatowns.458 However, there is a wide variety of diversity among 
the Chinese who, in reality, often speak different languages, come from different cultures 
----------------------
458 Paul Halsall, The History of Chinatown, Brooklyn College,1996-1999, available at 
http://academic,brooklyn.cuny.edu/core9/phalsall/studpageslikram/chinatown.htm (last visited Nov.1, 2006). 
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and live in all different parts of town. Among Native Americans, many human cultures 
over thousands of years flourished without resorting to reward-punishment systems. The 
results were cohesive societies that could serve as models for changing our fundamental 
h c:. d 459 approac to lalrneSS to ay. 
These are good examples that Thai Government can learn from. Moreover, the 
Thai Government should revise previous policies that succeeded in the past such as the 
flexible policies of King Rama Xr.460 
F. The Transparent Justice System and Fair Policy 
The concept that the justice system is transparent is at the heart of the Thai 
Government's need not only to ensure the legitimacy of the criminal justice system but 
also to establish a foundational public confidence in all of the infrastructures. According 
to this understanding, justice informs the making of life decisions, the building of social 
relationships and the designing of societal structures. For these reasons, the transparency 
459 Denise Breton, The Mystic Heart of Justice, Steiner Books 2001. 
460 1. Any regulations or procedures that coerce people into suppressing their religious beliefs or practices 
have to be abandoned or amended. The new amendment shall not contradict Islam religion. If any 
regulations or procedures will support the Islamic Religion, it should be done. 
2. To collect Tax or any fee should be comparable to the rate of tax in a neighbor country. The rate should 
not exceed or be less than the rates in such country. 
3. Any action of the officers that make the civilian waste their time shall be revised and processed by the 
justice. 
4. Any policy that make the civilian waisttbeir time shall be revised and amended. The officer shall do his 
best. --
5. The officer who shall be designatec[inPattani must be honest and polite. When sending any officer, such 
Officer has to be trained to know his duty according to section 1 and section 4 above. The commander must 
sUpervise his officers in control and attempt to prevent mistakes from happening before they happen. 
6. Any regulations or procedures that make people feel uncomfortable shall be considered or, at the very 
least, such regulations or procedures shall be submitted to the King who will adjudicate. 
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of the law is a crucial element to establishing a fair and just (as well as functioning) 
• 461 
Soclety. 
One part of such a foundational concept is that the Thai Government gives out fair 
punishment whether the offender is an officer or civilian. There is a popular prejudice 
that officers of the law receive less than impartial treatment when any charge is brought 
against them. Part of the challenge that exists in Thailand today is to find a way to rectify 
this popular belief so that if an officer is proven guilty of a crime, he or she is punished 
accordingly. Of course, if a civilian commits the same offense, the Government must be 
compelled to punish him or her using the same criteria. 
Moreover, punishment is only meted out to people once firm evidence has 
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a fair legal precess. When the judge orders 
the punishment to the offender, it is crucial that it is a result of the transparent process of 
justice that the offender is guilty of such a crime and not merely because the State is more 
powerful than the individual. 
A shift in the popular belief towards a more just and transparent system of the 
Government will help build trust in the Government's policies. It will also remind the 
officer to exercise more judiciousness in volatile situations and will help decrease what is 
currently rampant corruption. 
Secondly, the Thai Government should review the justice system by starting with 
identifying the problems and proposing the implementing of solutions. For example, 
---46, ----------
Lynette Parker, cited Denise Breton and Stephen Lehman, The Mystic Heart of Justice, West Chester 
Pennsylvania: Chrysalis Books 2001. 
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according to Chapter 4, there are some provisions of Martial law against the Human 
Rights Law. These provisions should be amended in order to accord with (not in 
contradiction to) Human Right Laws. Moreover, mostly people in southern Thailand are 
Muslim, and the Thai law for Muslim people must be adjusted according to the whole 
system not merely the family law. 
Thirdly, the implementation of the provisions should be made as easy as possible. 
The provisions should not use the vague words or meanings that might lead to dispute or 
might be easily misinterpreted. Namely, many international organizations such as the 
International Crisis Group 4620r Human Right Watches are concerned that the Thai 
Emergency Decree grants enforcement official's immunity from prosecution and such a 
decree violates Thailand's international legal obligations.463 According to these 
provisions, the two articles have created a grave public misunderstanding that this Decree 
granted immunity of officers. The aim of the Decree is to assilre the officer who is on 
duty that he will not be punished if he performs an action in good faith in case of there is 
any infringement against a civilian. This fundamental Decree is similar to the Section 449 
464 and Section 450465 of the Thai Civil and Commercial Code and the Section 6i66 and 
462 An independent, non-profit, non-governmental organization, working through field-based analysis and 
high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve conflicts across Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the 
Middle East. 
463 S T 'E ee hal mergency Decree B.E.2548 (2005), at sec.16. 
[A] Regulation, Notification, order or an act under this Emergency Decree shall not be subject to the law on 
administrative procedures and the law on the establishment of Administrative Court and Administrative Court 
Procedure. 
Ibid. at sec.17. 
[T]his does not precludeihe right of a victim to seek compensation from a government agency under the law 
onJiability for wrongful act of officials. 
464 
See The Civil and Commercial Code of Thailand, Kamol Sandhikshetrin's version, at sec.449 
[~] person who, acting in lawful defence or under a lawful! command, has caused injury to any. person is not 
hable to make compensation. 
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Section 68467 of the Thai Penal Code, in which guilt is only established by identifying a 
clear intention and exempts punishment if the illegal act was committed in good faith. 
Such a decision is, however, the result of legal procedure and if such an act is clearly 
seen to have a clear intention then that officer will have to be committed and punished. 
This law does not prohibit the victim from suing the officer if he or she believes that such 
an infraction violated their rights.468 Because any person may be criminally responsible 
for committing an offence against the law of nations, no one individual is exonerated 
from this responsibility.469 Then, this Decree cannot mitigate or disallow punishment of 
an official for any illegal operation. There is no such rule as: "The King can do no 
wrong," "the Emperor is above the law," or "Ceasar's wife is above suspicion. ,,470 
The injured person can claim compensation from the person against whom the lawful defence was directed, 
or from the person who wrong fully gave the command, as the case may be. 
465 Ibid. at sec.450. 
II]f a person damages or destroys a thing in order to avert an immediate common danger, he is not liable to 
make compensation, provided the damage done is not out of proportion to the danger. 
If a person damages or destroys a thing in order to avert an immediate individual danger, he shall make 
restitution therefore. 
If a person damages or destroys a thing in order to protect the rights of himself or of a third person against 
immediate danger threatened by the thing itself, such person is not liable to make compensation, provided 
the damage done is not out of proportion to the danger. If the danger was caused by such person's fault he 
is liable to make compensation. 
466 See Thai Penal Code sec.4, Lueng Dulyasath-Pathiweth' s version (Suchart Jiwachart ed.), sec.67 
IA]ny person shall not be punished for committing any offence of account of necessity: 
(1) when such person is under compulsion or under the influence of a force such that person cannot avoid or 
reSist; or 
(2) when such person acts in order to make himself or another person to escape from an imminent danger 
Which could not be avoided by any other means, and which such person did not cause to existthrough his 
own fault; 
Provided that no more is done than is reasonably necessary under the circumstances. 
467 Ibid. at sec.68. 
lW]henever any person commits any act for the defence of his right or right of the another person so as to 
escape from danger arising from act of violence which violates the law and such adanger is imminent, such 
act, if reasonably committed under the Circumstances, is lawful defence, and such person shall not be guity. 
46a The Office of the Council of State, Thailand. 
469 See S. Sucharitkul, cited in note 211supra at p.249. 
470 Ibid. 
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Every civilian and officer is a legal subject and therefore beholden to the Courts of 
Justice. 
Fourthly, heavy-handed policies, characterized by slogans such as the "war on 
drugs" or the "war on terror," will stimulate rather than quell dissident groups looking for 
an overt (seemingly) anti-Muslim policy against which they might seek to revenge 
themselves upon the State. Although the State's standpoint is, of course, that every kind 
of illegal act is in need of punishment, whereas the dissidents will likely look upon such a 
policy as a fairly transparent form of social control. 
Finally, before launching any policy, the Thai Government should be concerned 
that there is an underlying sense of distrust in the Government. Most perceive the State to. 
break its promises, incompetent and the antagonistic towards those whom they are 
supposed to serve. Citizens are likely to trust the Government only to the extent they 
believe that it will act in their interests, that its procedures are fair, and that their trust of 
the state and of others is reciprocated.47\ As I mentioned in the above chapter, Southern 
Thailand has continuing problems, namely; crime, grim poverty levels and ethnic 
conflict. To resolve these problems, the Thai go'vernment must develop a policy that 
devotes funds to this area, funds equivalent in size to those devoted to the other 
provinces. Moreover, funds must be accompanied by a way for the State to check if these 
funds are being utilized effectively and ways to monitor how the State might best use this 
money in the future interests of the region. 
471 M . 
argaret Levi, A State of Trust, Trust and Government 8, New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
206 
G. Remedial Measures 
As the Government attempts to go forward with changing this popular belief, 
another help would be to give assistance to the victims who have suffered as well as 
expedite and review pending issues and petitions in accordance to the due process and the 
law to the remedial measures given to families affected by incidents. This has already 
started to take place. For instance, the Prime Minister's Order No. 9/2548, dated 6 
January B.E. 2548 (2005), allowed a Remedial Commission for persons who have 
suffered from the Tak Bai incident to be provided with necessary assistance and 
compensation for the families of the deceased. The injured, as well as missing persons, 
are covered by damages and losses. Regardless of the investigation's result, remedies 
have been made in various forms such as financial assistance of up to 300,000 baht per 
person, free education as well as social assistance to enable the affected families to 
continue their daily lives and lifestyles.472 However, remedy measures are not the only 
form of payment, and the Thai Government should express a public apology to the family 
of the innocent victims. 
V -2 Security Measures 
In an attempt to stop the violence, there have been security measures that the Thai 
Government has instituted. However, daily killing goes on and an analysis of both 
preventive measures and where security has failed in the past will help try to solve some 
~--------------------
The Thai National Reconciliation Commission (NRC). 
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of the security problems that have plagued Thailand despite the Government's best 
efforts to secure land, air and sea for this area. 
A. Border Security 
Protecting cross-border security and enhancing business mobility are two key 
elements in these efforts. But more is needed. All security and law enforcement agencies 
must be improved upon to detect, monitor and be alert to any movement of persons or a 
group of persons who are believed to be associated with terrorist organizations. The goal 
is to deter any terrorist group from using Thailand as a base.473 
The Ministry of Interior formulated policies for cross-border security and 
equipped rural provinces with ways to prevent, arrest, and suppress terrorists from using 
Thailand as a safe haven. As a result, the Thai authorities responsible for protecting 
national security have created a "watch list" database of suspicious terrorist groupS.474 
However, there is again great room for improvement. There needs to be a far 
greater assurance that the highest possible integrity of all government officials who are 
involved in border operations have a more well-coordinated exchange of knowledge, 
know-how and experience. Immigration officers need to have seminars, conferences or 
workshops for managing 'groups of individuals from the ultra-wealthy to the very poor.475 
In terms of preventing passport counterfeit, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
other relevant authorities are doing their utmost to ensure that the procedure of issuing 
473 Progress Report on Thailand's Implementation of Counter - Terrorism Activities, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Kingdom of Thailand, available at http://www.mfa.go.th/internetldocumentrr errorism%20Report.doc 
(last visited Aug. 1,2006). 
474 Ibid. 
475 Counter Terrorism Action Plan: Counter Terrorism Task Force Meeting Phuket, Thailand, Aug. 20, 2003 
2003/S0MIII/CTTF/028 Agenda Item: 6, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. 
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visas for entry and exit continues to meet international standards.476 But to· ensure more 
safety and security for tourists, a standardized strategic safety and security master plan 
needs to be developed-~:me that is based upon a crisis management model and the 
promotion of and development of simple-to-use security measures for potential threats to 
h .. d 4TI t e tounst III ustry. 
B. Maritime Security 
Ninety-five percent of Thai imports and exports are transported exclusively by 
sea. With the Andaman Sea in the West and the Gulf of Thailand in the East, Thailand 
has one thousand and five hundred nautical miles arourid its border and a water area of 
about three hundred and eighty thousands square kilometers. Thailand is also surrounded 
by the water areas of many neighboring countries, namely, Cambodia, Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Myanmar, Bangladesh and India. Therefore, 
coping with maritime terrorism is quite a challenge to Thailand, as the area of 
responsibility is huge, compounded by concerns about criminal activity (piracy and drug 
trafficking) as well as threats to Thailand from unprotected connecting waters.478 
Although Thailand also continues to promote strengthening domestic policies and 
broadening intematiooalcooperation to suppress piracy and armed robbery, Thailand 
needs to enhance its maritime defense and disaster relief capabilities in order to improve 
476 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Thailand. 
477 See Counter Terrorism Action Plan cited in note 475 supra. 
478 Suriya Pornsuriya, Maritime Terrorism: Thailand's Perspective 1, Royal Thai Navy_ 
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the navy's mobility capability and enhance its ability to work with other allies or 
coalition partners during contingencies. 
Besides the Royal Thai Navy, the Marine Police, the Marine Department, the 
Customs Department and the Fisheries Department are also major players in maritime 
counter-terrorist capacities in Thailand.479 The joint training on the international level 
units are very important but such ventures need to be more routine so that there is an 
ongoing commitment between Thailand and countries such as the USA, Australia, 
Canada, and India to develop the skills and required discipline for the Thai armed forces. 
Moreover, the support and financial assistance to . help build a greater capacity of 
Government agencies for maritime security is necessary.480 
479 lb' Id. at p 3. 
480 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Thailand. 
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c. Aviation Security 
Although the National Security Program of Thailand has made progress revising 
its security program, measures, and procedures to provide tighter civil aviation security 
systems in airports and the screening of passengers' luggage are as important as maritime 
security. Training for emergency responses during aircraft hijacking situations among 
national authorities481 has improved and the introduction of highly effective baggage 
screening procedures has tightened security in the airports. So although accelerating 
implementation of standards for reinforced flight deck doors for passenger aircraft and 
supporting International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) mandatory aviation security 
audits has helped,482Thailand still needs additional training and technical assistance in 
completing the ICAO mandatory aviation security audits to develop into a center to train 
other countries or organizations. It would be in Thailand's best interest to set up 
simulation-type activities for crisis management during emergency situations.483 
Although Thailand has joined Conventions to prevent the use of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction through biological and chemical forms, there is an ongoing need to 
exchange up-to-date information among all relevant agencies and countries. For example, 
the Office of the National Security Council of Thailand with the US embassy arranged 
the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) First Responder Training Program in June 
2001 and also jointly held the Postal Chemical/Biological Incident Management Training 
Program for relevant governmental agencies during April 2002.484 This is a good 
481 Ibid. 
482 See Counter Terrorism Action Plan cited in note 475 supra. 
483 Ibid. 
484 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Thailand. 
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example of cooperation between the US and Thailand although there is an ongoing need 
for more cooperation between Thailand and other countries as well. Thailand also needs 
to develop a strong policy toward countries that have such weapons and must develop 
concrete plans as to what to do in response to a country potentially deploying these 
weapons. 
D. Intelligence Measures 
So long as the violence in Southem Thailand continues to increase, it could be 
implied that these intelligence measures are inadequate and need more development and 
improvement. The Thai Government has increased her existing close cooperation with 
their allies. For example, the sharing of information and intelligence on terrorist 
activities and movements has dramatically increased in the last five years. A list of 
persons who have any connection with terrorist groups has been shared among a wide 
array of agencies so that they can cooperate in an attempt to prevent suspects from 
entering the country by checking criminal records, interrogating suspects and monitoring 
h . 485 d 1 1 t elr movement. However, such problems can't be solve by one agency a one; t 1ey 




E. Cyber Crime 
To anticipate and prevent violence of all types, the Thai Government has become 
cognizant of a new form of violent threat. The FBI predicts that terrorist groups will 
either develop or hire hackers specifically for the purpose of coordinatif!.g large-scale 
attacks with cyber attacks.486 A cyber attack could be used to destroy not only the 
electronic, but also the physical infra structure that holds a nation ~ogether since 
important elements of a nation's infrastructures (defense systems, chemical and 
hazardous materials, water supply systems, transportation, energy, finance systems, and 
emergency services) are electronically controlled by centralized computer networks. For 
instance, in 2002, a hacker was arrested in Australia for breaking into the Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition (SCDA) of an Australian sewage and water treatment plant 
for directing the pumping of one million liters of sewage into the environment. This is 
the first reported instance of a hacker successfully breaking into a critical infrastructure 
and causing massive damage. I believe it is a harbinger of things to come. 
With nearly two hundred countries connected to the Internet, cyber crime has 
become a global issue that requires the full participation and cooperation of the public 
and private sectors in all countries, including each one of the one hundred and eighty 
developing countries around the globe. A major component of information and 
infrastructure security is a nation's ability to deter, detect, investigate, and prosecute 
cyber criminal activities. Industrialized nations and multinational organizations have 
taken significant steps toward combating cyber crime. The central problems in 
combating cyber crime to date are (1), inadequate international coordination anEl (2), 
486 Terrorism Law 286, Jeffrey F. Lawyers & Judges Co, 2004. 
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woefully deficient legal frameworks and organizational capacity In developing 
countries.487 Not only should the provision of laws relating to such crimes be updated by 
the Thai Government but there should be institutional agencies devoted to directly 
assessing the level of threat and vulnerability such as Computer Emergency Response 
Teams.488 
F. Rules of Engagement489 
Not only preventative measures need to be evaluated but it is also necessary to 
consider the failure of security forces in the past in order to better evaluate what needs to 
be changed for greater succ~ss. One of the lessons that the tragic events in Krue Se and 
Tak Bai taught the thai Government is that although the training and equipment for the 
Security Forces were adequate to handle crowd control situations, the decision about 
what type of force to use, when to use it, under what circumstances should it be used and 
what are the repercussions of that act were all not well thought out. In the case of killing 
of the two marines and luling Case, for instance, Thai Security Forces failed to use force 
out of fear that such action would escalate the violence and enflame public opinion. 
However, were they to have followed the concepts of the Rules of Engagement, which 
permit force in cases of national security, many lives would most likely have been saved. 
According to international standards and practice, military use of force is allowed in 
487 Jody R. Westby, International Guide to combating Cyber crime XXI, American bar Association Privacy& 
Computer Crime Committee Section of Science & Technology Law (Chicago, Illinois). 
488 See Counter Terrorism Action Plan cited in note 475 supra. 
489 Rules of Engagement (ROE) are the primary too used to regulate the use of force, and thereby serve as 
one of the comerstones of the Operational Law discipline. The legal factors which serve as a foundation for 
ROE, that is, customary and conventional law principles regarding the right of self defense and the laws of 
war, are varied and complex. They do not, however, stand-alone: non - legal issues, such as political 
objectives and military mission limitations, also play an essential role in the construction and application of 
ROE. (see Operational Law Handbook cited in note 329 supra at p.67). 
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cases of self-defense and under circumstances of necessity. The rules of engagement are, 
in other words, not merely measures necessary for crowd control but also for preventing 
too long a delay in responding to a terrorist act.490 The rules allow for action as much as 
they attempt to deter an irresponsible use of force. 
Since 1981, Thailand and the United States have coordinated annual bilateral 
military exercises.49 ! This mission (COBRA GOLD) was originally created to improve 
Thailand's military readiness and knowled~e of how to fight terrorism by providing an 
opportunity for the two militaries to work together. However, this training is not just a 
political bond between Thailand and the United States but rather a sign of the United 
State's investment with helping prevent terrorism throughout Southeast Asia.492 Thailand 
is one of five countries in the Pacific region in which the U.S. has devoted time~ money 
490 1) Every military officer stationed in the three southern provinces of Thailand must receive training on 
effective crowd-control handling and negotiations in accordance with the standards used during UN 
peacekeeping operations in East Timor; 
2) A special "Riot Control Company" was set up to handle crowd control - using only shields and batons for 
protection and no firearms permitted. There are two units thus far - one stationed in the south and other - its 
reinforcement unit, is located in Bangkok; 
3) The UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials was also 
translated and disseminated as a training manual to all relevant agencies; 
4) The Southern Border Provinces Peace building Command also conducts an evaluation of its personnel's 
overall performance periodically (3 to 6 months) to ensure efficiency in resolving the situation in the south in 
a peaceful manner; 
5) A number of cultural awareness trainings and language course have been organized for security 
personnel working in the southern provinces of Thailand to enhance understanding among the local 
community; 
6) The Ministry of Defense and its Supreme Command Headquarters have periodically organized human 
rights seminars, in conjunction with international military offices. (e.g., May 2005, a seminar on human rights 
and laws governing conflicts of firearms); 
7) The Royal Thai Police also gives high priority on the prevention of human rights violations by police 
officers. It issued a human rights handbook and organized education and training programs for police 
officers on human rights issues. (e.g., Training for police officers in the south by the Foundation for Human 
Rights and Development in Yala). 
491 Four years after independence, unrest again threatens EastTimor, T~ JAKARTA POST, May.17, 2006 
p. 12, available athttp://www.etan.org/et2006/may/13/17military.htm(lastvisited Nov.1, 2006). 
492 Abigail B. LaBin, USMC, 1 ih Annual Cobra Gold In Thailand, available at 
http://www.pacom.millforumlWinter_98/cobraJhtml (last visited Nov.1, 2006). 
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and energy to help fighting terrorism (along with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, 
and the Republic of the Philippines).493 
Although the military training (COBRA GOLD) was commonly perceived to be a 
sign of tacit support for US foreign policy, the Thai Government promotes such military 
training because the Military Joint Task Force is a way for Thai Security Forces to 
develop military skill and tactics. The Thai Government should not support the Military 
Joint Task Force, however, if it is an endorsement of any particular US political policy 
but only so long as it is merely an acknowledgement of the ongoing commitment both 
countries have toward combating terrorist activity. 
v -3 Modifying the Communist's strategies 
As a result of Vietnam War (a conflict that provided numerous lessons regarding 
counterinsurgency), Thailand faced to a bid for power from the Communist of Thailand 
(the CPT). The strategy of the Communist Party is to combat the state's greater mili-
tary power by mobilizing the people through the appeal to a counter-state. Direct 
mobilization of a popular base and indirect mobilization through front organizations were 
to be the party's main lines of operation. Further, the Communist Party used local 
guerrilla units (main forces were never formed) to challenge government control of 
certain areas tactically. The link operationally between the party and the guerrillas was a 
clandestine infrastructure, the counter State, a local area in which the Communist of 
Thailand control was deeply rooted and that functioned as a base for further expansion. 
To establish authority in such areas, the Communist party employed terror. Recalcitrant 
493 Military Cobra Gold, Global Security Organization, available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/cobra-gold.hbn (last visited Nov.1, 2006). 
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villagers, or those whose community standing made them symbols of government 
authority (e.g., village headmen and schoolteachers), were selectively targeted.494 The 
Communist Party of Thailand continues to use the same strategies for committing acts of 
violence as they have for the last twenty years. They have recruited new members of 
political dissent. For instance, the hill tribe people, who have been typically treated as 
second-class citizens, by the average Thai soldier, are frequently involved in hostile acts 
against members of the population. The Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) has taken 
advantage of the hostility generated and stoked the fire created by the government's 
discriminatory racial attitudes. 495 
However, the new face of the dissident was dissimilar from the communists of 
the 1970s and 1980s, as the communist - separatist struggle in southern Thailand was 
rapidly transforming into a politico-religious conflict. Dissident ideologues were 
becoming increasingly skilled at politicizing and mobilizing the targyt audience, using 
~. ~ 
religion rather than nationalism as the selling point. The character of campaign was 
changing from guerrilla warfare to urban terrorism as communists engaged in ambushes 
and raid in populous areas. The dissidents mostly conducted assassinations and 
bombings. Whereas the communists of the past operated mostly in the jungles and 
mountains, the new wave of dissidence began to operate in the villages, towns and 
cites.496 The complexion of the problematic in southern Thailand is changing rapidly an 
although much as changed from end of the cold war, the main strategies of these 
494 See T.A.Mark , cited in note 88 supra 
495 Ibid. at p. 39 
496 Rohan Gunaratna, & Arabinda Acharya , & Sabrina Chua, Conflict and Terrorism in Southe~ Thailand 
110, Marshall Cavendish Academic 2005. 
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dissenting factions have remained the same. These groups continue to bid for power, 
despite the changes in the world politics. 
Today, the members of dissidents are the Ponok's teachers and religious leaders. 
There is no arguable that the dissident movement in Southern Thailand has used pondok 
as recruitment centers. The main strategies and approach of the communist party are not 
different and have inspired the current group of dissidents in southern Thailand. 
As General Saiyud Kerdpol stated: 
An imperfect system itself "threw up" the manpower that became the 
Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). The people's war strategy, 
combined with· a plenitude of manpower produced by government 
abuses, allowed the Communist Party of Thailand to grow. -197 
To establish political control over the fonnerly contested areas and to meet future 
challenges, the old strategies that the Thai Government have relied on should not be 
forgotten and should be revised in the following ways: 
* Psychological operations, persuasion, and using the 
cooperation of civilians. 
* Development-for-security, with development understood to 
be a socio-economic-political process. 
* Civic-action programs instituted and local forces formed. 
497 See T.A.Marl< , cited in note 88 supra 
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* The democratic process to be brought in accord with 
traditional demands by the populace for a just order, thereby 
legitimizing the government. 
* The army's task to foster just such development as a counter. 
* All regular army and security force units in operational areas 
were likewise placed under the CP M task forces, where they 
work intimately with civil authority. 
* Offer amnesty with minimal security precautions, so as to 
• A b'l' . II' ./98 entIce uemo I lZe Insurgents to resume norma lVes. 
That is, the Thai Government should consider developing new capabilities adapted 
from what can be learned from the past in order to meet future challenges. Even these are 
old strategies but not completely antiquated; the government can adjust these strategies to 
the current situations and apply them. In addition, one of the most important issues is that 
the Government must realize is that as the heavy-hand tactics grew, so did the number of 
dissidents. 
v -4 International Cooperation 
Any policy on terrorism cannot succeed alone. Any plan for peace between 
nations needs mutual assistance and international cooperation. In 1992, Thailand 
developed the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act that forms a broad basis for 
cooperation with other countries in criminal matters, e.g., taking testimony and 





l ! forfeiture of properties. The rest of the law is based on principles of double criminality 
i 
1 
1 and reciprocity that allow Thailand to extend assistance in criminal matters to virtually 
1 
I every country. The law is supplemented by the Treaties of Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters that Thailand has with five countries (United States, Canada, United 
Kingdom, France and Norway). The Royal Thai Government set up the Committee of 
Counter-International Terrorism (COCIT), which is responsible for the coordination 
between policies and operational units. This measure was ProP9sed by the National 
Security Council and endorsed by the Thai Cabinet in 1983, when the National 
Reconciliation Commission (NRC) was established in order to address the violence 
afflicting southern Thailand and bring about a peaceful resolution by balancing security 
with respect for .the rule of law and human rights. That is a good policy but not adequate. 
Thailand has to do more to cooperate with international human rights organizations that 
have as their goal protecting against civilians from violence. 
One such instance of an effort to solve problems in the south is the cooperation 
between the Thai Government and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). 
The Thai Government reaffirmed that the Government is willing to work with the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference and with southern local communities to solve 
problems by peaceful means. The Thai Government also avowed to keep an open mind, 
welcoming the occasion to exchange opinions with the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference to promote the constructive role of the peace-loving moderate Muslims 
(which constitute the majority of the world's Muslims). In exchange, the Organization of 
the Islamic Conference will try to help the communities in the southern Thailand. The 
relationship between the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Thai 
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Government is, nonetheless, a tenuous one and both sides must pay constant attention to 
how the media reports on this ongoing dynamic. Public opinion is easily swayed by such 
reports and media bias can often distort and exaggerate politically volatile situations. 
An admirable instance of cooperation between both sides was Thailand facilitated 
and arranged a visit by the Ole delegates to visit to Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. This 
visit enabled the delegation to have a better understanding of the actual situation in the 
southern part of Thailand. In the future, there should be a permanent office in the area 
devoted to human rights and coordinating the joint efforts of the Thai Government with 
the Muslim factions. 
V ....:.. 5 Conclusion 
The short-term goal is to stop the dai'ly killing; the long-term goal is to stem the 
ongoing violence. The success of such security measures depends largely upon funding, 
military training, developing tactics and techniques through the cooperation on both a 
domestic and international levels. Most importantly, there will be no success if the 
problems in southeastern Thailand are seen as what could be solved over a short period or 
without the cooperation from the diverse groups of people in this area and the Thai 
Government. 
In 2005, a hundred million hand-made paper origami birds were dropped over the 
troubled Southeast region of Thailand with peace messages on the paper. The spectacle 
showed, if anything, the great dedication of many Thai citizens (the creators of the birds 
were primarily non-Muslims) to the cause of resolving the conflict but little practical help 
in addressing the deep-seated problems of this conflicted region. 
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Regardless of how the form or characteristic of the violence changes over time, 
the solutions and recommendations that I suggest can be used in many different 
circumstances. These ideas I believe apply not to resolving problems during the times of 
violence but also to easing tension during peacetime. 
By addressing the roots of the problem and the attempts to settle these disputes 
through dialogue and acknowledging the legitimate aspirations of the Muslim people in 
the south, there can be a deeper sense of connection between these people. There has 
been little done by the Thai Government to encourage the people of this area to maintain 
a proud expression of their cultural identity. This freedom of cultural expression should 
be guaranteed by the Thai constitution within the framework of respect for the territorial 
integrity of Thailand. The fairness of the Thai policies, the transparency of the justice 
system, the effectiveness of security measures, the International cooperation and most 
importantly, the concept of universal human rights -- all of these are what will make 
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